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INTRODUCTION

This study originated
puzzlement

and wonder

about what appeared

views as to the nature
different

of philosophical

parts of the writings

Commentary

on the Ethics

speculative

science,

of Aristotle

by its certitude.2

reasoning

from effects

and opposes

to proceed

lIn I'Eth., Lect.

35: !lIn scientlaspecu1ativa~

In his

that

"in

in a reso--

is made,

knowledge

our knowis char-

On the other hand, he caJ.ls

to their causes

it to reasoning

found in

he insists

and scientific

acterized

to be conflicting

method

su'ch a resolution

uncertain,

initial

of Thomas Aquinas.

it is necessary

luti ve manner; ,,1unless
ledge remains

in the author's

a resolutive

from causes

to effects,

process,
which

he

3 (Taurini: Marietti,
necesse

1949) n.
est ut procedatur

modo resolutorio."
2De Ver. XII, 1, resp. (Quaestione~ Disputatae,
Editl0 V, Taurini: Mariettl, l.927, Vol...III): "Oportet quod
de eis flxam cognitionem habeat: quod esse non potest, nisi
ea inspiclat in principio in quo possunt cognosci: quamdlu
enim non fit resolutio cognitorum in sua principia, cognitl0
non firmatur in uno, sed apprebendit ea quae cognoscit secundum probabilltatem ... non posset enim ex quibusdam in
alia pervenire firmitur, non facta resolutione in prlma
principla." Ibid., XI, 1, ad 17: l;Certitudinem scientiae, ...
habet a1lqulS:-:-:per quod [lumen rationis] prlncipia cognoscimus, ex qU.ibus ori tur scientiae certi tudo, ... I!

1

2

terms a compositive
from effects

process.

however,

can a method

proceed

is certain

of reasoning

cause be the necessary
tainty

is based

ses to answer,

knowledge

one in science

on its being

therefore,

mean by resolution?"

with other

with which he is directly

through

whereas

from effect

through

How

to
cer-

causes '?"

question

this dissertation

is this:

"Exactly

propo-

what does 'l'homas

never wrote a treatise

directly,

issues,

prop-

causes.3

if the latter's

"knowledge

Since Thomas

with this question

in connection

.which proceed

from cause to effect; 2

which proceeds

The fundamental

dealing

Demonstrations

to cause are quia demonstrations,

ter quid demonstrations
science,

1

but discusses

to clarify

concerned,

it only

the question

no single treatise

or

IS. T. I-II, 14, 5, resp. (Dttawa: Institut Albert
Ie Grande, 1941++): "Quod quidem si, sicut est prius in cognitione, ita etiam sit prius in esse, non est processus resolutorius, sed magis compositivus; procedere enim a causis
in effectus, est processus compositivus, nam causae sunt
simpliciores effectibus.
Si autem quod est prius in cognitione, sit posterius in esse, est processus resolutorius;"
2~.
I, 2, 2, resp.: "Duplex est demonstratio.
Una quae est per causam, et dicitur propter quid et haec est
per prioria simpliciter.
Alia est per effectum et dicitur
demonstratio quia, et haec est per ea quae sunt priora quoad
nos; cum enim effectus aliquis nobis est manifestior quam
sua causa, per effectum procedimus ad cognitionem causae."
3In I Post. Anal., (Opera Omnia iussi Leonis edita, Vol. I,Roma:Jlr82)
Lect. IV, n.s:lTScire
aliquid est
perfecte cognoscere ipsium, hoc autem est perfecte apprehendere veritatem ipsius: ...Oportet igitur scientem, si est
perfecte cognoscens, quod cognoscat causam rei scitae ...
Quia vero scientia est etiam certa cognitio rei; quod autem
contingit aliter se habere, non potest aliquis per certitudinem cognoBcere; ideo ulterius oportet quod id quod scitur
non posBit aliter se habere."

3

text could be taken as the central
be seen as explaining
treatise

one, which 'others might

or developing

that comes closest

in greater

to being a discourse

ology is not in the form of original
tion, but rather
logical

Thus the initial
weight

of a theological

reflections

of Boethius

question

to give to Thomas'
In his original

commentary

concerning

writings

whereas

factor

represent,

instead,

the real thought

a commentary

upon,

of the author

may be academic,

but where the com-

it is pressing--

he never wrote
Albert

of Christian

a pagan,

of which he was in fundamental

Christian.

It would appear,

therefore,

taries must either fail to present
questions,
senting

Platonists

was Aristotelian,

and Aristotle,
agree-

and his faith was
that the commen-

his own view on some

or, if they do, only at the expense

the view expressed

the

in agreement,

but only on the works

for his method

of the

are in fundamental

Great, with whose views he was fundamentally

ment,

of

or do they

on any of the works of his teacher,

with neither

fac-

in the commentaries

Where text and commentator

is Thomas Aquinas

was how much

the real thought

of the work being commented

mentator

the Trinity.

of the text being ana-

the author

the question

on the theo-

the sole regulative

Do the comnlentaries represent

agreement,

reflec-

commentaries.

there is the added regulative

commentary?

The

on method-

philosophical

this inquiry raised

tor is the truth of the matter,

lyzed.

detail.

of misrepre-

in the work being expounded.

In

4

•

the first case, these expositions
as sources

of his own thought;

relatively

worthless
Thomas

himself

Thomas

would

and which,

agree,

has made a positive

Thomas

frequently

sense.
statement

the text under discussion
Accordingly,

mentaries

with which

uses such phrases

to any authority
positively

of Thomas'

those who feel that the commentaries
viewpoint

fore be used without
standing

Modern

his thought;

as, "he

as well as

a position

excludes,l

there are those who reject

as non-representative

the personal

one

the error in the view he rejects.

But he does not ever attribute
which

and acciWhere

was led to hold this view because ... ," explaining
the truth of the matter,

if ap-

on Aristotle,

substance

dent are used only in their Aristotelian

he cannot

as

would mis-

In the commentaries

gives them these meanings;

of his authorities

substance

as said of ~ss~, have meanings

terms indiscriminately,

his teaching.

never

was well aware of the second dan-

not have ~ecognized

to the latter's

represent

they would be

to avoid it; for example,

said of God and accident

plied

in the second,

as i1expositions."

ger, and most careful

which Aristotle

would be of little value

of Thomas,

further

COill-

own thought;

display,

in 2.ddition,

and that they may there-

ado as sources

and finally,

the

for under~

those who hold a middle

IJ, Owens, "The Cone Ius ]_on of the Prima Via,"
Sehoolman 30 (1952-53) p. 212.

5
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l

position.

The last is the one that seems the most prudent

for our purposes

here.

It is important

to recognize,

that none of the commentaries

are the purely

exegeses,

with strict attention

doctrinal

exposition,

medieval

approach

philosophers

in the first place,
objective

to historical

that would be written

was quite different.

were less concerned

accuracy

today.

The

The medieval

with what the philosophers

held than with how much of the truth could be found,
or implicit,

in their wr'itings. 2

and sought to penetrate
to achieve
of thought,

The commentator

the meaning

an historical

in

explicit

considered.

of the text, not in order

reconstruction

of an earlier

but in order to find therein

a witness,

system

more

or

...,

less partial,

of the truth.~

Sometimes
literal meaning

Thomas

is satisfied

with explaining

of a text; at others he goes beyond

search of the intention
sion of the author's

of the author,4

premises,

----------------------

whether

the logical

the

this in
conclu-

or not he himself

---------------

ITurner, Walter H., "St. 'I'hornas'
Exposition of
Aristotle: A Rejoiner," in New Scholasticism 35, 2 (1961),
pp. 210-24.
---

medievale

Thomas

2Gilson, Etienne, L'~sprit de la philosophie'
(Paris: J. Vrin, 1932), ch'-2,p.
225.

3Chenu, M-D., Introduction & l'etude de Sainte
D'Aquin, (Paris: J. Vrin, 1950T, p. 177.

4 Chenu, p. 177.

•

ever drew it.l

Someti~es

new note, a philosophical
question

was totally

his premises,
Thomas

conclusion

doctrine

ignorant

of which

the author

with them.2

in
from

For example,

found in Aristotle, 3 Boethius, 4 or

of premises

though

it is possible

the words of all three to this doctrine.
Thomas makes

to accomodate

Nor is the dis-

in the Summa Theologiae,

I, 5, 5, be-.

tween ratio entis and the ratio boni one which Augustine,
the one hand, and the author

of the,Book

other,

in the texts Thomas

ever intended

to make

This last is the technique
interpretation:
is perceived

in the document

under

of Wisdom,

of benign

and poorly

quotes.6

or reverent

consideration,

expressed

"there

intuition,

IDoig~ J., "Aquinas on Metaphysical Method, II in
Philosophical Studies (Maynooth) v. 13 (1964), p. 21; and
Chenu, p. 177.2Doig, p. 21.
3Ibid.
4A. Maurer, On Being and Essence by St. Thomas
Aquinas, trans. and intro-. by '-Maurer(Toronto:
Pontifical
Institute of Medieval Studies, 1949)~ p. 48, n. 20.
5Ibid.,

on

on the

a sign ... which allows us to reach for some-

thing else: the underJying

Thomas"

a

of partj_cipated Esse is not the logical

the Liber de causis,5

tinction

injecting

and which does not follow

though reconcilable

doctrine

I

he goes even further,

p. 44, n. 6.

6M-D Phi11ipe, lfReverentissime exponens
The Th0n:!ist(Jan. 1968) 32, p. 87.

Frater

7
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the direction
the author's
pursuing

of the research
attempt

to completion

regards

his authorities;

which undoubtedly

but in the commentary

Surely,
objective,

in other works.,,4

as legitimate

as long as such teaching

do express

Therefore,
sources

when he does not differ

on the

basically

we shall regard
of Thomas'

by that which

we shall assume

with an authority

the

own teaching

that

he agrees with

in its context,

an authority

is either what the latter intended

and that what he attributes

or should have intended--

lphillipe,

the view Thomas

2Ibid., pp. 90-91.
3In I de Cae10 Lect.
4rrurner, p. 213.

22 (Leonine, Vol.

to

or would

p. 94.

n. 8.

his

views which Thomas

the position

have intended

pe

represents

"although

is not contradicted

in one of his other works;

what

itself.3

we can say then that

the commentaries

commentaries

is not for the pur-

is," in the commentary

Oaelo; not in the Proemium
own position,

he himself

what men have taught but for knowing

the truth of the matter

appears

we treat him as a friend,

that "the study of philosophy

pose of knowing

holds

In bringing

the truth with us with fervor and self-detachment.2

It is thus that Thomas
observes

of the author."l

III),

had

8

corne to hold as the most adequate
we find a disparity
would,
which

of course,
is a direct

of views

prefer

and fruitful

in different

that expressed

exposition

of Thomas'

the disparity

be between

commentaries,

we shall take the probable

sition

one.

1

treatises

Should

we

in the treatise
own thought;

two such treatises,

should

or between

two

date of the compo-

of each into account.2
In regard

of Boethius
certainly

to Thomas'

in particular,

composed

before

is not the literal meaning
important
,treatise

factor:

1260.3

However,

discussion

in this work it

and division

scientific

methods

in philosophy

develops

questions:

of sciences

of Boethius!

of questions

and precision

[Thomas]

some truly fundamental

the nature

works,

of the text that is the all-

"With a fulness

any of his other writings
cussions

this is one of his earliest

it is much less an exposition

than a scholarly

arise out of it.

cornmentary on the De Trinitate

which

unknown

in

in these disthe problem

of

and of the proper

and theology.

With regard

IDoig, p. 20; Melvin Glutz, "The Formal
Metaphysics,"
in The 'I'homistXIX (1956) p. 62.

Subject

of

2The chronology we are using is that given by A.
Walz in St. Thomas Aquinas: A Bibliographical
Study trans.
Bullough (Westminster,
Md.: Ne\vman-Press, 1951

r:--

3M-D Chenu, La Theologie comme science au XIlle
siecle. (Paris: Le Saulchoir, 1943, 2nd ed .fI-:--T-.
-Eschmann,
"A Catalogue of St. Thomas's Works" in rrne Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquina~, Etienne Gilson -Oijew York:
Random House, 1956), pp. 405-6.

9
to these problems
principal

the Expos.

text."l

Nevertheless,

work, we cannot restrict
have to consider
position;

the possibility

during

it, or at least developed

the next twelve

context

of a discussion

clarify

some aspect

that controls
methodology,

to thirteen
concerning

on a different
~

of the latter.~

is left to the reader.

inasmuch

as we de not yet have either

ments

to permit

to interpret
without

consistency

such a synthesis;

each treatment

hesitation

lEschmann~
200-D

the

in order to

of the analysis

of

the scattered

critical
index.3

one,

editions

of

1'here is,

in the various

treat-

so long as we are careful

in its own context,

call our synthesis

test is how well St. Thomas

methodology

It is a formidable

or a comprehensive

sufficient

How-

It is the issue at hand

comments

nonetheless,

topic,

and the task of synthesizing

works

years.

for its own sake bu~ within

both the depth and breath

all of Thomas'

we

that it was not his final

modified

not primarily

is St. Thomas'

to it too narrowly:

ever, each of his other statements
is undertaken

Tri~.

since it is such an early

ourselves

that he perhaps

it further

pe

Sup~r

follows

Thomistic.

this method

we can
The final
in his own

p. 406.

Phillipe,

p. 85.

3This last will soon be available as the exhaustive and accurate Index Thomisticus, prepared by computer
under the direction or-Rev. RobeI'to Busa~ S. J., is
presently being finally collated in Venice with publication due to begin shortly.

10
philosophizing.
it would

If he does seem to proceed

appear

interpretation
centrality

to substantiate
of his doctrine

he insists

in this manner,

not only the accuracy
of resolution,

but also the

it has, at least in his own philosophy.

If this is indeed the case, such a study would
essential

for a proper
The method

heavily

hunches
this,

until,

of investigation

has been to rely most

texts themselves,

hopefully,

seem to be

of that philosophy.

ordering

them by trial and error according

secondary

inquiry

understanding

on the Thomistic

reordering

some clarity

and

to various

has emerged.

In

sources were of little help at first:

continued,

of our

some that had seemed promising

as

turned

out

to be false leads, and others which had seemed tangential
were found to be most

fruitful.

indebtedness

to both wherever

Furthermore,

some insights

to the manner
in the absence

in which

I have acknowledged

I was conscious

carne through

my

of it.

a negative

reaction

a given text was used or explained;

of a critical

and comprehensive

index,

research

done by others has been of great assistance

locating

at least the majority

of the relevant

when my use of those texts differed

profoundly

texts,

the
in
even

from theirs.

I

RESOLUTION:

ITS MEANING

What is first revealed
that resolution

has a variety

AND SYNONYMS

by a survey

of meanings

that some of them have no reference
cal method.
collection

It is used,
of physical

dissolutions,

changes

and in most

This sense of resolution
release

of bodily

for Thomas,

whatever

for example,
which

of the texts

fluids,3

to designate
are, broadly

liquifaction,2

the destruction

and

to philosophia whole
speaking,

cases, of.a disintegrative
includes:

is

sort.l

the

of anything

by

lIn V Meta., XXI, #1087 (Taurini: Marietti, Editio
III, 1925): -"Tertia modo diei tur fieri ex aliquo, sicut
simplex 'ex composito ex materia et forma. I Et hoc est in
via resolutionis,
sicut dicimus quod partes fiunt ex toto ...
Ratio autem hujus est, quia forma est finis in generatione.
Perfectum enim dicitur quod habet finem, ...Unde patet, quod
perfectum est quod habet formam.
Quando igitur ex toto perfecto fit resolutio partium, est motus quasi a forma ad
materiam; sicut e converso, quando partes componentur, est
motus a materia in formam.
Et ideo haec propositio ex quae
principium designat, utrobique comp~tit: et in via compositionis, quia determinat principium materiale; et in via
resolutionis, quia significat principium formale.1I
2Su~a
Contra Gentiles (Taurini: Marietti, 1938)
IV, 61, .1: "Corporalis vita materiali alimento indiget~ ...
ad naturam corporis sustentandam, ne propter resolutiones
continuas dissolvantur et eius virtus depereat; .. ," Ibid.,
81, #12: "Sic etiam est in corpore humano; ... materiapartiurn et resolvitur per actionem caloris naturalis et de novo
adgeneratur per alimentum." In II Sent., d.S, q.l, a.4, q.2,
sed contra (Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1929-1947): "Completur
generatio per virtutem formativam quae est in semine ex
corpore vivo resolutio."
3Thus he speaks of resolutio seminis: Cf. In II
Sent., d.18, q.2, a.3, sol.; ST f, 119, 2 resp.; 11-11,152,1,
resp. ad LI; 154, 3, ad2,
5, resp.; III, 31, 5,
ad 3; 32, 4, resp.; 35, 3, ad 3; and of resolutio 1acrymarum: In IV Sent., d.15, expositio textus #743; d.50, q.2,
----,--,-3-Q
..
-'-='-IT
#'?
(rl
. tt' \
a ..:>, SO-L
;
....:uoa:!:..,
,/ .L,::>,r::
J..~
\ varle
l).
11
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heat or fire;l

the decomposition

ter2 and the distillation
the putrifaction
of a physical

of corporeal

by which

or disappearance

matter

in wa-

such water

is purified;3

of bodies;4

the reduction

whole to its physical

parts or elements;5

and

lIn II Sent., d.6, q.l, a.3, ad 3: "Ex reflexione
radiarum solismultiplicatur
splendor et calor in aere qui
est juxta terram: unde vapores resoluti ex aqua et terra
elevantur;" ST I-II, 102, 3, ad 8: "Et ideo totum comburebatur, ut sicut totum anima, resolutum in vaporem, sursum
ascendeba t;" III, 59, 5, resp ..
: "Tandem inc inera tum omnio
resolvitur." Cf. also In IV Sent., d.43, q.l, a.4, ad 2.
2S. T. III, 66, 4, ad 2: "Nec etiam aqua decoctionis carnium, aut aliorum huiusmodi, nisi forte sit facta
tanta resolutio corporum Ijxtorum in aqua quod liquor plus
habeat de aliena substantia quam de aqua ..."
3s. T. III, 66, 4, ad 5: lrAqua rosacea est liquor
rosae resolutus.
Unde in ea non potest fieri baptismus.
Et ... nec in aquis alchimicus, sicut nec in vino.
Nec est
eadem ratio de aquis pluvialibus, quae generantur ex
majori parte ex sublimatione vaporum resolutorum ex aquis,
minimum autem est ibi de liquoribus corporum mixtorum; qui
tamen per huiusmodi sublimationem, ... resolvuntur in veram
aquam ..."
4S. T. I-II, 73, 2, resp.: " ...Unde non minus
est mortuus aliquis primo die mortis, et tertio vel quarto,
quam post annum, quando iam cadaver fuerit resolutum."
Cf. 11-11,107,2,
resp.; 111,51,3,
resp. ad 1; III~ 54,
1, ad 2: "Christus ab oculis discipulorum evanuit, non
quia corrumperetur aut resolveretur in aliqua invisibi~
1 •
..Lla
•••

"

5In VII Meta., XI, #1478: " ... ex partibus, in
quas aliquidper
corn.lptionem resolvitur ..." Ibid., #1476;
In IX Meta. X, #2337: "Quia unumquodque resolvitur in ea
ex quibus componitur: in nullis autem videmus resolvi corpora mixta nisi in quatuor elementa ... " C:f. In VII rv'ieta.
XI, #1480; In IV Sent., d.43, q.l, a.4, 801.2; In Ide
Gen. II; Leonine' III, #4.
- --

13
the reduction
being,l

of a substance

the first of which

is first in composition

to prime matter

exemplifies

or to non-

the maxim

that

"what

i.s last in resolution; ,,2this can

also be said of spiritual

disintegration

or dissolution.3

lSCG III, 144, #3: "Si aliquid privatur eo quod
est in natura eius ut habeatur, impossibile est illud 1'8parari nisi fiat resolutio in praeiaeentem materiam, ut
iterum aliud de novo generetur: ... ex eodem materia pater it
aliud integrum generari, non idem numero, sed specie.
Res
autem spiritualis, ... non potest resolvi per corruptionem
in aliquam praeiacentem materiam ..." In XII Meta. II, #2~38:
"Per prius etiam est in potentia ad formas etementares, et
eis mediantibus ... est in potentia ad divers as formas unde
non potest ex quolibet immediate fieri quodlibet, nisi fo~te
per resolutionem in primam materiam. '1 Also, what has been
generated out of prime matter is reduced again to potency
by corruption: De Potentia Dei (Quaestiones Disputatae
(Taurini-Romae:~arietti,
1927, Vol. I)) V, 3:-resp::"
"Forma vero sieut ex potentia materiae educuntur in aetum
in rerum generatione, ita in corruptione de aetu reducuntur
in hoc quod sint in potentia." ST III, 75, 3: liper consecrationem substantia parlis vel vfni resolvitur in praeiacentem materiam, vel quod annihilitur." De Pot., V, 3,
resp.: "Non est imposstbile Deum ad non esse redueere.l!
2Super lib. de Causis, Sancti Thomae de Aquino
Librum de CaUSIs EXPosito (ed. H. D~-saffrey, O~P., Fribourg: Societe Philosophique,
1954) I, 10-12, p. 5:
"Neeesse est enim id quod prius advenit ultimo abscedere;
videmus enim ea quae sunt priora in eompositione esse ultima in resolutione." ST II-II, 34, 5, resp.: "Id quod e8':.;
primus in eonstruetioneest
ultimum in resolutione." Ibid.,
107, 2, resp.: " ... quod est ultimum in generatione es:r-primum in resolutione."

3In II Sent., d.22, q.l, a.l, ad 2: "Quod est
primum in eompositione est ultimum in resolutione; etideo
non sequitur quod si fides est prima in eompositione
aedifieii spiritualis, infidelitas sit prima in resolutione
ejusdem." ST II-II, 168, 2, resp.: "Aliud autem attendenduITI
est, ne totaliter gravitas animae resolvatur ..."
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A frequent
duction,l

synonym

for resolution

and ttie usual antonym
In another

reduction

resolution,

of division:

into its simple parts

of division;4

to divide

and

the complex

is said to be division

or by way of resolution.3

used in all orders
Thomas

is composition.2

group of texts, both resolution

name one method

or composite

of this sort is re-

This method

in practice,

does not often call it resolution

by

may be

however,

or reduction

when

lIn IV Sent., d.43, q.l, 8-.4, sol.2: "Non solum
animae et corporis coniunis solvantur, sed eitam elementorum
commixtiio; sicut etiam acetum non potest in vini qualitatem
reduci nisi prius facta r~solutione in materia praeiacentem:
ipsa enim elementorum commixtio ... et conservatur, quo ex
cessante omnia mixta in pura elementa resolventur."
Ibid.,
sol.l: "Illud quod corruptum, et vitiatum est, in suam novitatem non reducitur nisi corruptione mediante; sicut acetum
non fit vinum nisi aceto corrupto, ...Unde ...non erit [natura
humanaJ reditus ad itnmortalitatem nisi morte mediante. l!
2Cf. p. 12, n.l and p. 15, n.2 above.
3In XI Meta. I, #2172: "Universalia sunt principia
scilicet in-cognoscer-i"do;et sic genera magis sunt principia,
quia simpliciora.
Et quod dividantur in plura quam species,
hoc est, quia continent plura in potentia.
Sed species continent plura in actu.
Unde sunt magis divisibiles per modum
resolutionis compositi in simplicia." In Libros Peri
Hermeneias expositio III; (Leonine I) #4: "Divisio fiat per
resolutionem ad indivisibilia sive simplicia."

4In III Meta. III, #355: '!Invenimus autem duplicem
modum compositioniset
divisionis: unum scilicet secundum
rationem, prout species resolvuntur in genera ... Alio modo
secundum naturam sicut corpora naturalia componuntur ex igne
et aere et aqua et terra et in haec resolvuntur."
ST I, 30,
3, resp.: "Est autem duplex divisio. Una materialis, quae
fit secundum divisionem continui, et hanc consequitur
numerus qui est species quantitatis .... Alia est divisio
formalis, quae fit per oppositas vel diversas formas; et
hanc divisionem sequitur multitudo quae non est in ali quo
genere ..." Cf. _In_f_V Meta. X, #566.
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he is speaking

of physical

formal division,

reduced
future

but a species

principles,

is resolved

privations,

to the genus of their substance
effects

In the case of

a genus is most often said to be divided

into its species,
to, its genus;2

division.l

are reduced

into, or reduced

and accidents

are

or subject;3

to their present

efficient

lIn De Gen. I, lee. IV, #LI:
"Videmus removere in
omni divisioneea
in" quae divisium resolvitur ... cum unumquodque generetur ex his in quae resolvitur.
Si ergo
resolvitur in nihil, seqU0tur quod etiam generetur ex
nihilo.
Quod autem componitur ex nihil, nihil est ...
Quarto probatur ... quod non fiat resolutio in puncta.
Quia
similiter sequeretur quod sit corpus compositum ex punctis."
In II Sent., d.18, q.l, a.l, sol.: lIDividitur autem aliCluid
dupliciter scilicet per se ut corpus, et per accidens ut
forma corporalis materiae impressa.o ST III, 77, 7, sed
con.: "Fractio fit per divisionem quanti.!!
2In II Meta. III, #356: "Oritur autem haec dubitatio propter duas divisiones rationis.
Quarum una est secundum quam genera dividimus in species.
Alia vero est secundum quam species resolvimus in genera." Cf. In II Sent.,
d.42, q.2, a.2, sol.; and~!
1,19,12,
ad 3; I=YI-, -7~.
3S. T. I, 3, 5, resp.: "Aliquid est in genere dupliciter.
Uno modo, simpliciter et proprie, sicut
species ... Alio modo, per reductionem, sicut principia et
privationes."
I-II, 10; 1, resp.: "In omnibus autem ea quae
non per .se insunt reducuntur in aliquid quod per se inest,
sicut in primum.ll SCG I, 98, #4: "Omne autem quod est per
participationem,
reduci tu:::'
ad ieI quod est per seipsum. l!
In IV Meta. IV, #584: !!Omnia entia reducuntur ad contraria,
quia-vel sunt contraria, vel sunt ex contrarias; contraria
vero reducuntur ad unum et multitudinem,
quia unum et
multitudinem
sunt principia contrariorum: unum autem et
multitudo sunt unius scientiae, scilicet, philosophiae:
ergo et ejus est considerare ens secundum quod est ens."
Cf. In III Sent., d.2, q.2, a.l, 801.3; In I de Gen. X,
#8; ST II-II, prol.; 30, 3, ad 4; 58, 12-,-ad 1; 62; 2,
resp:; 106, 5, ad 2; 123, 4, obj. 4; III, 63, 2, resp.
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cause;l

potency

ical position
common;3

is reduced

are reduced

equivocal

to univocal

to the analogical

all that is, in any order,

Since formal division

of a philosoph-

to the basic view they hold in

terms are reduced

these in turn are reduced
because

to act;2 variants

is employed

ones, and

term being,4

is reducible
in the service

to being.5
of defini-

lIn Lib De Causis I, p.9, 1.18-25: "Propter ultimum finem, qui-estuniversalis,
alii fines appetuntur, quorum appetitus advenit post appetitum ultimi finis et ante
ipsum cessat; sed et huius ordinis ratio ad genus causae efficientis reducitur, nam finis in tantum est causa in quantum movet efficientem ad agendum, et sic, prout habet rationem moventis, pertinet quodamodo ad causae efficientis
genus. Tl De l\1aloXVI, 7, ad 14 (Taurini: Mariett::t,Edi tio V,
Vol. II )-:
-"Eri t enim quemlibet effectum futurum reducere in
aliquam causam praesentem vel praeteritam, quam ex quo est
vel fuit ... "
2This maxim is used so often, in so many different
contexts, that the list of instances would be excessively
long: these may be found in any lexicon of Thomas' works.
One example will be sufficient here: In V Phys. III, #2:
nUnde nunc brevi tel" dicere sufficiat ,quod quilibet motus
est in eodem genere cum suo termino, non quidem ita quod
motus qui est ad qualitatem sit species qualitatis, sed
per reductionem.
Sicut enim potentia reducitur ad genus
actus, propter hoc quod omne genus dividitur per potentiam
et actum: ita oportet quod motus, qui est actus imperfectus,
reducatur ad genus actus perfecti."
3S. T. I, 3, 8, resp.: "Circa hoc fuerunt tres
errores.
Quidam enim possuerunt quod 'Deus esset anima
mundi' ... et ad hoc etiam reducitur, quod quidam dixerunt
Deum esse an imam primi caeli."
4S. T. I, 13, 5, ad 1: "Licet in praedicationibus
oportet aequivoca ad univoca reduci, .. , omnia univoca reducuntur ad unum primum, non univocum, sed analogicum quod est
ens."
SIn IV Meta. IV, #578: "Quaecumque reducuntur in
unum et ens-,-debentc-onsiderare a philosopho, cujus est considerare unum et ens: sed omnia contraria reducuntur ad unum
et ens: ergo omnia contraria sunt de consideratione philo-
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tion, whose
essence

function--

of some real thing,

is modelled
almost

ideally,

on the formal divisions

Not every definition

the simple.2
resolution

the whole

The antonym

and reduction

sophi,

so that

have this double reference.

is by means

into parts,
of division,
by division

which has the same double reference
and the intentional

of concepts

among things,

is by way of resolution,l

by way of resolution

is, by dividing

is to state the

the formal division

all the above phrases

division

at least--

but every

of division,

that

or the composite

into

and therefore

is, again,

of

composition

to both the ontological

orders.3

cujus est considerare

unum et ens."

lIn I Phys., 13, n.2 (In octo libros Physicorum
expositio Leonine----ecr:-,.
I): "Ea inquaeresolvitur
tiefinitfo
alicuius rei, sunt componentia rem illam unumquodque resolvitur ... in ea ex quibus componitur.
Sed ratio eius quod
fit secundum naturarn, resolvitur in subiectum et formam. II
Ibid., n.15: "Ea in qua resolvitus definitio alicujus rel
sunt componentia rem illam, quia unumquodque resolvitur in
ea ex quibus componentur."
2In III Phys., I, 3: "Differunt autem hoc duae
definitioneS-:- Continum enim, cum sit quoddam totum, per
partas suas definiri habet: partes a~tem dupliciter comparentur ad totum, scilicet secundum compositionem prout
ex partibus tatum componitur et secundum resolutionem prout
totum dividitur in partes.
Haec igitur definitio continui
data est secundum viam resolutionis; quae autem ponitur
in praedicamentis,
secundum viam compositionis."

3In II Sent., d.22, q.l, a.l, ad 2: "Ordo compositione estcontrarius
ordini resolutionis."
In II Meta.
III, #356: lISemper enim videtur illud quod estuItimus
terminus divisionis esse prim~m principium et elementum in
componendo." In II Sent., d.17, q.3, a.l, resp.: llAliquid
venire in compositionem aljcujus ... aut per essentiam suarn
per modam principii materialis vel formalis ... "
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I

One reason
historical

for such variations

situation:

and was expressed

philosophy

by Greek culture.

culture,

and modified

a more

suitable

nothing

similar

a capacity

fluency

the writings

problem.

words.l

thus Latin

concepts;

evolved

through

take account

use.

when

into

faced a

to make up words
to already

or to

existing

did what seemed best to him-- not

Further,

for a Greek term, and
for several

the Latin terms themselves

Thus our study of resolution

of the historical

the time of Thomas

lacked

from Greek

the work of translation

one Latin term might be used as the equivalent
Greek terms. 2

But

that necessitated

of the philosophers

all chose the same Latin equivaient

different

to be

it was, in

Consequently,

forced, meanings

Each translator

Greek

and expression.

to a degree

They had either

new, and perhaps

and was in-

the Greek language

philosophical
indigent.

it grew

it affected

among the Romans;

semantically

those undertaking

formidable
attach

occurred

in Greek diminished

translating
Latin,

Reciprocally,

for its growth

for expressing

this respect,

of Greece,

and developed

vehicle

is the

was born in Greece;

in the language

fluenced

in meaning

evolution

must

of resolutio

up to

Aquinas.

Its earliest

use as a technical

lChenu,

p.

94.

2Ibid.,

p.

96.

term appearg

to
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be in a commentary

on Plato's

his nam~ for th~ method
starting

Ir~[10:8l)~

by Chalcidius. 1

of inquiry which,

taking

point what is least real and knowable,

It is

as its
and posteri-

or in itself, but most knowable

and prior in our experience-

- the sensible

to the discovery

matter,

world--

the justifying

proceeds
principle

is to say, it is an analysis
ent principles,

of material

of things

of prime

change.

That

into their constitu-

and in that sense, ~ decomposition.2

IFragmenta Philosophorum Graecarum, ed. Guil. Aug.
Mullachius (Paris:Didot, 1867) vol. II, pp. 148-258. LouisM Regis, Analyse et syntese dans 1'oeuvre de Saint Thomas,1l
Studia Mediaevalia
(Bruges: De Tempel, 1948) p. 305.
2Chalcidius, -cap. CCC, p. 245: "Est igitur propositarum quaestionum duplex probatio.
Altera quae ex antiquoribus posteriora confirmat, quod est proprium syllogismi.
Praecedunt quippe ordine acceptionis, quae elementa vocan- .
tur, conclusionem.
Altera item, quae posterioribus ad praecedentium indaginem gradatim pervenit; quod genus probationis resolutio dicitur.
Nos ergo quia de intiis sermo
est, quibusantiquius
nihil est, utemur probationis remediis
ex resolutione manantihus ... Sunt ergo tam sensibilia quam
intelligibilia.
Et intelligibilia quidem sunt, quae
intellectu comprehenduntur rationabili indagine.
Sensibilia
vero, quae irrationabili opinione praesumuntur, incerto
quodam opinionis eventu.
IlIa quidem ex aeternita, nec
ullum initium habentia; haec temporaria, et ex aliquo initio
temporis a regione ncstra primaria, ad naturam versus
secunda.
Rursem intelligibilia,
e regione quidem naturae
priora, juxta nos vero secunda sunt.
Quotus quisque igitur
.in disputatione sic exordietur, ut ab iis quae prima sunt ad
nos versum, ascendat ad ea, quae sunt a nobis secunda-,--- -reso1Ver--e-dicitur quaestionem ...
quid sit illud, quod haec
omnia insepatabiliter
adhaerens complexumque contineat; inveniemus aliud esse quam id quod quaerimus, silvam.
Inventa
igitur est origo silvestris.
Et hoc quidem est unum duarum
probationurn genus, quod Resolutio dicitur." Cf. Regis,
pp. 305-6.

20
,

e

When BoethJus
Porphyry's

translated

commentaries

on parts

for the Greek term analusis,
analutikos,

resolutorius

Greek to analyticus.l
the epistemological

Analusis,

methodology

by Aristotle

equated

it with judicativa

philosophers

Dionysius.
Chalcidius

of analusis

his De Divisione

proper

he chose
and for

latinizing

and so resolutio,

veritatis,3

to science
Analytics.2
which

also used resolutio

in his translation

he opposed

and Boethius

Latin,

the

names
exHe

led later

it with the via iudicii.4

to identify

However,

of merely

in the Posterior

Scotus ~rigena
equivalent

~.•...into
0"'"
.i.
-Lv

logic and

the Latin resolutios

instead

plained

Aristotle's

as the Latin

of Pseudo-

it, not to compositio

had done, but to divisi£.5

Naturae,

he gives redeo

as

In

as a synonym

lIn Porphyrium Dialogos I (Patrologia Latina, 64
col. 64c); In Cat. Aristotelis, Lib. I (PL 64, col. 162c);
In Lib de Interpret (editio prima, PL 64, col. 345 b-c;
editio secunda, PL 64, col. 539 c-d) In Post. Anal. Lib. I
cap 1, 18 (PL 64, col. 734c) De Diff.~o~ib~
(PL 64,
col. 1173c) Lib. II (col. 1184d)~.
Regis, p. 307.
2Regis,

p. 307.

3In Top. Ciceronis, Lib. I (PL 64, col. 1047 b-c)
De Diff. Top. Lib. I (PL 64, col. 1174 c).
4Regis, p. 308.
5Expositio super Cae1estem Hierarchiam, CAP. VII,
para. 2 (PL 122, co1.18lT-a-185 c) cr. P. G. Thery, "Scot
Erigene traduceteur de Denys" in Archivum Latinitatis Medii
Aevi, 'rome VI (Paris: Champion, 1931) pp. 221-'(4, Cr'.-Regis-,

~.08.
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for !,es.Q.l'{.Q,
and redi.tuB for re_SO]~tio.l
merely

an epistemological
Albert

this.

method,

but a metaphysical

the Great, however,

For Albert,

resolutio

method;

in his commentary

equates

via resolutionis

It is not for hJm
law.

2

does not follow him in

is only an epistemological

on the Posterior

Analytics

with via intellectus

or the act of simple apprehension.3

he

abstEahenti~.,

Resolutoria

is the

lLib. II, para. 1 (PL l22, col. 526): "Analutike
a verbe anluo, id est vero solvo interpretatur.
Inde etiam
nascitur nomen analusis, quod in resolutionem vel reditum
similiter vertitur.
Sed analusis proprie de solutione
propositorum quaestionem dicitur; analutike vero de reditu
divisionis formarum ad principium ejusde-m divisionis.
Omnis enim divisio, quae a graecis merismos dicitur, quasi
deorsum descendens ab uno quodam definitio ad infinitos
numeros videtur, hoc est generalissimo usque ad specialissimum.
Omnis vero recollectio veluti quidam reditus, iterum
a specialissimo inchoans, et usque ad generalissimum
ascendens, analutike vacatur.
Est igitur reditus et resolutio
individuorum in formas, formam in genera, generum in ousias,
ousiarum in sapientiam et prudentiam, ex quibus omnis
divisio oritur, in easdemque finitur." Cf. Regis, p. 309.
2Regis,

p. 309.

3In I 'Post. Anal., Tr. 3, cap. 3 (ed. Borgnet,
Paris: ViveS; 18~I,~
b: "In via autem resolutionis,
ultimum efficitur primum et e converso;--primum fit ultimum.
Resolut{o est compositi in simplicia, posterioris in prius,
et causati in causam.
Et incipit ab ultimo secundum naturam
quod immediatum sensibile est sensuum, non quidem per se vel
commune sensatum sed per accidens; quia in hoc albo crispo
accipitur hic homo, et in hoc homine homo, et sic usque ad
primum in quo stat resolutio."
"Et hoc igitur modo differunt nobis priora et
notiora ab his quae natura sunt priora et notiora.
Et
dicuntur natura priora, secundum intellectum notiora; quia
via resolutionis est via intellectus abstrahentis, quae est
etiam principium lntelligendi id quod naturat." Cf. Regis,
p. 310.

22

name he gives to scientia
"analytics."l

There

iudicandi

are two phases

ing-- the inquiry which

ted to the prior,

known.

to the sources,"

can be resolved
discovered,
covery

the discovery

to the simple,

even earlier.

and the mate-

Only those things

which have been previously

one knows how to evaluate
the techniques

Therefore,

is rela-

All of these are resolution,

but one cannot make any evaluation

unless

of a dis-

it; therefore,

of resolving

one

and judging

there must be two types of reso-

The first is the resolution

propositions,

joining

so to speak.

and evaluated

must have acquired

lution.

and the evalu-

Thus the posterior

the composite

rial to its formal principle.
"returning

know-

the latter is made by perceiv-

ing some sort of causal relationship
previously

called

to any scientific

leads to discovery,

ation of what is discovered;

to something

which the Greeks

and these into terms.2

of the syllogism

into

The second sort of

/

lLiber de Praedicabilibus,
Tr. I, cap. III,
p. 3b: "ScientiamJudicandi
quam Graeci Analyticam, Latini
autem Resolutioram nuncupaverunt."
Cf. Regis, p. 311.

. Regis,

21 Priorem
p. 312.

Anal.,

Tr. I, cap. II, p. 20gb. Cf .

23
. t S In
. th e d'
reso 1u t.
lon-1 conSlS
lscovery

immediate

and necessary

be demonstration--

. 1
0 f" prlnclp~es

truths without

and causes--

1tJhichthere cannot

the definitions

which

en-

sure the truth of the conclusions.2
Thus the term as Thomas Aquinas
corne to mean one of the two essential
sophie method,
essential

more important,

element,

apprehension

compositio,

or definition

elements

howeyer,

and in the order of reasoning,

knowable

to us which must be the starting
It is a method

to the simple,

of philo-

both in the order of

as it is the one which provides

complex

it had

than the other

inasmuch

composition.

inherited

those things more
point for

which proceeds

from the

from what is more to what is less

lIbid., cap. I, p. 290a: "Attendum est auteE1
cum omnis et tota logica sit scientia disserendi, et haec
dividitur in scientiam inveniendi, et in scientiam judicandi quod inventum est.
Inventivum autem fiat per
localem habitudinem terminorum ad invicem, judicium autem
fiat per resolutionem.
Et quamvis intentio quoad nos
prio~ sit resolutione, eo quod non possit resolvi
judicari nisi quod jam inventum est, quia omnis resolutio
est ad ,2Fiora secumdum naturam, quia non resolvitur nisi
vel posterius in prius, vel compositum in simplex, vel
in suum formale principium; et idea ars resolvendi et
judicandi secundum rationem resolutionis est ante artem
inveniendi.
Nee potest esse nisi duplex resolutio,
resolutio scilicet rei conclusae in principia et causas
per quas concluditur et syllogismi collecti jam et constituti in principia formalia." cr. Regis, pp. 311-312.

er-

Regis,

p.

21 Post. Anal.,
312-.---

Tr.

I, cap. I, p.

514b; Cf.
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i

dependent

in its being,

from effect to cause,

divisible

to the indivisible.
and explication.l

position

sively epistemological,
principle

as well.

from the

It is the method

This method

could be exclu-

or, more broadly,

an ontological

It had been equated with abstraction

and also with evaluation.

It had been opposed

composition

and division.

Thomas

in meaning

and terminology

ever, does he compare
all together,
ficial

these varying

senses of resolution

whose grasp of philosophic

lRegis,

to both

preserves these variations
,
in his writings;2 nowhere, how-

nor give a list of synonyms.3

thinker,

of ex-

"To a superthought

begins

pp. 312-13.

2For example: In I Post. Anal., cap. XXII, lect.
35, 2 (Leonine ed.): !!Demonstrativa scientia, quae resolvendo ad principia per se nota iudicativa dicitur, est pars
logicae ..." (Ibid., cap. XXXII, lect. 42,10):
"Vocat autem
resolutionem, quando propositiones assumptae non sunt manifestae, sed oportet eas resolvere in alieas manifestiores ...
principia demonstrativarum
syllogismarum sunt immediatae
propositiones,
quae vel statim assumentur ... vel ad eas
devenitur per resolutionem."
In II Post. Anal., cap. V,
lect. 4, 2: "Sicut enim in PoS'terioribus Analyticus docetur
resolutio usque ad principia prima, ita etiam in Prioribus
Analyticus fit resolutio ad prima quaedam simplicia pertinentia ad dispositionem syllogismi in modo et figura."
In his Expositio super Dionysium De Divinis Nominibus (eO..
Pera: Rome: Mariettr;-1950)
cap. ~ Lect. 2 (51) it is an
ontological principle: !!Duplex processus invenitur in
rebus, scilicet: resolutionis et compositionis;
et secundum
utrumque, tendunt res in divinam similitudinem."

compare

3Nor is there any agreement among lexicographers;
Schutz, Deferrari, and Peter of Bergamo.

25

.'

and ends with an exact use of language,
appear

as a horrid

original

genius,

all current
through

precisely

usage

patient

blemish.

and careful

reflecting

doctrine.

The reason

precedes

the reflection

to understand
employed,

philosopher's

because

he is original,

familiar

on performance

which

and give exact expression

The first problem

possible

this question

has been included
meanings

his

always

enables

one

to the method

only "long after the
has moulded

and vehicle

the

of such

a study of this type must face

and solve is, "which are the relevant

the various

and express

for this is that performance

culture which is the background
.
2
expression."

material

texts

with his practice,

death when his influence

der to answer

finds

It is only

study of the relevant

on this to discover

and this becomes

will

But the fact is that the

inept for his purposes."l

that we may hope to become
and through

the foregoing

texts?"

that the foregoing
in detail.

resolution

It is in orhistorical

We propose

acquired

through

to use
this

IBernard J. Lonergan, 8.J.,' Verbum: Word ahd Id~a
in Aquinas (Notre Dame, Ind.:
University of Notre-Dame Press,
1967) p. 23.
'
2Ibid., pp. 23-4; Cf. p.
precede reflection on performance,
of that reflection."

XII: "Performance must
and method is the fruit
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evolution,
these,

and the synonyms

as a guide to locating

Thomistic

corpus.

method,

interest

processes

texts

with

in the

is in resolution

but inasmuch

grows out of reflection

psychological

associated

the relevant

Our primary

as an epistemological
method

and antonyms

on logical

as any such
techniques

as well as experiential

and

reality,

with a view to ascertaining

how the first two can give

assurance

of the ~ast,l we must

of true knowledge

these orders and their inter-relations

as well.

The term most often associated
is reduction;
text,2

in some instances

and in others,

and the doctrine

reduction

both are used in the same

in another.3

resolution

far more often than resolution,
it has been said that Thomas

the former

term. 4
Thomas'

However,

is used in one

In fact, Thomas

the reason

determine

with resolution

where the topic under discussion

are identical,

text and reduction

consider

uses

which may be

himself

the considerations

prefers
which

choice of a term seem to be m.ore complex

1M. Rose Brennan, The Intellectual Virtues according to the Philosophy of St:--:1'ho~TIas
TIa10 Alto 5 'Ca1.-:-Pacific Books, 19 In), p-.-19:"

2cf. p. 15, n. 1.
3 Ibid., and p. 14, n. 1.

4J• Guy Bougerol, Introduction ~ l'~tude de
BonaventurE!..(Tournai: Descleeet
C-fe--:-,--19bl-)--p:-TDr::---
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than personal
example,
author

preference

he customarily

alone:

in his commentaries,

utilizes

the term employed

of the text, with whatever

text, as well as any variations
term analyticu~
writings,

appears

Analytics,

the one Thomas

analutikos

translation

of the Posterior

Greek and is twice rendered

Here Thomas

uses analyticus

only once.

translates

However,

that Thomas

XXII of

as analyticu~.

four times and resolvendo

the Greek analusis

is resolutio

his own COITunen-

twice in Chapter

Aristotle's

appears

the

on Aristotle.l

used in writing

appears

Thus,

times in Thomas'

all of them in his commentaries
of Moerbeke's

by the

it has in that

in its meaning.

only twenty-four

In William

tary,2

nuances

for

in chapter

XXXII William

as resolutio,

uses four times;

and here

analyticus

is

used only once.
Neither

can we assume

the same term in different
cation.

that because

texts,

Thomas

~ses

it has the same signifi-

In point of fact, at least some of the time

reduction

is the Latin equivalent,

of an entirely

different

not of analu~i~,

Greek term, anagoge,

but

as he

11 owe this information to Rev. Busa who
graciously provided me with as much of the Index Thom~sticus as he could prior to its final collation for----publication. Cf. p.
9, n. 3.
Leonine

2This is given along with the Greek text in the
edition, vol. I.
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states.l

himself

be equivalent
perhaps

In fact, the meaning

to that of !,esolutio,2 but one suspects

Thomas

is using the Greek term inaccurately,

where his text makes
reductio

the meaning

is the Latin phrase

here the Greek term translated
one, apagoge,3
Another
for resolution
to support

meaning.

reduc~o

by re~u2tio

is usually

is abstraction;5

this, for Thomas

however,

and,

Significant

ad ~bsurdam:
is yet a

translated

4

deductio.

term that has been taken as a synonym

way of resolution6
Again,

which

that

of the Greek clear,

would also have a different

in this regard

third

here does seem to

and indeed the texts appear

does speak of abstraction

and abstraction

the fundamental

by

as a type of resolution,7

question

1In VI Meta., lect. 3, #1202:
vel anagoge ~-quod idem est ... II

is, "What does

" ...hac reductione,

')

~Ibid., " ...Causae
usque ad aliquid principium,
- causam.:'ll
3Henrico
(Graz: Academische
1132.
Begriffe

Macmillan,

entium per accidens reducuntur
cujus non est ponere aliam

Stephanus, Thesaurus Graecae Linguae
Druk. U Verbagsonstadt,
1954) II, col.

4RUdolf Eisler, Wortbuch der Philosophischen
(Berlin: E.S. Mittler und Sohn, 1904) v. I, p. 196.
5Regis, p. 316 and n. 4; Epistemology
1959) p. 446 and p. 536,-n:-lol.

6 ~.

I, 12, 4, ad 3; III 3, 3, ad 3.

7SCG III, 100, #4.

(New York:
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it mean

in each case?

in a variety
which

Iror Thomas

if

of senses.

in thinking,

thinker's

exact meaning

exact words
ever,

It is our own literate

tends to equate precision

precision

or most obvious
one familiar
culture

is merely

in which he expressed
impossible

a significance

with the language

bral.3

and consistence
precision

a matter

to assign

in signification

and consistency

than the first

culture,

precise

by

Thomas'
still

terminology

are impracticable

in doctrine

to.4

How-

as apprehended

a manuscript

the

to literal

and context.,,2

In such a culture,

a

of having

his thoughts.l

of a passage

was pre-Gutenberg;

residually

that having

any more definite

meaning

culture

in the use of words with

and to suppose

"it is virtually

meaning

also uses a.bstraction

ideals;

was what medieval

thinkers

were attentive

Aristotle

and Thomas'

(New York:

lWalter J. Ong, S.J., The Presence of the Word
Simon and Schuster, 1970) pp. 32-3~
2Ibid.,

warning

Therefore,
against

mindful

looking

of

for more

p. 46.

3Ibid., pp. 267-68; and on p. 271: "Communal
memory, invested with the aboility of oral cultures to conserve thematic and formulaic (rather than verbatim) accuracy,
could actually serve as a stabilizing textual influence to
counteract the weakness of written textual transmission
endemic in manuscript culture before. print."
4Ibid., p. 47.
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ce~titude

than the nature

try to grasp what Thomas
might

of the subject
thought

he was doing,

we must

not what we

think he should have done.
The verb from which abstraction

general
direct

meaning
object

sition--

"to draw away from;

in the accusative

there is usually

which

allows,l

present

the ablative

it is drawn,

of the manner
ablative.

also an ablative

of separation--

the accusative

even in classical

tion to its literal meaning,
Thomas

is simply using

discern

in addition

to a

case-- what is drawn away--

and even further,

in which

Thus,

II

comes had the

indicating
perhaps,

a prepothat from

an indication

was drawn

Latin

a number

without

from the

it had, in addi-

of transferred

ones.

the vwrd as it comes to him; we can

a graded progression

from the physical

a bodily

part to the logical

concept;

fluid is drawn out of the body through

omission

removal

of

of a "part" of a
tears;

2

lIn I Eth, 3, #36: "Ad hominen disciplinatum,
idest bene instructum, pertinet, ut tantum certitudinis
quaeratinunoquoque
materia, quantun natura rei patitur ...
Et ideo auditor bene disciplinatus,
non debet majorem
certitudinem requirere, nec minori esse contentus, quam
sit conveniens rei de qua agitur."
2

In IV Sent., d.50, q.2, a.3, qua. 3, 'sed c()ntra:
"Fletus corporalis fit per quamdam resolutionem lacrymarum.
Sed a corporibus damnatorum non potest fieri perpetua
resolutio, cum nihil in eis per cibum restauretur; omne
enim consurnitur si aliquid ab eo continue abstrahatur."
Cf. SCG IV, 90; Quod. VII, 3; Opusc. X.
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and life and human nature
way.l

Even if we restrict

tivities
variety

of sensing,
of senses:

withdraws

ourselves

knowing,

tc the immanent

and willing,

concentration

in an abstract

a man from making

suspends

judgment.3

on one of these activities

a rational

Stupefaction

"

lights dulls one's taste for spiritual
hand, dedication

to the things

ac-

we find a

us from the other two;2 e. g., sensory

can distract
passion

can be signified

choice

appetite
since

with earthly

things;4

de-

on the other

of the spirit results

in

ISCG I, 98, #2: "Vita enim viventls est ipsum
vivere in quadam abstractione significatum."
ST III, 16, 7
ad 4: " ...si tamen ex parte subiecti poneretura,liquod
nomen
significans naturam human am in abst~acto, posset hoc modo
significari ut subiectum factionis, puta si dicatur quod
natura humana facta est Filii Dei." (italics m.ine)
2S. T. 1-11,77,1,
resp.: "Passio appetitus sensitivi non potest directe trahere aut movere voluntatem, sed
indirecte potest.
Et hoc dupliciter.
Uno quidem modo, secundum quandam abstractionem.
Cum enim omnes potentiae
animae in una essentia animae radicentur, necesse est quod
quando una potentia intenditur in suo actu, altera in suo
actu remittatur, vel etiam totaliter in suo actu impediatur." (italics mine)

3S. T. II-II, 146, 2, resp.: "Virtus moralis conservat bonum rationis contra impetus passionum: et ideo ubi
invenitur specialis ratio qua passio abstrahit a bono rationis, .ibi necesse est esse specialem virtutem.
Delectationes autem ciborum natae sunt abstrahere hominem a bono rationis." Ibid., I-II, 77, 1, resp.: "Et secundum hunc modum
per quandam distractionem,
quando notus appetitus sensitivi
fortificatur secundum quamcumque passionem, necesse est quod
remittatur vel totaliter impediatur motus proprius appetitus
rationalis, qui est voluntas.rr
(italics mine)
4S. '1'. II-II, 46, 2, ad 2: "Quamvis stultitiam
nullus veli~ult
tamen ea ad quae consequitur esse stultum, scilicet abstrahere sensum suum a spiritualibus et immergere terrenis.ll SCG III, 121, #1: "Sicut autem per cor-
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l

detachment

from the delights

from temporal

responsibilities
2

to live a life of 10ve.
to serve another
preclude

uses are analogously

other

is essential

specifically

religious

vows, which would
But all these

to each other,

for they are

one: the abstraction
for human knowing,

human activity,

for a person

a man obligated

his obligation.)3

related

and freedom

it easier

(Nevertheless,

to one primary

images which

makes

may not profess

his fulfilling

attributed

of the flesh,l

whether

from sensory

upon which

speculative

all
or

poralia et sensibilia mens hominis elevari potest in Deum,
sic quis ~is in reverentiam Dei debito modo utatur, ita
etiam earumindebitus
usus mentem a Deo vel totaliter abstrahit, dum in inferioribus rebus constituit~r voluntatis
finis; vel mentis intentionem a Deo retardat, dum ultra
quam necesse sit, ad huiusmodi res afficimur." (italics
mine)
lIn IV Sent., d.49, q.5, a.2, sol. 1, ad 3: lINon
est inconveniens quod abstractioni a carnali vita- al~quod
aliud praemium accidentale debeatur, quod fructus dicitur."
Ibid., sol. 3: "Spiritualitas vero superabundans est per
quam homo ab hujusmodi delectationibus
carnis spiritum
suffocantibus omnino se abstrahit ... in quo invenitur perfecta abstractio a delectabilibus
carnis quantum ad omnes
circumstantias."
(italics mine)
2S. T. I-II, 89, 2 ad 3: "Illi qui sunt abstracti
a cura temporalium rerum , etsi aliquando venialiter
peccent, tamen levia peccata venialia committunt et frequentissime per fervorem caritatis purgatur.
Unde talis non
superaedificant venialia, quia in eis modicum manent.
Sed
peccata venialia ipsorum qui circa terrena occupantur;
diutius manent, quia non ita frequenter recurrere possunt
ad huiusmodi peccata venialia delenda per caritatis fervorem." (italics mine)
3S. T. II-II, 88,8,
ad 2: " ... Servus autem, quia
est in potestate domini etiam quantum ad personales operationes, non potest se noto obligare ad religionem, per quam
ab obsequio'domi.ni sui abstraheretur."
(itali.cs mine)
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practical,

depends.
Hence, whatever

withdraws

in matters

of bodily

perfection

of intellectual

even the alienation
which

occure

concern

ception

of extra-sensory

knowledge.2

the human

demoni~

to the

activity.l

and corporeal

spirit more

susceptible

Thus,

things

possession

types of knowing:

of the future

from immersion

contributes

and spiritual

in sleep, sickness,

renders

foreknowledge

likewise

from sensation

ecstacy

a person

or

to re-

for example,

and other types of prophetic

This is, however,

a more total withdrawal

IS. T. II-II, 15, 3, resp.: "Perfectio intellectualis operationis in homine consistit in quaedam abstractione a sensibilium phantasmatibus.
Et ideo quanto intellectus hominis magis fuierit liber ab huiusmodi phantasmatibus, tanto pot ius considerare intelligibilia pcterit
et ordinare omnia sensibilia; ... Manifestum est autem quod
delectatio applicat intentionem ad ea in quibus aliquis
delectatur; ... delectationis tactus, ciborum scilicet et
venereorum, quae sunt vehementissimae
inter omnes corporales
delectationes.
Et ideo per haec vitia intentio hominis
maxime applicatur ad corporalia, et per consequens debilitatur operatio hominis circa intelligibilia; ... Et e
converso oppositae virtutes, scilicet abstinentia et castitas, maxime disponunt hominem ad perfectionem intellectualis operationis." Ibid., I-II, 46, ad 3: "Ad perfectum
operationem intellectus requiritur quidem abstractio ab hoc
corruptibili corpore, quod aggravat animam." SeQ III, 47,
#2: "Huius autem signum hinc etiam accipi potesf, quia
quanto magis mens nostra ad contemplanda spiritualia elevatur, tanto magis abstrahitur a sensibilibus."
(italics mine)
2S. T. II-II, 172, 1, ad 1: "Anima quando abstrahitur a corporalibus, aptior redditur ad pereipiendum influxum spiritua1ium substantiarum; et etiam ad percipiendum
subtiles motus qui ex impressionibus natura1ium causarum in
imaginatione humana relinquuntur, a quibus percipiendis
anima impeditur cum fuerit circa sensibilia occupata."
Ibid., II-II, 175, 1, resp.: " ...Alio modo quantum ad modum
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from the senses than that which

occurs normally

knowing.

itself

through

The manner
the normal

activity

a sort of "abnormal"
be hard to justify
matter

of knowing

the union

is an impediment

could function

not

but rather

If it were not, it would

of soul and body,

to understanding.

just as well without

with the latter would

is superhuman,

of the intellect,

activity.l

in human

since

If the soul

a sensitive

seem to be a frustration

body, union
of the

homini connaturalem, qui est ut per sensibilia intelligat
veritatem.
Et ideo quando abstrahitur a sensibilium
apprehensione,
dicitur rapi, etiam si elevatur ad ea ad
quae naturaliter ordinatu~, dum tamen hoc non fiat ex propria intentione; sicut accidit in somno qui est secundum
naturam; une non potest proprie raptus dici.l1 "(italics
mine)
Huiusmodi autem abstractio, ad quemcumque fiat,
potest ex triplici causa contingere.
Uno modo ex causa
corporali ... propter aliquam infirmitatem ... secunda modo
ex virtute daemonum ... Tertio modo ex virtute divina.
Et
sic loquimur nunc de raptu, prout scilicet aliquis spiritu
divino elevatur ad aliqua supernaturalia,
cum abstractione
a sensibus ..." Ibid., II-II, 175, 2, ad 2: " ...Unde quando
homo ex violentia appetitus inferioris abstrahitur a motu
appetitus superioris, magis abstrahitur ab eo quod est sibi
proprium." Ibid., 11-11,173,3,
resp.: "Sed quando fit
revelatio prophetica secundum formas imaginarias, necesse
est fieri abstractionem a sensibus, ut talis apparatio
phantasrnatum non referatur ad ea quae exterius sentiuntur."
(italics mine)
IS. T. I, 12, 4, ad 3: "Et ideo cum intellectus
creatus per suam naturam natus sit apprehend ere formam
concretam et esse concretum in abstractione ... potest -per
gratiam elevari ut cognoscat-Substantiam
separatam subsistentem, et esse separatum subsistens." (italics mine)
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former's

very nature

1

as a knowing

power.-

do see that, apart from intervention
substances,
activity

of one or more

intellect,
tellect
bodily

an illness

or bodily

by more intellectual

injury which

senses, hinders

impedes

the activity

the
of the

which would not be the case if the human in-

were the kind of power that does not make use of a
organ.2

than abstraho

Thus Thomas

sometimes

uses absolvo

for this more total severing

from its normal way of functioning
body.3

And in fact we

A cognate

of absolvo,

of the soul

in and through

resolvo,

rather

the

is, however,

used

IS. T. I, 55, 2, resp.: " ...Ex ipso modo essendi
competit eis-[Substantiis
spiritualibus inferioribus] ut a
corporibus et per corpora suam perfectionem intelligibilem
consequantur; alioquin frustra corporibus unirentur."
2S. T. I, 84, 7, resp.: " ...Cum intellectus sit
vis quaedam non utens corporali organo, nullo modo impediretur in suo actu per laesionem alicuius corporalis
organi, si non requireretur ad eius actum actus alicuius
potentiae utentis organo corporali.
Utentur autem organo
corporali sensus et imaginatio et aliae vires pertinentes
ad partem sensitivam.
Unde manifestum est quod ad hoc
quod intellectus actu intelligat, ... requiritur actus
imaginationis et ceterarum virtutum.
Videmuus enim quod
impedito actu virtuti imaginativae per laesionem organi, ...
impeditur homo ab intelligendo in actu ..."
3De Ver. VIII, 12, ad 3: "Et quia male corporis
aggravatur,-et
dum sensibilibus intendit, minus est intelligibilium capax; ideo quando a sensibus abstrahitur vel
per somium [sic] vel per aegritudinem, vel quocumque alio
modo, fit ex hoc magis idonea ad impressionem superioris
spiritus recipiendam.
Et ideo dum praedicto modo a
nexibus corporis absolvitur, futura praenoscit ..."
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i

e

far more
a union

frequently

in this sense of severing

of parts.
Where the noun, rather

the synonym

for abstractio

than the verb,

is, of course,

Usually

the meaning

be a physical

process,

we

of bodily

the two are used interchangeably

is a sort of dissolution;

is employed,

resolutio;l

have seen that both are used for the release
fluid.

or dissolving

where

it need not, however,

for the intellect

also

"dissolves"

lIn IV Sent., d.43, a.4, a.2: " ...Sed in cineres
aliquidresolvi
nisi per combustionem ... 1t
2. "Sed contra ... Oportet omnia corpora in cinerem
resolvi.
Resp ....Sicut omnes moriuntur ad hoc quod omnes
vere resurgere possint, ita omnium corpora dissolventur ad
hoc quod omnium corpora reformari possint.
Sicut etiam in
poenam hominis mors a divina iustitua est inflicta, ita et
corporis resolutio ... non solvum animae et corporis coniunctio solvatur, sed etiam elementorum commixtio; sicut
etiam acetum non potest in vini qualitatem reduci nisi
prius facta resolutione in materiam praeiacentem.
Ipsa
etiam elementorum commixtio ex motu caeli causatur, et conservatur.
Quo cessante, omnia mixta in pura elementa
resolventur.
Ad 2 ... Cineres intelliguntur omnes reliquiae
quae remanent, humano corpore resoluto, duplici ratione.
Primp ...inolevit modus loquendi [apud antiquas] ut in quae
corporus humanum resolvitur, cineres dicantur.
Secunda,
proptercausam
resolutionis,
quae est incendium fomitis,
quo corpus humanum radicitus est infectum.
Unde ad purgationem huius infectionis oportet usque ad prima componentia
corpus humanus resolvi.
Quod autem per incendium resolvitur, dicitur in cineres resolvi.
Et ideo ea in quae
corpus humanum resolvitur, cineres dicuntur.
Ad 3 ...Ille ignis qui faciem mundi purgabit,
poterit statim corpora eorum qui vivi inveniuntur usque ad
cineres resolvere, sicut et alia mixta resolvet in materiam
praeiacentem.1t
potest
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the compostie
.t •1
1

Thomas

sensible
speaks

the intellect,"
he speaks

2

singular

but later} dealing

of "two resolutions

terms.3

of knowing

in one text of Htwo abstractions

made by

with the same question,

which are made by the intel-

lect," and uses both abstractio
valent

in the process

and resolutio

This way of resolution

as equi-

by abstraction

IS. T. 1,12,
4, resp.: !: ••• Unde per intellectum
connaturale est nobis cognoscere naturas, quae quidem non
habent esse nisi in materia individuali; non tamen secundum
quod sunt in materia individuali, sed secundum quod abstrahuntur ab ea per considerationem
intellectus.
Unde secundum intellectum possumus cognoscere huiusmodi res in universale, quod est super facultatem sensus.
Ad 3 ... intellectus noster potest in abstractione
considerare quod in concretione cognoscit.
Etsi enim cognoscat res habentes formam in materia, tamen resolvit compositum in utrumque, et considerat ipsum formam per 8e.1I
Thomas also speaks of reducing material forms to
intelligible species by abstraction: ST I, 55, 2, ad 2:
"esse ...
formae in imaginatione, ... medium est inter esse
formae quae est in materia, et esse formae quae est i~ 1ntellectu per abstractionem a materia et a conditionibus
materialibus.
Unde ... intellectus angelicus non posset
formas materiales reducere ad esse intelligibile, nisi
prius reduceret eas ad esse formarum inaginatarum.
Quod
est impossibile, cum careat imaginatione ... Dato etiam quod
posset abstrahere species intelligibiles a rebus materialibus, non tamen abstraheret; quia indigeret eis.1I
2S. T. I, 40, 3, resp.: "Duplex fit abstractio
per intellectum.
Una quidem secundum quod universale
abstrahitur a particulari ... Alia vero secundum quod forma
abstrahitur a materia ... 11
3Compendium Theologiae in Opuscula Omnia (ed.
Mandonnet, Paris: S. P. Lethielleux,l927)
vol. 11,'1, 62:
"Est enim duplex resolutio, quae fit per intellectum.
Una
secundum abstractionem formae a materia ... Alia vero resolutio est secundum abstractionem universalis a particulari."
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from material
we cannot

know singulars,4

reflection
which

and individuating

an essential
cerned
refer

is clearly

by which we return

is the opposite

conditions,

to and know singulars,

part of the method

would

Such reflection

for clarityts

complicate

there is no need to do so: the doctrine
abstraction
is called

is well developed
simply

"abstraction,"

is

sake, to

to also spea.k of "resolution

thus merely

and

with which we are con-

here, and we have chosen,

abstraction"

which

not the same as the

of abstraction.

to as resolution;

through

things.

by

Further,

on this type of

in numerous

places

where

it

and this is how vle shall

refer to it hereafter.
But what of the term reflection
Latin noun reflexio
verb reflecto,
active

having

and perfect

basic meaning
in a literal

is derived
reflexi

passive

The

from the third conjugation
and reflexum

participles

things,

as its perfect

respectively;

is "to turn or bend back."
sense of material

itself?

its

It can be said

including

parts

lSCG II, 100, #4: "Ad intellectum enim nostrum
perveniunt per viam resolutionis, per abstractionem a
conditionibus materialibus et individuantibus:
unde per
eas singularia cognosci non possunt a nobis." ST I~ 12,
4, ad 3: " ... intellectus creatus per suam naturam natus
sit apprehendere formam concretam et esse concretum in
abstractione per modum resolutionis cuiusdam, ... r: Cf. also
ST III, 3, 3, ad 3.
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of ones own body,
look back.

things:

Two English

bending

words

are derived

"bending

whether

from it: reflection

back,"

experiencing,

sensible

on.lll The human

or has experienced

here, we will adhere
study of Thomas'
of texts selected
done by Father

. .••.

based

2

as

on what it
previously,

is of significance

of his writings,

he concluded

on

for us

A careful

on a representative

from the whole

Webert;

spirit,

but also it is reflexive:

to it in our own usage.

usage,

or

sense of

i. e., it can also reflect

Since the distinction

the

for us

the more concrete

or intelligible,

on itself,

and re-

i. e., deliberating

it, can do both: it can reflect

able to return
itself.

"looking

back" or "returning

is presently

the soul or the mind."

is of no relevance

the latter retains

views

sense of

the former most often means

back of light, which

here, and a mental

Thomas

"to divert

In common usage,

pondering;

i. e., lito

It can also be said :Ln a figurative

II

non-material

flexion.

e. g., llturn one's eyesback,1I

number
has been

that the term is used

IFrequently the two spellings are used interchangeably: "reflection" is the more common, but one still
finds, especially in British publications,
"reflexion"
where the mental activity is what is clearly intended.
Yet the distinction is retained in other forms, especially
in the adjectival: we speak of a "reflexive verb" but would
never speak of a "reflective verb."
2J. Webert, O.P., "Reflexio: Etude sur les operations reflexives dans la psychologie de S. Thomas d'Aquin,"
Melanges Mandonnet (Paris: Vrin} 1930) I, pp. 285-326.
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to name a number
varied meanings

of psychological
can be reduced

or particularizations.l
the intellect's

of which the others

glance"

possible;2
will,

a kind of mutual

and will on intellect;3

senses are:

of sensible

reflection

refer-

are types

at the concrete

dual which makes a sort of knowledge

its

ones,

to a single meaning,

These fundamental

"backward

although

to three principal

these cannot be further reduced
ring to a single operation

operations;

indivisingulars

of intellect

and a properly

on

scientific

reflection.

It is this last which grounds all science,
•
logic, and epistemology; by means of it one knows the uni-

versal,

and knows,

is really
object,

a double

Thus it

reflection:

on the

and an indirect,

the act of knowing
knowing

as well, that he does know it.

"reflection"

or "reflexive

which assures

the object.4

to be the prime

a direct

belongs

reflection"

one of certitude

This scientific

analogate,

reflection

reflection

the one to which

will and will on intellect--

p. 324.

2Ibid. , pp. 307-10.

3 Ibid. , pp. 313-15.

-

4Ibid. , pp. 315-19.
5Ibid. , pp.

in
is taken

the name

most properly.5

The second type of reflection--

lIbid.,

on

324-25.

of intellect

is of no immediate

on

interest
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for our inquiry;
relate

to resolution

of our inquiry.
been

via iudicii--

of knowing,

in the context

resolution

we propose

causes,
assure

technique

of these

to elucidate
whereby

and even the ultimate
us of truth

real beings

deductio,

in knowing

universe

stages.

including

cause,
because

universe,

and its Uncreated

to specific

ThE sense of

is that of an epis-

order the connections

in the sensible

examen,

seem most appropriately

the particular

or more universal,

the intentional

created

inductio,

since they refer more narrowly

considered

to the general

in the course

the other terms which have

as synonyms--

in the activity

temological

of reflection

can only be determined

Similarly,

suggested

stages

how the other two senses

God.

is reduced
principles,

Such procedures

they reproduce
which

exist between

and between

Cause.

in

the

and

•

II

SOME HISTORICAL
ON THE MEANING

AND PROCESS

Before we can ask

OF KNOWING

'what does Thomas

method

of knowing

within

the larger perspective

by knowing?'

PERSPECTIVES

he calls resolution?'

In the history

mean by the

we must

locate

of 'what does Thomas
of philosophy

it

mean

up to Thomas'

\

time, two radically
the Platonist,
supposes

knowing

the duality

a consequent,

opposed

is primarily

Thomas

a confrontation;

of knower and known;

"For
it

it consists

added movement ... For the Aristotelian,

the other hand, confrontation
and essentially

vieNs had been advanced:l

is secondary.

knovling .is perfection,

found Aristotle's

in
on

Primarily

act , identity. ,,2

view of knowing

the more cogent;3

ISCG II, 98, #19: "Et hoc quidem oportet verum
esse, secundum sententiam Atistotelis qui ponit quod
intelligere contingit per hoc quod intellectum in actu fit
unum cum intellectu in actu; ... et secundum hoc est idem
intellectus et intellectum et intelligere.
Secundum autem
positionem Platonis, intelligere fit per contactum intellectus ad rem intelligibilem
... Unde et Dionysius dicit
quod superiores substantiae intelligibiles
sunt quasi cibus
inferiorem." cr. Lonergan, Verbum, p. 183.
2Ibid.,

pp. 183-4.

.
3De Ver. X, 6, y'esp.: "Et ideo prae omnibus
praedictis positionibus rationabilior videtur sententia
Philosophi
" In III De An. X, #371: "Inducitur autem
Aristotelis
ad exclucfendum opinionem Platonis, ..."
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e

.,.

I

he accepted

it and made it the basis of his own analysis.~

Let us begin,
explanation

therefore,

of knowing

with a brief

as Thomas

summary

understood

No less than Plato, Aristotle
a clear distinction
between

between

knowledge

truth and prejudice.

tinction

in a recognition

character

Plato understood

known be completely
matter,
physical

actual

which excludes
dualism

p.

to maintain
and

Plato had based the disand universal

which he explained

and completely

all change,

as rooted

and. the lcnown.2

this as requiring

in which matter

lLonergan,

wished

and opinion,

in the imma teriali ty of both the knower
But because

it.

of the unchangeable

of human knowledge

of Aristotle's

that the

separate

from

he was forced to a rneta-

can be neither

the object

188.

2S. T. I, 84, 1, resp.:"
Plato, ut posset
salvare certam cognitionem veritatis a nobis per intellectum
haberi, po suit praeter ista corporalia aliud genus entium
a materia et motu separatum, quod nominabit species sive
ideas, ... Sic ergo dicebat scientias et definitiones et
quidquid ad actum intellectus pertinet, non referri ad ista
corpora sensibilia, sed ad ilIa immaterialia et separata;
ut sic anima non intelligat ista corporalia, sed intelligat
horum corporalium species separatas.1l
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nor the source
the contact
cluding

l

of knowledge.

of matter

knowing.

was the function
thereupon
2

stand.

of arousing

the sensible

in-

not even

soul to sense:

the intellectual

in knowing

soul to under-

that the reason

with this consequence

interest

in any sense,

The most he could allow to sensation

It has been suggested

passionate

cannot

sensation--

one, be a cause of knowing,

it in turn roused

uncomfortable

however

with matter--

an instrumental

of sensory

Consequently,

Aristotle

was

was that he had a

the sensible

world directly;3

he came to it, he seems to have had the conviction

IS. T. I, 84, 1, resp.: "Videtur autem in hoc
Plato deviare a veritate, quia cum aestimaret omnem cognitionem per modum alicuius similitudinis esse, credidit quod
forma cogniti ex necessitate sit in cognosciente eo modo
quo est in cognito.
Consideravit autem quod forma re inteltectae est in intellectu universaliter et immaterialiter et
immobiliter; quod ex ipsa operatione intellectus apparet,
qui intelligit universaliter
et per modum necessitatis
cuiusdam; modus enim actionis est secundum modum formae
agentis.
Et ideo existimavit quod oporteret res intellectas hocmodo in seipsis subsistere, scilicet immaterialiter
et immobiliter. _ Hoc autem necessarium non est."
2Ibid., 6, resp.: " ... Plato vero e contrario
possuit.intellectum
differe a sensu; ... Sic igitur secundum
Platonis opinionem, neque intellectualis cognitio a sensibili procedit, neque etiam sensibilis totaliter a sensibilibus rebus; sed sensibilia excitant an imam sensibilem a
sentiendum, et similiter' sensus excitant animam intellectivam ad intelligendum."
3H. D. Hantz, The Biological Motivation in Aristotle (New York: private-printing,
1939) p. 1. Cf.Joseph
Owens, The ~octrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics-rroronto:
Pontifi:'~alInstitute of Mediaeval Studies,
1957) p. 318, n. 44.

that what common
serving

sense has always

of respectful

The common
however

enabled

consideration

to be so is de-

even by the philosopher.

sense view of the matter

is that knowledge,

is "aboutrt

world;

attained,

planation

assumed

Aristotle

worked

the sensible

out respected

the ex-

this view,

for ~t

him to hold that what is known by the intellect

a partial

constituent

of the realities

is

first known by the

senses.l
Aristotle
which

described

the intellect

derives

lars an immaterial,
to this process
means

as opposed
where

from something
To abstract

thing--

knowledge

is subtracted

from consideration.

rated."

But these two opposite

used a different

doctrine

lLonergan~
20wens,

a word which

else by any sort of process

Aristotle

notions

what-

For what is
rtsepa-

are combined

in

no doubt due to

20.

The Doctrine

or

some-

word meaning

of abstraction,2

p.

singu-

to iladdition," and can be

something

retained

by

of their natures;

is thus to omit or eliminate

the matter--

the medieval

process

sensible

he gave the name ~phaeresis,

used in any instance

ever.

from changing

universal

"subtraction"

removed

a psychological

of Bein~ ... , p.

239.
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confusions
described

introduced
earlier.

through

variant

As a result,

translations,

the medievals

Aristotle"

things which doubtless

Stagirite,

but which were,

as

read

llin

would have surprised

to them, the plain meaning

the
of

l

his text.

Thus the explanation
Thomas

adopted

from Aristotle

latter might well be puzzled
before

Thomas

or ground

further

convictions

of human knowing

is one whose details
to be credited

developed

and attitudes

merely

a baptized

misrepresenting
is merely
Plato's

synthesis"
version

preference:
of working

himself

even

different

To speak of an "Aristo-

as if Thomas ' position
of Aristotle

preferred

as he understood
Thomas

profoundly

was

is to risk grossly

either or both positions.

that Thomas

with,

the

any part of it to express

from those of "the Philosopher."
telio-rrhomistic

which

What can be said

Aristotle's

position

to

both of these.
tells us the reason

for his

he found it more in accord with the experience
in, and on, a sensible

basis towards

under-

lCf. Aristotle: Neta. 10, l087a, 10-25; De An.
111,7,
431b, 12-16; Meta.XI;
3, l061a, 28-b3; Fhys.II,
2, 1935, 34-35; Meta.-VII, 11, 1037a, 16-17; Caer:-YII,
299a, 16-17. Cf.()wens, Doctrine-of Being ... ,~
239, 39798, nn. 28-34.
--

Ie
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standing

than that favored

explained
ticipation

intellectual
of eternal

illumination. 2
experience

by his contemporaries,-

knowledge
truth--

Repeatedly

to manifest

1

who

by way of an actual

Augustine's

he appeals

theory

par-

of divine

to our psychological

the value of what he says: Ilqui-

libet in se ips.2.experiri

potest ...;1l3 Ilet quod hoc verum

sit, experimento

4

apparet; Il Il
et_ hoc experimento

scimus; 115 Ilquod experimento
of experience

he rejects

cogno-

potet. esse falsum. 116 On behalf

outside

intervention

in human

IS. T. I, 88, 1, resp.: IlSecundum opinionem
Platonissubstantiae
immateriales non solum a nobis intelliguntur; sed etiam sunt prima a nobis intellecta ...
Applicatur tamen animae cognitio rebus materialibus,
secundum quod intellectui permiscetur phantasia et sensus ...
Sed secundum Aristotelis sententiam quam magis experimur,
infellectus noster secundum statim praesentis vita-e--naturalem respectum habet ad naturas rerum materialium;
unde nihil intelligit nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata.1l
(italics mine). Cf. In IV Sent., d.50, q.l, a.l, sol.;
d.49, q.2, a.6, ad 3-.-In-III Sent., d.23, q.l, a.2, ad 3;
ST I, 87, 3, corp. Lonergan, ~20-32,
42.
Knowledge
Gregorian

2Mariasusai Dhavamony, S.J., Subjectivity and
in the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas (Rome:
University Press, 1965) p. 133.
3~.

1,84,7,

resp.

4De Spiritualibus Creaturis (Romae: Universitatis Gregorianae, 1959, ed. Keeler) X, resp.
5S. ;T. I, 79, 4, resp.
6Expositio super Librum Boethii de Trinitate
(Ed. B. Decker) Leiden; ~ J. Brill, 1955,-r, 3, resp.
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knowing

in the form of separated

possible

or agent alone.l

properly

in man,

and receives

intellect,

we not experienced

agent-

Both of these intellects

since he abstracts

the actually

either

species

intelligible

these activities

are

from images

in his mind:

in ourselves,

had

we should

not have come to be aware of them.2
Thomas
with Plato,
though

agreed with Aristotle,

as even Aristotle

that the goal of human knowing

this did not mean precisely

is science,

the same thing to each

of them.

The Greek term which Thomas'

Latin

scientia,

translates

could mean

true and scientific
opinion;

is episteme
knowledge,

(2) an organized

our modern

sense;

to practical

as opposed

knowledge
?

or praktike.~

(1)

to doxa,

body of knowledge--

(3) theoretical

knowledge,

which

one,

science

in

as opposed

The distinction

lQuaestiones Disputatae de Anima (Taurini-Romae
Marietti, 1927; v. II) V, resp.:
Si diligenter consideremus, inveniemus eodem ratione impossibile esse, intellectum agentem substantiam separatam esse, qua ratione et
de intellectu possible hoc supra ostensum est ... Utrumque
.'..harum opera tionum experimur in nobis ipsis." (italic s
mine) .

11:-:-.

2SCG II, 76, #17: "Sed utraque actio, scilicet
intellectus possibilis et intellectus agentis, convenient
homini; homo enim species abstrahit a phantasmatibus
~t
recepit mente intelligibilia actu; non enim aliter in
notitiam harum actionum venissemus,-nisi
eas in nobi-S
experiremur."
(italics mine)
----3Francis E. Peters, Greek Philosophical Terms
(New York: New York University Press, 1967JPP. 59=b~

•

between

doxa and e2~steme

seems to be pre-Socratic;

first it was prbbably

no more than a distinction

levels

of conviction,

a difference

kind.

The influence

world

of opinion

of Parmenides,

from the realm

led Plato to use episteme
the eide; the immutable
Aristotle

the transcendent

eide were immanent
episteme
whether

sense knowledge

was knowledge

poietike,

physike,

things;

praxis;

knowledge

of truth.

of

For

Aristotle's

accordingly,

of the true causes,

and it is derived

inter-relates
he divides

and theologike:

last of these into mathematike,
he frequently

theoretike

the

from

by induction.2

in Metaphysics3

episteme

than of

of the eid~; not,

eide of Plato.

or of becoming,l

When Aristotle

However,

ground

is demonstr1ative knowledge
of being

rather

of pure being and thought,

to mean exclusively

in sensible

between

who sharply divided

everlasting

also, episteme

however,

of degree

at

or theoria;

and episteme

ledge of the causes

lpeters,

he subdivides

physike,

episteme

the

and theologike.

alone for episteme

praktike
techne.

of becoming,

of

it into praktik~,

uses episteme

poietike,

the species

whereas

is also called
__
T
e_ch_n_e_
is knowtheoria

is know-

pp. 59-60.

2Ibid.,

p.

58.

3Ibid.,

p.

60; Cf. Metaphysics

VI, 1025b--26a.
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ledge of the causes
causes

of being,

Philosophia

theologia,2

is a synonym

first philosophy,
physics.5

of being;l

is also called

for episteme

or ~heolOgia,4

However,

being as being,8
ing.9

causes

theoretike;

of becoming6-from techne

of becoming.

to restrict

IMetaphysics
2peters,

there is

I, 981b; Peters,

can

which deals

And theologia

theoria

or

the internal

that is, being that is separate

The tendency

Doctrine

sophia.3

point of view physics

Thus it is distinguished

with the external

of the ultimate

and second philosophy,

from another

be said to deal with the causes
causes.7

the knowledge

studies

and unmov-

to sophia:

as Plato

ibid., p. 191.

ibid., p. 193.

3Metaphysics

I, 980a-83b;

4MetaphysicS

VI, 1026a; Peters;

5Metaphysics VII, 1037a;
of Being ... , p. 174.
6PhysicsII,

Peters,

Peters,

199a; Peters,

ibid., p. 197.

ibid., p. 156.
ibid.; Owens,
----

The

ibid., p. 191.

70n the resol~ution
of the apparent
Owens, The Doctrine of Being ... , p. 169.
8Metaphysics

IV, 1003a;

Peters,

9Metaphysics

VI, 1026a; Peters,

conflict

ibid., p. 141.
ibid.

see
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didl and Plotinus

will later,2

his desire

to include

physics

knowledge,

but his attraction

is tempered

as a genuinely
toward

sense is evident when he considers
is the highest

human activity

It would
Aristotle,
is about

is ousia--

so the primary
certain
causes.

science

6

whether

in the ~icomachean

or substance--

As the primary
science

theoretical

contemplation

by reference,,4 because

being

being

is theologia.

by

the more restricted

seem, then, that science

"equivocal

by reference.5

in Aristotle

~thics.3

is, for
what science

itself

is separate

equivocal
substance,

It is the most

since it is about the most universal

Physics

is a secondary

instance

of wisdom

lRepublic VII, 540 A-C (The Dialogues of Plato
trans. Jowett, New York: Random House, 1937) pp.-'799-800.
2Ennead.£.III, 8, 2-7 in The Essential Plotinus
(trans. E. O'Brien, New York: Mentor Books, 1964) pp. 103-

69.
3Nicomachean Ethics X, 1177a-1179b. Cf. J.
Kearney, "Happiness and the Unity of the Nichomachean Ethics
Reconsidered,"
Proceedings of American Catholic Philosophical Association,
1966, pp. 135-43.
4We have equivocity by reference when the things
called by the same name have different natures, only one of
which is the nature the name signifies.
The others, however
have some reference to this nature, as being a sign of it,
or productive of it, hence they are so named; Cf. Owens,
The Doctrine of ~eing ... , pp. 55-57.
5Ibid.,

pp~ 164-68.

6Ibid.,

pp. 140,151-62.
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because

it deals with a secondary

instance

and the same is true of mathematics;2
"being"

is less universal

Practical

and productive

into-being"
science

which

in each case the

than the primary
science

is always

instance.

are about the "coming-

singular;

hence

it, and the

which deals with it, are still more remote

the primary

instances,

which are primary

they are in the highest

degree

in Plato--

bequeaths

to his philosophical

was directly

what was known,

dependent

as
,,4

and

by reference--

by reference--

So we see that for Aristotle
knowledge

somewhat

or knowledge,

as equivocal

what it is about is equivocal

Aristotle

because

and unchangeableness.

It is about this that there is science
of science

from

and unchanging.3

conceived--

in terms of permanence

it is this notion

precisely

permanent

"Being and entity are apparently

because

of being,l

that

heirs.
the certainty

of

on the immutability

of

and this is also Thomas'

view.

For both,

/

theoretical

science

or prod~ctive

is more

science

"scientific"

precisely

lIbid.,

p. 164.

2Ibid.,

p. 174.

because

30wens, p. 175; Cf. Metaphysics
19; IV, 1004a 3-9; IV, 1005b 35.

4 Ibid ..

than practical
the latter deals

VII,

1026a 13-
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with becoming-being.
timate

and perfect

its separateness
bodied

But, where2s
knower

for Aristotle

is "the unmoved

and permanence

mover--

remarkably

for all

like a disem-

human intellect" 1__ for 'l'homasit is God, the crea-

tive source of all that is and is known.2
Aristotle

man is impeded

in knowing

soul is the form of a material
needs matter"
Thomas

the ul-

instead

man is impeded

ficant reason

separated,
uncreated.3

substance,

for the further

that he is a created

not merely

his

"a form which
from matter,

and much more

knower

we find Thomas

for

signi-

and the truth he

from the Absolute

by being immaterial,

If, therefore,

for

truly only because

of a form separate

seeks takes its permanence

Whereas

truth,

but by being
having problems
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with, and even occasionally
thorough-going

retreating

intellectualism,

from, Aristotle's

we should not find it

surprising.l
The changed
the connotations

of the Latin adjective

modifies

scientia

modifies

episteme.

verb meaning

point of view is reflected

equivalent
Whereas

form--

the deponent

observe,

of a difficulty
our English

simply,

the Latin

comes,

verb specio, but from a derived

verb

speculor,

which means to watch,

is a look-out,

Thus the Latin verb carries

scout,

spy

connotations

and risk, and these have been retained

equivalent

The human knower

which

the Greek term is from a

spy, and a speculator

or investigator.

speculativa

to the waytheoretike

seeing or beholding

not from the equivalent

even in

words

speculate

in

and speculative.

is a scout in a territory

of which he is

that the concept of creation determines the inner structures
of nearly all the basic concepts of the philosophical
ontology of Thomas Aquinas ... St. Thomas' doctrine of
truth can be grasped in its essential and profoundest
meaning .only if we formally take account of the concept of
creation."
lef. ST I, 14, 1, ad 3.
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e

not and cannot be the master,l
astray.

Thomas

intellect,

does not regard

nous, as that whose

with the same satisfaction
sopher

Anaxagoras'
function

as Aristotle

of our own day has expressed

on which
simplify,

to some more than others,

go

of

is to dominate
does.2

A philoin words

"to dominate,

to understand ... to understand
system.

notion

the matter

it would be hard to improve:

fit it into an economical
though

in which he may easily

to

a thing is to

And to all of us, ...
to understand

thing ...

[but] all economy

is essentially

relative

to some good other than wonder.

is a good

arbitrary,

and

And ... the love

IPieper, p. 55: "Man is conceived as a traveler,
one who is on the way; that means, first, that his steps
have meaning, that they are not in principle futile,
they do lead nearer the goal.
And this, in turn, is
unthinkable without that other element: so long as man,
in his existence, is 'on the way,' just so long the way
of his knowledge is without an end. And this hopestructure of the quest for the essence of things, for
philosophic knowledge, springs from the fact ... that the
world (the worlci and knowing man himself) is creatura."
2De ~nima III, 4, 429a 18-20, of Aristotle;
and Thomas'-rn de Anima, lect. 7, n. 679. lowe
this point
to R. McLaughli~
Abstraction as Constitutive of Science
according to Aristotle and St.'Thomas. (Unpublished Ph. D.
Dissertation, University-of'Toronto,
1965) pp. 137 and 342,
n. 9. The use I have made of it, however, differs sharply
from his.
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of understanding
Aquinas,

is a vow of poverty."l

though perhaps

not Aristotle,

With this Thomas
would heartily

agree.
From another

viewpoint,

however,

Thomas'

cedure has far more in common with Aristotle1s
ours today: both lived in a culture where
dominated

the written

word.

pro-

than with

the spoken word

This was very clearly

the

\

case in Aristotle's

time, dialectic

much more prominent

than v~riting that Plato refused

commit

his deepest

The medieval
of writing

situation

unborn

script culture

insights

was more ambivalent;

for transmitting

generations

substitute

philosophical

the wisdom

had been recognized,

the written

error on the part of the copyist
dialectic,

them-- were still very
writings,

except

the diputatio
dominated

were

the importance

of the past to
yet in a manu-

is too great.

of human
Oral

and all that went wj_th

the very form of Thomas'

for some of the later commentaries,

culture,

to

to the latter.2

the possibility

rhetoric,

strong:

or quaestio.

so

word can never be more than a

for the spoken word--

institutions--

and rhetoric

Compared

the Middle

is

with our own print-

Ages were overwhelmed

lAsher Moore, "The Methods of Philosophyu in
XII International Congress of Philosophy, vol. 5, p. 425.
2Cf. Plato's

Seventh

Epistle.
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with orality.l
We tend to impose the conditions
word--

fixed in space, infinitely

identical

fashion--

the thing for which
we define

it stands.

examining

in a completely

meanings

and exhaustively

and then proceed

to fit things

pigeon-holes.

in the opposite

the things

We start with the words;

by carefully

into these pre-constructed
ever, proceeded

repeatable

first on the spoken word, and then on

them clearly

distinguishing

of the printed

Aristotle,

direction.

how-

He began by

called by the same name to see in

what ways they were alike and in what ways different,
order to discover

whether

they were univocal

and if the latter, what sort of equivocals

sense: rather

as the things being treated
themselves
language,

have likenesses
and perhaps

fully mirrored.
things.3

Concern

Since the things

and differences,

even in definition,

Equivocity

equivocity
is needed

and the differences

follows

for careful,

and keep it

he used the terms

demanded.

order that both the likenesses

or equivocal,

they were.2

He did not limit a term to one exact meaning
fixed in this precise

in

into language

precise,

in

in
be faith-

from

and fixed defini-

lCf. Ong, pp. 266-67.
2'I'opicsI, 15, 106a 9-10. Owens ~ ibid., pp. 3301, n.

31.
30wens,

ibid., pp. 60-62.
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tions is quite proper

.

sciences

deal with

a science

to grammar

language.

of real things,

the richness

and ambiguity

and logic, for these

But such concern

since, by leaving
of reality,

is fatal to

no room for

it falsifies

its

object.l
Whatever
Aristotle

some later thinkers

and Thomas Aquinas

might hold,

had no doubt whatever

philosophy

deals with real beings,

understand

the thought

~nd anyone

own point

take anything

not the identity

for granted,

with Aristotle's,

meaning.

of view.

"literal"

terms gives us any assurance
We must take all possible

any ill-planned

or ill-supplied

lest a small error in the beginning

effort

of Thomas'
with

translation

of equivalent

precautions

journey

to

We cannot

much less its identity

our own; not even that the correct
of Thomas'

seeking

of either must make a serious

to do so from the latter's

perspective

that

against

of exploration:

cause us to fail in

ITOpics I, 15, l07b 6-12. On Generation and
Corruption, I, 6, 322b 29-32. Owens, ibid., pp. 55=56.
Neither Aristotle nor Thomas envisioned contemporary experimental science which is, consequently outside the scope
of this dissertation.
However, it appears to differ from
the sciences of the real they knew insofar as it does not
claim to deal with reality "as it is in itself"-- rather,
it does so through models and constructs based on the observed interactions of real things, and thus not irrelevant
-- in fact, quite effective-- in controlling these; yet
not necessarily corresponding in any point with "the thing
in itself."

.'e
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our efforts, 1 all SUPI)11cs and
plorers

must be carefully
Accordingly,

Thomas'

sciehtia

picture

associated

laboratory

fJapS

studied

left by previous

and tested.

we dare not casually

by our English

translate

term science:

with the latter

full of equipment

the mental

is apt to be either

of a library

or librarian

picture,

for the sake of completeness

than because
would
mental

be more

of any re~l need

find this picture
picture

the scientist

and its furnishings

would

secondary.

of a "deposit"

contained

in some sort of cache.

operative

before

'locates'

In earlier

something
locale

locking

thinkers

book,

of thousands

be

"which

of a

could not be thought

out of books

of as

or some other

IDe Ente et Essentia, prooemium,
S. Thomae Aquinatis-recl. f.'landonnet,Paris:
Lethielleux,
1927) vol. I, pp. 145-64.
270.

had

cannot

of copies

into men's minds. ,,2 For l"homas scientia

p.

the location

them once for all in exactly

ages knowledge

to be transferred

20ng,

Thomas

in his

Such a notion

of' the printed

the same place upon the pages
work.

be primary,

in the

of knO\'lledge, a kind of commodity

the advent
words,

Platonic--

The medieval

no notion

truly

be included

to have him in it.

excessively

a

full of books.

And even if the scientist
it would

ex-

was the

Onusculam
S. P.

Omnia
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name, not of an abstract
qualitative
the three

perfection
speculative

by abstraction

science

represents

sensible

things

intellect's

intellectual

acquired

of intelligible

species

from images

in the internal

senses,

affecting

status

things.

is very different

temology

human understanding

assures

species
certain

In Thomas'

process,

is

problems:

that through

this is resolution.

is a gradual

as

from that of the

How can we be assured

what finally

to be-

the things

presents

the former we truly know the latter?

as the

the intellect

is immaterial,

however,

of the

senses;2

The fact that the intelligible

its ontological
extra-mental

contours

the external

they specify

by abstra~tion,

one of

virtues.

the intelligible

own forms,

power,l

presence

come, in its own way, which
known by it.

but of a

of the human knowing

As the habitual
derived

body of knowledge,

episAs

proceeding

in

l~~.
I, 14, 1, resp.: "Cognoscentia a non cognoscentibus in hoc distinguuntur,
quia non cognoscentia
nihil habent nisi formam suam tantum; sed cognoscens na.tum
est habere formam etiam rei alterius, nam species cognoti
est in cognoscente." Ad 3: "Scientia est secundum modum
cognoscentis; sci tum enim est in sciente secundum modum
scientis."
2De Ver. X, 2, resp.: "Species intelligibiles
in
intellectu possibili remanent post actualem considerationem
et harum ordinatio est habitus scientiae." On the originality of this identification of intelligible species and
intellectual habit, cf. Lonergan, pp. 188-89.
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steps from partial
too is a gradual

to cornplete understanding~

process

level of understanding
process.
meaning

Therefore~
of resolution

and proceeds

in steps:

has its corresponding
the most direct
appears

resolution
each

resolutive

way to discover

the

to be by investigating

its

role in each of the stages of human understanding.
\

•

III

JUDGMENT

AND REDUCTION

In this chapter

TO THE SENSES

we wish to consider

and function

of the resolution

Thomas

I1reduction to the senses. 11 rrhat all our know-

calls

ledge is derived
repeated

natural

so insistently

just as insistent

deriving

in some fashion

from another

source.

any

He is

it as knowle6ge

to the senses.l

by reduction

is

of

left for asserting

that what establishes

is that it be judged

which

in a wide variety

that there are no grounds

knowledge

to judgment

from sense experience

by Thomas

treatises

proper

the nature

Where

lIn IV_ Sent., d.9, q.l, 0..4, q.l] sol.: "Judicium
enim perfectumhaberf
non potest de aliqua cognitione, nisi
per resolutionem ad principium unde cognitio ortum habet ...
Cum ergo omnis cognitio intellectus nostri a sensu oriatur,
non potest esse judicium rectum nisi reducantur ad sensum.
Et ideo Philosophus dicit in VI Eth. quod sicut principia
indemonstrabilia
quorum est intellectus, sunt extrema,
scilicet resolutionis, ita et singularia quorum est sensus.11
P. Rousselot, S.J. writes that Thomas lIrequiert une certaine
collaboration des sens, non seulement pour'fournir aux
jugements leur mati~re, mais pour critiquer l'usage wgme
de 10. facult~ de juger: c'est l'op~ration de la resolutio
in sensibilia.11 A note to this passage states: I1La resOIUtio
in sensibilia est en somme 10. constatation de l'etat normal
du sujet connaissant, necessaire
10. legitimite du
jugement." L'essemble des sense acquiert ains1 une valeur
criteriologique.11 L'intellectualisme
de S. Thomas (Paris:
Beauchesne, 1924, 2 ed.) p. 65.

a
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this is not possible,

we cannot h2xe perfect judgment,~

do not have real knowledge.
by this reduction
detailed

2

Precisely

to the senses?

explanation;

understood
necessary

to need frequent

of it as a resoltuion,
duction.
its nature

The most

does he give a

in fact, he does not mention

to need much explanation

it something

it more

too well

and too obviously
Sometimes

he speaks

but most often he calls it a re-

suitable

is to ask,

mention.

we

what does he mean

Nowhere

than a few times, as if he thought

1

way to Legin to investigate

'what is its function

in human

knowing? '
What is known by the human intellect
and immediately
things.3

is the natures

In their proper mode of existence

are individuated
sensible,
known,

or quiddities

by matter;

is unintelligible.

these natures

but individuated
Therefore,

must be abstracted

directly

of sensible
such natures
matter,

though

in order to be
from such matter.

4

l~.
I, 84, 8, resp.: "Unde impossibile est
quod sit nobis judicium intellectus perfectum cum ligamento
sensus, per quem res sensibilis cognoscimus."
2Ibid.,

ad 2.

3De Vel". XV, 1, ad 7: "Unde circa naturas rerum
sensibiliumprimo
figitur intuitus nostri intel1ectus ..."
Ibid., I, 12, resp.: "Quidditas ... rei est proprie obiectum
intel1ectus."
4S. T. I, 85, 1, resp.: "Cognoscere vero id quod
est in materia individuali, non prout est in tali materia,
est abstrahere formam a materia individuali."
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Thus abstraction
sensible

thing into its component

"resolution"
does,

in this very broad

in fact, several

resolution.l
rower,

is a sort of "dissolution"

times

However,

more technical

with abstraction,

parts,

of the concrete

and can be called

sense of the term.

speak of abstraction

when resolution

Thomas
as

is given its nar-

sense it not only is not synonymous

but is actually

opposed

to it, as we in-

tend to show.
What abstraction
not the way these natures
ever.3

Yet the natural

yields

is a universal;2

exist in sensible

capacity

things,

this is
how-

of the human intellect

.1-- a b ou t senSl.b"'Le tlngs.
. h'
t o k now th e t rU~11

4

is

Its knowing

lCompendium Theologiae I, 62: "Est enim duplex
resolutio, quae fit per intellectum.
Una secundum abstractionem formae a materia, in quo quidem proceditur ab
eo, quod formalius est, ad id, quod est materialius; nam
id, quod est primum subiectum, ultimo remanet, ultima vero
forma primo removetur.
Alia vera resolutio est secundum
abstractionem universalis a particulari, quae quodammodo
contrario ordine se habet; nam prius removentur conditiones materiales individuantes, ut accipiatur, quod commune
est ..." Cf. Also 9CG II, 100, #4; ST 1,12,6,
ad 3.
2De Vel'. II, 6, ad 1: "Unde patet quod abstractio,
quae est communi omnium inte11ectum, facit formam universalem. "
3SCG I, 53, #2: "Res exterior intellecta a nobis,
in intellectu nostro non existit secundum propriam naturam;"
Ibid., #3: "Intellectus ... intelligit rem ut separatam a
conditionibus materialibus,
sine quibus in rerum natura
non existit."
4In II Meta. I, #285: "Anima humana ... secundum
naturam est actus
corporis, ejus autem intellectiva potentia non est actus organi corporalis, ita habet naturalem
aptitudinem ad cognoscendum corporalium et sensibilium
veri ta tern..."
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e

activity,

therefore, must reach the things which
.
1
.ternal to the knower.
Their abstracted species
intellect

are only their formaJ. determinations,

their existential

reality;

they cannot be recognized
but only as disincarnate
which measures

cor:0real

possibilities,"

our knowledge

thing is as we think or say it to be.3

of

therefore,

existence,

It is the thing

of it, and whether

truth in what we think or say depends

in the
deprived

taken in themselves,
as having

are ex-

on whether

there

is

or not the

Thus the nature

IS. T. 1,84, 2, resp.: " ... actus cognitionis
extendit ad-ea-quae sunt extra cognoscentem. Cognoscimus
enim etiam ea quae extra nos sunt."

so

se

2phillipe, p. 227: "Son objet p~re,
immerge
dans la matiere, ne peut exister en dehors du monde sensible. Aussi l'intelligence doit-elle, pour Ie saisir, Ie
dematerialiser:
depouillement qui ne va pas sans Ie priver
de sa vie et de sa realite existentielle. Un tel objet
desincarne ne peut plus etre objet d'intuition, si l'on
reserve ~ ce terme Ie sense formel que lui donne S. Thomas.
L'intuition a un caractere immediat et total, que seul un
objet existant peut donner. Un objet abstrait ne peut etre
que Ie terme d'une apprehension, et cette apprehension est
necessairementd~pourvue
des proprietes reconnues ~
l'intuition. Sans doute l'apprehension,
comme l'intuition,
impliquent immediation objective: l'objet comme tel est
conhu en lui-meme sans aucun intermediare objectif."

3S. T. I-II, 64, 3, resp.: "Verum autem intellec~."
tus nostri absolute consideratum, est sicut mensuratum a
re; res enim est'mensura intellectus nostri, ut dicitur in
X Metaphy.; ex eo enim quod res est vel non est, veritas
est in opinione et in oratione. Sic igitur bonum virtutis
intellectualis
speculativae consistit in quodam medio, per
conformitatem ad ipsam rem, secundum quod dicit esse quod
est, vel non esse quod non est, in quo ratio veri consistit. II
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abstracted
actually

cannot be known truly unless

existing

in the material

lect in its first operation
natures

of things;

account

of the proper
Thomas

intellect
species

a second

only of the

operation

to take

that in the first act of the

is given to the intelligible

between

thing can it become

The intel-

of things.2

as its own form; not until

to the conformity

thing.3

existence

its attention

universe,l

takes account

it requires

explains

it is' known as

it turns

its species

and the extra-iliental

aware of the species

Thus it is only in composing

its attention

as true of the

and dividing

that the

IS. T. 1,84,7,
resp.: "1ntellectus ... humani,
qui est coniunctus corpori, proprium obiectum est quidditas
sive natura in materia corporali existens; ... De ratione
autem huius naturae est quod in aliquo individuo existat,
quod non est absque materia corporali, ... Unde natura ...
cuiuscumque materialis rei, cognosci non potest complete et
vere, nisi secundum quod cognoscitur ut in particulari existens."
21n I Sent., d.19, q.5, a.l, ad 7: "Prima operatio
respicit quiddItatem rei; secunda respicit esse ipsius.
Et
quia ratio veritatis fundatur in esse, et non in quidditate,
...ideoveritas
et falsitas proprie invenitur in secunda
operatione ... et non in prima." Cf. De Ver. I, 3, resp. and
Lonergan, p. 44.

3De Ver. 1,3, resp.: "Veri enim ratio consistit
in adequatio-rei et intellectus; idem autem non adaequatur
sibi sed qualitas diversorum est; unde ibi primo invenitur
ratio veritatis in intellectu ubi primo intellectus incipit
aliquid proprium habere quod res extra animam non habet, sed
aliquid ei correspondens,
inter quae adaequatio attendi
potest. 1ntellectus autem formans quidditates, non habet
nisi similitudinem rei existentis extra animam."
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'e

intellect
thing.1

applies

intelJigibility

It does not do this, however,

composition
joining

the ab~tracted

or division

or separating

the intellect's
intellect's
position

the predicate

commitment

judgment

or division

such positing

js a mental

which

merely

insofar

synthesis;2

It is the
of com-

thing;4

there may indeed be synthesis,

express

?

the synthesis

as true of the known

as its

the copula

and subject must

to the synthesis.J
posits

to the

1!without

as in a
l-

qur;stion or hypothesis,
The synthesis

may be true or false,

known to be either.

applicando

~ut as yet there

"Finally,

is no judgment.ll:J

but as yet it is not

so long as synthesis

is not

lSCG II, 96, #10: llCornponitautem aut dividit
intelligibilia
prius abstracta ad res."

2S. T. I, 3, 4, ad 2: "Esse dupliciter dicitur:
uno modo, significat actum essendi; alio modo, significat
compositionem propositlonis,
quam anima adinvenit coniugens
praedicaturn subiecto. 11 Cf. ibid., 1~8, 2, ad 2: In I Sent.,
d.19, q.5, a.l, sol.; and Lonergan, p. 49.
-----

31 n I. Perl. r
~erm. ITI
_,

. . nomlna
.
enlm
significant-alIquid,
scilicet qUQsdam conceptus simplices,
Iicet rerum compositiarum~
et ideo non est verum vel falsum,
ni8i quando additur esse vel non esse, per quae exprimitur
iud'icium intellectuE;~ I, Cf. Francis ':I'yrell,
The Role of
ABc,ent in Judgment: ~:.'Thomistic Study (l:Jashingt~D~C.:
Catholic University Press, 1948) p. 16.
J13[::
d):

"F'
.
d'1
.illlusmo

4De Ver. I, 9, resp.: "Veritas est in intellectu
... sicut consequens acturn intellectus, et sicut cognita
per intellectum.
Consiquitur namque intellectus operationern, secundum quod iudiciurn intellectus est de re secundum quod est." Cf. ibid., X, 8, resp.; ST 11--11,173,2,
resp.; ibid., I, 16--,
~ resp.: In I Perr-Herm., III, #7;
and Lonergan, pp. 49-50.
-- - ----- ._-5Lonergan,

p. 49.
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posited,

the peculiar

is lacking;
mation

objective

as yet the primary

(or negation)

of an

reference
meaning

reflects

its conformity

that it formally

attains

in judging

by means

with their natural

Thus this reflection

is an activity

tion, though

a necessary

element

acts which Thomas

refers

in several

p.

thing,

of the reflection
formal determinamode of existence.3

opposed

to abstrac-

of the epistemological

to as resolutions

what is the specific

lLonergan,

knowing

part of human knowing.

that they are some sort of reflexive
inquire

it is

truth.2

that the abstracted

Since the common

or division,

on its synthesis,

tions are recomposed

equally

compo-

with the extra-mental

It is, accordingly,
involved

of mental

with real composition

only when the intellect
and judging

of "Est," the affir-

'in actu esse' is not involved."I.

Since the truth is the correspondence
sition or division

of the judgment

nature

seems to be

activity,

we must

of the reflexion

in-

49.

2In I Peri Berm. III, #9: "Cognoscere autem
praedictam conformitatis-habitudinem
nihil est aliud quam
iudicare ita esse in re vel non esse." De Vel'. 1,3, resp.:
"Quando incipit judicare de 1'e apprehensa, tunc ipsum judicium intellectus est quoddam proprium ei, quod non invenitur
extra in reo
Sed quando adequatur ei quod est extra in re,
dicitur judicium verum esse.
Tunc autem judicat intellectus
de re apprehensa quando dicit quod aliquid est vel non est,
quod est intellectus componentis et dividentis; ... inde est
quod veritas per prius invenitur in compositione et
divisione intellectus ..."
3Phillipe,

pp. 22-28.
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volved

in judgment.
There are various

ordinary

perceptual

judgments

there are scientific
of these

sensible

about sensible

judgments

singulars,

which are not perceptible
though

types of judgments:

about the universal

from what the external

Some of the latter are perceptible

gination,

but some are perceptible
there are existential

each is reduced

rived

sider each type of judgment
to the small number
secondary

sources

of all,'when
means

Thomas

the external

Secondly,

We shall con-

in turn, utilizing,

to specific

corpus,

may avoid later confusion:

he customarily

reflexion

the
of

types of judgments.

speaks of "the senses,"

between

in addition

the implications

refers

first

he most often

an internal

we shall make use of the helpful

by Fr. Klubertanz

upon the way

in this way was de-

senses; when he means

such as imagination,

The way in

to begin with.

that have developed

observations

senses

to the ima-

of texts in the Thomistic

these texts with respect
A few general

judgments.

being evaluated

from sense experience

senses,

only to the intellect.

to the senses depends

in which the knowledge

natures

and others about universals

provide.

which

singulars;

as such by the external

they are apprehended

Finally,

there are

sense,

to it by name.
distinction

as a psychological

made
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"bending

back" and reflection

as Tlthinking back over. ,,1

The first need not be a consciously
this it is the counterpart
psychological
as such.

performed

of abstraction,

and does not require

The second is always

act, and in

which

is also

that one be aware of it

conscious

and frequently

metaphysical.
According
flection;2

to Thomas,

we judge that the thing corresponds

which we apprehend

about that thing--

fied by the predicate

thesis and the thing; a direct

re-

to the form

in, or absent

by the subject.3

some sort of comparison

involves

that the form signi-

is in fact present

from, the thing signified
requires

every judgment

between

comparison

Clearly

this

the mental

syn-

is not possible;

IGeorge P. Klubertanz, "St. Thomas and the
Knowledge of the Singular," New Scholasticism, XXVI, 2
(April, 1952) p. 147.
--2In II Meta. IV, #1236:"
in hoc sola secunda
operatione intellectus est veritas et falsitas, secundum
quam non solum intellectus habet similitudinem rei intellectae, sed etiam super ipsam similitudinem reflectitur,
cognoscendo et dijudicando ipsam." Cf. Lonergan, p. 76, and
Tyr'rell, p. 17.
3S. T. I, 16, 2, resp.: "Intellectus autem conformitatem sui ad rem intellegibilem cognoscere potest; ...
quando iudicat rem ita se habere sicut est forma quam de re
apprehendit, tunc primo cognoscit et dicit verum.
Et hoc
facit componendo et dividendo; nam in omni propositione
aliquam formam significatam per praedicatum, vel applicat
alicui rei significatae per subiectum, vel removet ab ea."
cr. Lonergan, p. 75.
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but for Thomas

it is not necessary

thing must be present
to be actively

either.

in the internal

understood,l

.

?

senses

When reflected

there

image sufficient

the thing as it exists
that the composition

for its concept

not only when it is first under-

stood, but at any time.-

is in this sensible

The image of the

outside

on in its origin,
evidence

the mind to ground

or division

corresponds

does not doubt the trustworthiness

sense powers

(so long, of course,

he is not hesitant

can know the conformity

a judgment

to the thing.3

Since Thomas

normally),

about

of our

as these are functioning

to affirm

of its mental

that the intellect

synthesis

with the

lSCG III, 41, #2: "Intellectus enim noster secundum statum praesentem, nihil intelligit sine phantasmate,
quod ita se habet ad intellectum possibilem, quo intelligimus, sicut se habent colores ad visum ... "
2Ibid., II, 73, #41: "Necessitas phantasmatum ad
intellectum possibilem erit sicut est illius qui jam habet
scientiam ad considerandum secundum scientiam illam quod
etiam sine phantasmatibus
non posset.1I Cf. De Ver., X, 6,
resp.; and srI' I, 84, 7, resp. and ad 1.
--

3~.
1,84,7,
resp.: IINatura...cuiuscumque
materialis rei, cognosci non potest complete et vere, nisi
secOndum quod cognoscitur ut in particulari existens.
Particulare autem apprehendimus per sensum et imaginationem.1I
Of this text one author states that it IIlays the foundation
for knowledge of the singular and the conformity of the intellect with reality in judgment ... \1 He goes on to say,
however, that Thomas does not discuss these matters e~plicitly in this text; that here he is not so much saying
that all human knowledge is judgmental as that seeing an
intelligibility
in phantasms is the way of knowing proper
to the human intellect as human. rEad W. Guzie, IIEvolution
of Philosophical 1'Ilethod
in the WrJ tings of St. Thomas,"
Modern Schoolman, XXXVII (1959-60) pp. 115-16.
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thing by referring

to its sensible

Thus the intellect

judges

by reflecting

2

derived.

The reflection
any thinking

image from which

Is this a conscious
of judgment

and formally.

is not a knowledge

His explicit

reflection?
which

existing

universal

nature

is known by abstraction

however,

in some sensible

the intelligible

in its first abstraction

very lacking

in intelligible

representation

detail

of the nature.

with things

having

the species

are gradually

knowledge,

of truth as truth,

nature

intellect

its knowledge

is that through

universal

singulars:

about the thing

man knows that he knows, that he possesses

truth consciously
however,

its proposition

on the sensible

was originally

image of the thing.l

the nature,

singular.

The

from sensible

species received
of a universal

in the

nature

is

and so an inadequate

Through

repeated

the intelligible

sharpened

but cf some

experience
contours

and clarified--

of

the name

lIn Boeth de Trin. VI, 2, ad 5: "Phantasmata comparentur adintellectumutobiecta,
in quibus inspicit omne
quod inspicit vel secundum perfectam repraesentationem
vel
per negationem." Guzie, p. 108: "Phantasms, though they are
not to be confused with the intelligible content of the
judgment itself, must nevertheless be present as sensory
representations
or symbols of what is affirmed or denied in
the act of judging." On the trustworthiness
of the se~se
powers cf. pe Ver. I, 9, and ST I, 16, 2.
2S. T. II-II, 154, 5, ad 3: " ... iudiciun, quod
perficitur per conversionem ad sensibilia, quae sunt prima
principia cogitationis humanae." Cf. Ibid., 173, 3, resp.
and Rousselot, p. 65, n. 1.
---
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for this process
originated

in sensible

to the sensible
Therefore,
volved

l

is induction.

singulars.

singulars,

singulars

we may discover

by inquiring

the intellect

must return

in order to judge its truth.
what sort of reflection

how the intellect

knows

is in-

sensible

2
Only the sense powers

suCh:3

Since this knowledge

the intellect

knows

can, know the singular

singulars

indirectly

as

by a sort

lIn VI Eth. III, #1148: "Est enim duplex doctrina
ex cognitis:una
quidem per inductionem, alia vero per
syllogisum.
Inductio enim autem inductiur ad cognoscendum
aliquod principium et aliquod universale in quod devenimus
per experimenta singularium." As we use the term today,
induction is the process of collecting and correlating
particular sensory experiences of particular sensible things
by which we come to a generalization
stating a specific
observation made under specified constant conditions to be
factually true of a certain kind of thing.
Induction merely
establishes, it does not explain.
Thus we distinguish induction from insight-- an act of understanding which grasps
the nature, the reason for the fact.
For Thomas, "induction'! named generalization and insight together, but
primarily the latter. Cf. In II Post. Anal. 20, #11, #14,
#15; In VI Eth.; #1148; In-r Met~,
#29; In Joan I, 1
(S. Thomae Opera Omnia. Parma: Fiaccadori, 1852-73, vol. 10)
Cf. J. Peghaire, Intellectus et Ratio selon S. Thomas
d'Aquin (Paris: Vrin, 1936) p-.-268.
2For a detailed study of all the relevant
see Klubertanz, pp. 135-66 passim.

texts

3In I Meta. I, #30: "Cognitiones singularium magis
sunt propriae sensibus quam alicui alteri cognitioni, cum
omnis cognitio singularium a sensu oriatur."

l

of reflection.
related
aware

powers

thing.
singular
2

of the human

is a particular

Thus the intellect
because
Thomas

of something

likeness

a reflection

extending

on the

of the extra-mental
of the

union with the imagina-

says that the intellect

but it knows the singular

can become

can get some knowledge

of its dynamic

directly,

are mutually

soul, the intellect

of what the senses know through

image which

tion.

Since sense and intellect

itself

by a bending

knows the quiddity
towards

the thing,

back on the image

IS. T. I, 86, 1, resp.: "Indirecte autem et quasi
per quandam reflexior1em, l)otest cognoscere s:Lngulare~ quia,
etiam postquam species intelligibiles abtrarerit, non
potest secundum eas Rctu intelligere nisi convertendo se
ad phantasmata, in quibus species intelligibiles intelligit .... Sic igitur ipsom universale per speciem intelligibilem directe intelligit; indirecte autem sin~llaria,
quorum sunt propositionem:
Socrates est homo.!!
2De Ver. II, 6, resp.: "Intellectus noster, per
se loquendo-,-singularia non cognoscat, sed universalia
tantum; ... Sed per accidens contingit quod intellectus
noster singulare cognoscit; ... Inquantum ergo intellectus
noster per simil:Ltudinem quam accepit a phantasmate, reflectitur in ipsum phantasma a quo speciem abstrahit, quod
est similitudo particularis, habet quamdam cognitionem de
singulari secundum continuationem quamdam intellectus ad
imaginationem."
Ibid., ad 3: "Homo cognoscit singularia
per irr:aginationem et sensum, et ideo potest applicare
universalem cognitionem quae est in intellectu, ad particulare, non enim proprie loquendo, sensus aut intellectus
cognoscunt, sed homo per utrumque." Cf. Klubertanz, p. 146.
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from which

image, however,
through

.
1
species were abstracted.

the intelligible
is derived

from the sensible

sense experience.2

is no reason

for thinking

Klubertanz

The

singular

observes

that this reflexion

that there

is a con-.

scious one.3
It can be a conscious
then the result

will be a scientific

of the singular,4
ligible

which,

species which

supposes

But ordinary
physical
a return.

because

perceptual

reflection--

they require

point from which

does,

its knowledge

not be aware of doing

so.

of the act of know-

awareness

analysis

judgments

The intellect

knowledge

it speaks of the intel-

in character:

metaphysical

of course:

reflective

is the principle

ing, is metaphysical
species

reflection,

of this

and reflection.5

do not require

meta-

only a reflexion,

in fact, return
Originated,6

Its awareness

i. e.,

to the

but it need

is rather

of the

lIn III De Anima, 8, #713: rr[Intelle~tusJ cognoscit enim:naturam-speciei,
sive quod quid est, directe extendo seipsum, ipsum autem singulare per quamdam reflexionem, inquantum redit super phantasmata, a quibus species
intelligibiles abstrahuntur." Cf. Klubertanz, p. 147.
2Klubertanz,

p. 165.

3Klubertanz,

p. 147.

4Klubertanz,

p. 147.

5Lonergan,
6Klubertanz,

p. 171, n. 174.
p. 148.
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thing,l

and it would

seem that what is required

ment about a sensible

singular

the fact of the presentation
rather

the manner

of its presentation.

any judgment.

than, as in metaphysical

it would

Moreover,

requires

Therefore,

seem that reflexion

it would

reflection,
to return

of
to

is essential

seem that certitude

that one be conscious

that it be reflectively

of

for

since truth is in the intellect

as known by the intellect,2
judging

would be a recognition

of the thing-with-such-a-

character,

our question,

for a judg-

grasped.3Thus

in

of this reflexion;
we may call it a

IDe Vel'. II, 6, resp.: "S.imilitudo quae est in
sensu, abstrahitur a re ut ab objecto cognoscibili, et ideo
res ipsa per illam similitudinem directe cognoscitur; similitudo autem que est in intellectu, non abstrahitur a
phantasmate sicut ab objecto cognoscibili, sed sicut a
medio cognitionis; ... Unde intellectus noster non directe
ex specie quam suscipit, fertur ad cognoscendum phantasmata,
sed ad cognoscendum rem cujus est phantasmata."
2S. T. I, 16,2,
resp.: "Perfectio ... intellectus
est verum ut cognitum." Cf. above p. 66, n. 4.
3Cf. In II Meta. IV, #1236, above p. 69, n. 2.
Of this text Charles Boye-r, S.J . writes: "There, the two
ac~s of. the mind are studied in their differences and their
relations.
The first is the simple apprehension, the conception of a notion, the seizure of a non-complex.
By
reason of this act the mind comes into possession of a resemblance of the object, but it is still ignorant of the
nature of its acquisition.
The mind then places a second
act by means of which it returns on this possessed resemblance in order to know it as such and to affirm it as such.
This second act is the judgment.
To judge, therefore, is
to seize and affirm the conformity of a first apprehension
with the thing known."
"The Meaning of a Text of St.
Thomas: De Veritate, Q. 1, A. 9," Appendix to Peter Hoenen,
S.J., Reality and Judgment According ~o St. Thomas (Chicago:
Henry Regnery Co., 1952) p. 301.
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reflective

reflexion;

is an awareness
describes
phrases

simultaneous

with the reflexion

of doing it in a concrete

this reflection

instance.l

in D
__
E Ve_r
__
i_t_a_t_2
I, 9;

2

there
Thomas

Boyer para-

it as follows:
Truth is found in the intellect, not only as
actualized but as known; and it is known
because the intellect, in the act of judgment,
refle8ts upon its first operation, the act of
simple apprehension.
By means of this reflection, the intellect is not only conscious
of its act, but it has certitude that its act
is the expression of ~eality.
Now it cannot
gain such certitude except in the knowledge
of the nature of its act, and it cannot know
the nature of its act without knowing simultaneously the nature of the principle of this
act.
This principle is the intellect, and its
nature is to be-conformed to what is. A:l
these things can be known together in the act
itself of the judgment which terminates in the
object and this is possible because there is
no need of many acts to attain a cognition
and its conditions.
Truth is found as known
in the judgment because in this act the intellect reflects completely on itself and
grasps its proper nature.3

By reflecting

on its first act, that of simple apprehension,

lBoyer, p. 297: "The jud.gment is essentially an
ac~ of reflection, a return of the intellect on itself.ll
2De yer. I, 9, resp.: "Cognoscitur autem ab intellectu secundum quod intellectus reflectitur supra actum
suum, non solum secundum quod cognoscit actum suum, sed
secundum quod cognoscit proportionem eius ad rem: quod
quidem cognosci non potest, nisi cognoscatur natura principii activi, quod est ipse intellectus, in cuius natura est
ut rebus conformatur; unde secundum hoc cognoscit veritatem
intellectus quod supra seipsum reflectitur."
3Boyer,

p. 309.
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the intellect
position

makes

a judgment

or division:

fected

cause of the species

to the senses,
knowledge,

always
,

we must

in some way resolve
Thomas

of the text implies,

tion can be reduced

of
It

states.2

But the

image;

involves

"since the senses are the first

the same way in every case.3

attained

its species.l

is the sensible

of judgment

about which we judge,"
dammodo

once the nature

as it is aware of being af-

by the object known through

fore, the reflection

as a com-

it must be aware of its act.

of its act inasmuch

material

is expreBsed

in order to know.at

its act and its own nature,
is aware

which

there-

a reduction

source

of our

to sense everything
A.s the word quod-

this reduction

is not made

What is attained

to the senses directly,

in

by abstrac-

whereas

in some other way may be able to be reduced

what

is

to the

lIn III Sent., d.23, q.l, a.2, ad 3: "Intellectus
autem ... sicut-aIi~ognoscit
seipsum quia scilicet per
speciem non quidem sui, sed obiecti, quae est forma ejus;
ex qua cognoscit actus sui naturam, et ex natura actus
naturam potentia cognoscentis, et ex natura potentiae
naturam essentiae ..."

nostrae
dammodo

2De Vel'. XII, 3, ad 2: "Sed quia primum princ1pium
cognitionis est sensus, oportet ad sensum quodresolvere omnia de quibus iudicamus."

3In Boeth de Trin. VI, 2, resp.: "In qualibet
cognitione duo-est conslderare, scilicet principium et terminum.
Principium quidem ad apprehensionem pertinet,
terminus autem ad iudicium; ibi enim cognitio perficitur ...
sed terminus cognitionis non semper est uniformiter: quandoque enim est in sensu, quandoque in imaginatione, quandoque oritem in solo intellectu."
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senses only indirectly.
quiddities

are abstracted

but not from sensible
reduction

manifested

by these

things whose

from individual

matter

to the external

adequately
revealed

Hence natural

altogether,l

senses,

sensible

can be judged

since their natures

by their properties

are

and accidents

grasps ~he essential

must be judged by being reduced

to the external

nature
senses;

its truth is thus established,

however,

internal

since it is through

strumentality

by

senses.2

The insight which

senses

matter,

is sufficient,

reduction

of the image that it passes

once

to the
the in-

from habitual

to

IDe Ver. II, 6, ad 1: "Duplex est materia a qua
fit abstractio; scilicet materia intelligibilis
et sensibilis, •.. et dico intelligibilem, ut que consideratur in
natura continui; sensibilem autem sicut materia naturalis.
Utroque autem duplicitur accipitur; scilicet ut signata, et
ut non signata: et dicitur signata secundum quod consideratur cum determinatione diminsionum, horum scilicet vel illorum; non signata autem quae sine determinatione
dimensionum consideratur.
Secundum hoc igitur est sciendum, quod
materia signata est individuation1s
principium, a qua abstrahit omnis intellectus, secundum quod dicitur abstrahere
ab hic et nunc.
Intellectus autem naturalis non abstrahit
a materia sensibili non signata." Cf. In Boeth de Trin. I,
3; De Malo. XVI, 7, ad 5; SCG 111,84,#6-.----2In Boeth de 'l'rin.VI, II, resp.: "Quandoque enim
proprietateS-et
accidentia rei, quae sensu demonstrantur,
sufficienter exprimunt naturam rei, et tunc oportet quod
iudicium de rei natura quod facit intellectus conformetur
his quae sensus de re demonstrat.
Et huiusmodi sunt omnes
res naturales, quae sunt determinatae ad materiam sensib1lem, et ideo in scientia naturali terminari debet cognitio
ad sensum, ut scilicet hoc modo iudicemus de rebus natura~
libus, secundum quod sensus eas demonstrat, ..."
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actual

knowledge.

it can be recalled
need for a sensible

This image

thing having

the external

knowledge

of sensible

reduction
back"

senses.l

senses

by the memory,

command

the nature

is a reflexive

and

any

to be presently
all new

to the ex-

it need be reduced

in order to be used.

to the senses

without

So, in summary,

beings must be reduced

senses; but once acquired

the internal

retained

at the intellect!s

affecting

ternal

j.3

only to

Nevertheless,

process,

this

a "bending

on the induct1.on and the abstractj.on, thus 1.tmoves

the opposite
synonym

d1.rection from them.

in

Hence if induct1.on is a

for resolut1.on, as has been cla1.med, it cannot be

for reflexive
process.2

resolut1.on, since induction

But 1.f previously

acquired

is not a reflexive

knowledge

is used to

lSCG II, 73, #38: "Sed, PO:3t speciem in eo receptam, 1.ndigeteo quasi instrumento sive fundamento suae
specie1.: unde se habet ad phantasmata sicut causa ef'fic1.ens;
secundum enim imper1.um intellectus, f'ormatur in imaginatione
phantasmata conveniens tali speciei intellig1.bili, in quo
resplendet species intelligibilis
sicut exemplar in exemplato sive in imagine. I! Ib1.d., #41: " ... 1.n potestate
nostra est formare phantasmata accomodata consideratione
quam volumus, ..." Cf. Guzie, p. Ill, aEd Lonergan, p. 30.
2Cf. L-M Regis, Ep1.stemology (New York: Macmillan,
1959), p. 446. The note to his--remarks (p. 535, n. 99)
refers one to h1.s earlier art1.cle (e1.ted above, p. 19, n. 1)
for the supporting texts, but in that article the term
inducere is not listed among ihe synonyms for resolutio, so
one can only guess at the text or texts which led h1.rnto
this conclusion.
Perhaps one is SCG I, 12, where inducere
is used in reference to quia demonstration:
"Ex rationibus
demonstrativis,
mens nostra inducitur huiusmodi propositionem de Deo formare, quae exprimat Deum esse."
Of this
text A. Hayen in La Communication de l'etre d'apres S.
Thomas d' Aquin (Paris: Desclee de Brouwer~--1957) p. 122, wr'\t4!$
that here indu6ereis
used in a less techincal sense, since
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to assert

something

such an assertion
to the external

about a sensible

must always

senses,l

tact the singular

be established

be reduced

intellect

knows,

the external
they appear
likewise

correlated

apprehends

senses,

to them indirectly,
it acquires
Thomas

There

and compared

is not per-

It can, of course,

since whatever

from the evidence

the

provided

by

gives only a few examples;

in a variety ,of contexts

comes closest

con-

it cannot be reduced

in order to be judged.

senses.

varies.

senses

directly.

ceived as such by the external

always

of

by a reduction

for only the external

When what the intellect

to them directly

singular', the truth

and Thomas'

terminology

is no one text in which all are
with each other:

to this is Question

the text which

Six, Article

Two of his

induction as such, according to Thomas is radically distinct
from syllogistic reasoning. Cf. In VI Eth., #1148.
As we
shall see, quia argumentation belongs to-the via inventionis, and:i:3-a non-reflexive sort of a resolution, as abstraction also is: in this sense, induction may be said to
be a synonym for resolution.
lIn Boeth de Trin. V, 2, ad 4: "Scientia est de
aliquo dupliciter.
Uno modo primo et principaliter,
et sic
scientia est de rationibus universalibus,
supra quas fund atur.
Alio modo est de aliquibus secundario et quasi per
reflexionem quandam, et sic de illis rebus, quarum sunt
illae rationes, in quantum illas rationes applicat ad res
etiam particulares, quarum sunt, adminieulo inferiorem
virium.
Ratione enim universali utitur sciens et ut re
seita et ut media seiendi.
Per universalem enim hominis
rationem possum iudieare de hoc vel de ilIa." Cf. ST I, 86,
1, resp.; Lonerga.n, p. 169, writes: "Our science is of the
universal and necessary, and to account for a contingent and
particular judgment ... one must appeal to understanding
as
reflecting on sensitive knowledge."
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Commentary

on Boethius_~'!2~ Trinit.ai.:-~"
but it deals

with the three speculative
be developed

sciences.

from a few scattered

for us today for two reasone:
concern

themselves

natural

things,

predicting

confuse

know how he understood

the doctrine

available

accepted

it.

to an author

knowers

ceived

and

we no
of

on both

one in his own day, he selto enable us to
would

seem

used in such a case: to denot

at the time he set it down.
an assertion

true is its cor-

with what is, and the only way in which human

is through

the senses,

by the senses must

order that it be recognized
talk very frequently
rather

his position

make contact with the thing as it exists

own right

of

more often

in the light of the knowledge

Since what makes
respondence

describing

The best approach

himself

no longer

definitions

and, secondly,

sbout his illustration

to be the one Thomas

sciences

from which his theory

and because

issues was the commonly

velop

the proper

behaviour;

must

This is not easy

Hence his illustrations

than clarify,

dom says enough

hints.

with accurately

the physiology

is derived.

Thus his doctrine

the natural

seeking

but rather

their proper

longer accept
sensation

with

only

somehow

even what cannot be perbe reduced

as true.

senses provide.

to them in

But Thomas

does not

about how this is done: he talks

of how what is not perceived

by the intellect,

in its

is nevertheless

by the senses,

derived

but only

from what the

In the one text where he does discuss

how
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such things
between

are judged

to be true, he makes

what can be perceived

cannot be perceived

either,

on the basis

group of knowables,
abstraction
sensible

of mathematics;
straction,

ter.

apprehended

sensible

matter,

perceptible

a certain

but not from

to the external
entirely

reference

by the imagination;

sort of ab-.

in which all the sen-

yet it is not abstracted

judged by reduction

The first

The second group is the object

it is known by a different

There remains

by

as we have seen, are known by simple

often called precision,

are excluded,

senses, but can be per-

and what cannot be perceived

altogether.

sible characteristics

senses, what

of their diver'se relations.

from individual

matter

by the external

by the external

ceived by the imagination,

a distinction

hence

senses

from mat-

to matter

which

is

such things may be

to the imagination.l

The third group

lIn Boeth de Trin. VI, 2, resp.: "Quaedam vero
sunt, quarum-iudicium-non
dependet ex his quae sensu percipiuntur, quia quamvis secundum esse sint in materia sensibili, tamen secundum rationem diffinitivam sunt a materia
sensibili abstracta.
Iudicium autem de unaquoque re potiisime fit secundum eius diffinitivam rationem.
Sed quia
secundum rationem diffinitivam non abstrahunt a qualibet
materia, sed solum a sensibili et remotis sensibilibus condictionibus remanet aliquid imaginabile, ideo in talibus
oportet quod iudicium sumatur secundum id quod imaginatio
semonstrat.
Huiusmodi autem sunt mathematica.
Et ideo in
mathematicis oportet cognitionem secundum iudicium terminari ad imaginationem, non ad sensum, quia iudicium mathematicum superat apprehensionem
sensus." Cf. ibid., V, 3.
There is, in addition to rnathematicals, another-group which
cannot be reduced to the external senses, but only to the
imagination, since it is the latter which has produced them
by dividing and recomposing the sensible characteristics
perceived by the external senses.
These are the products
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is entirely

independent

by abstraction
onstration

of matter,

at all: they are attained

or by a judgment

be judged by direct
or imagination.

and so cannot be attained
either

of separation.

reference

by quia dem-

Thus they cannot

either to the external

These are the objects

which here means both metaphyics

of divine

senses

science,l

and sacred doctrine.

What vTe learn from this text is that what is material
reduced

and apprehended
to the external

and apprehended

with sensible

matter

senses, whereas

with imaginable

matter2

can be directly

what is material
can be directly

of creative imagination: one is reflectively aware of
having "thought them up." Cf. ST I, 84, 6, ad 2.
lIn Boeth de Trin. VI, 2, resp.: "Quaedam vero
sunt quae excedunt et id quod cadit sub sensu et id quod
cadit sub imaginatione, sicut ilIa quae omnino a materia non
dependent neque secundum esse neque secundum considerationem, et ideo talium cognitio secundum iudicium neque debet
terminari ad imaginationem neque ad sensum.
Sed tamen ex
his, quae sensu vel imaginatione apprehenduntur,
in harum
cognitionem devenimus vel per viam causalitatis, sicut ex
effectu causa perpenditur, quae non est effectui connensurata, sed excellens, vel per excessum vel per remotionem, quando omnia, quae sensus vel imaginatio apprehendit,
a rebushuiusmodi
separamus; quod modos cognoscendi divina
ex ~ensibilibut ponit Dionysius in libro De divinis nominibus.
Uti ergo possumus in divinis et sensu et imaginatione sicut principiis nostrae considerationis,
sed non
sicut terminus, ut scilicet iudicemus talia esse divina,
qualia sunt quae sensus vel imaginatio apprehendit.
Deduci
autem ad aliquid est ad illud terminari.
Et iedo in divinis neque ad imaginationem neque ad sensum debimus
deduci ..."
2For this substitution of "imaginable" for the
usual "intelligible" cf. Maurer's explanation, p. 29, n. 13
in his translation of Questions Five and Six of Thomas'
Commentary on Boethius' de Trinitate.
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reduced

to the imagination,

but not to the external

On the other hand, what does not exist as material
be perceived

through

the senses directly;

either by a judgment
Hence

Thomas

directly

(per se) sensible

directly

(per accidens);~

,

both proper

reduced

and common

intellect

external

any proper

the directly

or common

with respect

or

only inincludes

The indirectly

sensible

sensible

with respect

to a

it, or what is indirectly
being apprehended

So, for example,

life is not dis-

senses.2

Yet it is known by the

in what the senses provide:

the intellect,

sensible

what is

to all the senses,

to the external

ceive is someone

between

and what is sensible

sensibles.

only by the intellect.
cernible

to either

distinguishes

sense that does not perceive
sensible

it is apprehended

senses.
Elsewhere

is either

cannot

of separat~Lon or by quia demonstration.

it cannot be directly

internal

senses.

speaking

recognizing

or moving

what the latter per-

about on his own, and

these activities

as evidence

for

lIn II De Anima VI, 1. 13, nn. 383-398.
2Thus the biologist recognizes life through the
characteristic
life functions, such as respiration, assimilation, growth, healing: what gives no evidence of
carrying on such activities is classified as non-living,
and what, though morphologically
identical with other individuals which do carry them on, is not doing so at the
time, is classified as dead.
The latter can be difficult,
as the current discussion regarding organ transplants shows.
There would be no such problem if life were directly
sensible.
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f

It

the presence
manifesting

of a life principle,
them is alive.l

to the senses?
its reduction

Thomas

activity

How is this judgment

indirect.

the common

of the external

.,
ourse~ves

are a I'lve. 2

recognize

speaking

senses,

unlikely

hence

that the indirect

as flowing
reduction

sense as well as the external

there would be a direct

the common

Likewise

intellect

sense.
is based

our knowledge

on our awareness

that we

of life withfrom life;

would be to

senses.

own case, however,

the

that we would

about as evidence

these in ourselves

the common

seem that

He does say, however,

that we perceive

It appears

or moving

reduced

sense, which discerns

out experiencing
it appears

that the subject

does not say, but it would

is similarly

that it is through

affirms

In our

reduction

to

that we have an

that we do actually

IS. T. I, 12, 3, ad 2: IIVita autem non videtur
oculo forporali, sicut per se visibile, sed sicut sensibile
per accidens; quod quidem a sensu non cognoscitur, sed statim cum sensu ab aliqua virtute cognoscitiva.1I In II De
Anima, VI, 1.13, #396: IISicut statim cum video aliquem
loquentem, vel movere seipsium, apprehendo per intellectum
vit~m eius unde possum dicere quod video eum vivere.1I
2In II De Anima VI, 1. 13, # 390: "Sensus enim
communis estquaedam-potentia,
ad quam terminantur immutationes omnium sensuum.
Unde impossibile est quod sensus
communis habeat aliquod proprium objectum, quod non sit
objectum sensus proprii.
Sed circa immutationes ipsas
sensuum proprium a suis objectis, quas sensus proprii habere
non possunt: sicut quod percipit ipsas immutationes sensuum,
et discernit inter sensibilia diversorum sensuum.
Sensu
enim communi percipimus nos vivere et discernimus inter
sensibilia diversorum sensuum, scilicet album dulce.1I Cf.
ST I, 87, 3, ad 3.
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l

understand:
provided

by the internal

Our knowledge
intellect
acting

it seems the evidence
senses,

for this t60 would be

and so reduced

of the will is similar:

understands

the will through

on it and being acted on by it.

Thomas

acts proceed

But we would no~ recognize

says that the

its experience
He further

that we know the will has free choice because
ence that opposite

to them.

of

says

we experi-

from it successively.2

this unless

we remembered

the

l~.
I, 87 ~ 1 ~ resp.:"
seipsum intelligat
intellectus noster, secundum quod fit actu per species a
sensibilibus abstractas per lumen intellectus agentis, quod
est actus ipsorum intelligibilium,
et eis mediantibus intelligit intellectus possibilis.
Non ergo per essentiam
suam, sed per actum suum se cognoscit intellectus noster.
Et hoc dupliciter.
Uno quidem modo, particulariter,
secundum quod Socrates vel Plato percipit se habere animam
intellectivam, ex hoc quod percipit se intelligere.
Alio
modo, in universali, secundum quod naturam humanae mentis
ex actu intellectus consideramus .... Est autem differentia
inter has duas cognitiones.
Nam ad primam cognitionem de
mente habendam sufficit ipsa mentis praesentia, quae est
principium actus ex quo mens percipit seipsam.
Et ideo
dicitur se cognoscere per suam praesentiam.
Sed ad secundam cognitionem de mente habendam non sufficit eius
praesentia, sed requiritur diligens et subtilis inquisitio."
De Malo VI, 1, ad 18: "Principium humanae cognitionis est a
sensu; non tamen oportet quod quidquid ab homine cognoscitur, sit sensui subjectum, vel per effectum sensibilem immediate cognoscatur; nam et ipse intellectus intelligit se
ipsum per actum suum, qui non est sensui subjectus."
2De Malo, ibid.: "Similiter etiam et interiorem
actum voluntatis intelligit, inquantum per actum intellectus quodammodo movetur voluntas, et alio modo actus intellectus causatur a voluntate, ... potentia voluntatis ad
opposita se habens cognoscitur a nobis, non quidem per hoc
quod actus oppositi sint simul, sed quia s~ccessive sibi
invicem succedunt ab eodem principio."
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earlier

acts,

the internal

so it would
senses,

especially

The most obscure
istential
istence

judgment:

is as serted

case of this sort is the exjudgments

the act of ex-

than stated, but in exj.stential
is that a certain

quiddity

that it has esse, that it is an ens.1

The evidence

the existence

is immediate,

of actually

it all judgments
ask exactly

writings.
answer

of existence

However,

Robert
which

on this question;

a commentary

Schmidt

for existence

limits

levels

of evidence,

equally

indicative

out an
re-

is intended

as

of Thomas,

it here.2

in sense perception

of existence.

and to

found in

to Gilson's

of the thought

all conducive

for

But when we

S. J. has worked

itself

is--

in Thomas'

since the latter

in utilizing

discerns

answer

Schmidt,

on and explanation

we see no difficulty

Aquinas,

must be reduced.

we find no direct

in an article

flection

sensed being

what is the evidence

sense knowledge,

is to

the memory.

in predicative

is implied rather

.j udgment s what

seem that here reduction

to knowledge,

different
but not all

The first level is that of

IGilson, The Christian Philosophy
pp. 41, 44:--;d. ~'1'..J3",,'kV'-:l
cA••cL,-.<.v,

of St. Thomas

2Robert Schmidt, S. J., "The Evidence Grounding
Judgments of Existence," in An Entienne Gilson Tribute, ed.
Charles J. 0 I Neil, (l\1ilwaukee:Marquette University Press,
1959) pp. 228-44. We have added supporting texts in Thomas
whenever possible.
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formal

determination:

nite objects
things,

these determinations

of our knowledge

quate evidence

The second

for our ordinary

we are aware of as present
tiple determinations,
situation

perceptual

is a concrete

known as an object

and in some sense external
tellectual~

rather

in the sensory
acteristics

evidence

subject

in a sensible
to be derived

is still very inadequate:

of mul-

of our knowledge

but the insight

is inis grounded

of formal

interacting

world.

what

in a definite

Such awarene8S

unity,

ade-

judgments:

of the togetherness

in a functional
unities

to us.

than sensory;

of existence

evidence

level provides

in space and time, independent

functional

or as belonging

So on this level there is not yet any proper

for existence.l

evidence

defi-

but they are not properly

for we do not know them as beings

to beings.

notion

constitute

char--

with other

However,

the

from this level of sense
existence

at this level
')

means

"to be there",
The reason

Thomas

a purely

static notion.G.

it is inadequate

does not mean by existence

By existence

he does not mean

ISchmidt,

merely

something

pp. 231-33.

2Ibid., pp. 233-34.

is, of course,

that

"being present."
static, but some-
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thing dynamicl--

in fact the most dynamic

the source of all other dynamisms.2
known as dynamic,

must have an influence

its own activity,

causality

by the thing--

with respect

to be

itself dynamica.lly

an actj.vity which

upon the knower,lf3

be aware of being affected
efficient

For existence

If
the thing must present

... and do so through

of all since it is

The knower must
of its exercising

to his knowing

power,

which

-.

is in some sense passive

and actualized

by it.4

The funda-

lSCG I, 22, #7: "Esse actum quemdam nominat; non
enim dicitur-esse aliquid ex hoc quod est in potentia, sed
ex hoc quod est in actu.tI ST I, 14, 1, ad 3: IfIpsum esse est
perfectissimum
omnium; comparatur enim ad omnia ut actus.
Nihil enim habet actualitatem, nisi inquantum est; unde
ipsum esse est actualitas omnium rerum ..." Cf. GilsoD, The
Christia.n Philosophy, p. 34 and p. 446, n. 17; and Schmidt,
p. 241: "Existing is not what some particular sort of being
does under particular circumstances, but what any being does
by the very fact of being a being.!!
2SCG II, 54, #3: "Ipsum esse ... est proprius actus
substantiae totius; ejus enim actus est esse de quo
possumus dicere quod sit; esse autem
dicitur ... de toto;
... ipsa substantia est id quod est
" Ibid., #5: "Etiam
formam comparatur ipsurn esse ut actus.
Per hoc enim, in
compositis ex materia et forma, forma dicitur esse principium essendi, quia est complementum substantiae cujus actus
est ipsum esse." Ibid., #6: " ... in compositis ex materia
et 'forma, nec materia nec forP.1apotest diei ipsum quod est,
nec etiam ipsum esse; forma tamen potest dici quo est, secundum quod est essendi principium.
Ipsa autem tota substantia est ipsum quod est; et ipsum esse est quo substantia denominatur ens." cr. Gilson, Christian Philosophy,
pp. 33-34, p. 445, n. 11.
3Schmidt,

p. 235.

4In V Meta. I, #751: "Hoc vero nomen causa, importat influxum quemdam ad esse causati." Cf. Gilson,
ghristian Philosophy, p. 468, n. 14; Schmidt, p. 235.
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mental

evidence

this awareness
the common

is our consclou.~.!;.~~~_
that we are sensing;

sense attains

object.l

of being as causal

that such activity

must be itself

ground

the judgment

reflectively

caused by active

motive

of existence;

for the assent

is grasped,
attain

when the sensory

the efficient
evidence

of judgment.

manner

upori which

energy

aware-

and re-

it provides

something

can, beginning

"Our awareness

of sensible

things

all our judgments

the

is existing
with this,

of undergoing
is the natural

of existence

are

grounded. I; 4
The judgment
sible things

directly

lSchmidt,

co~cerning
presented

the existence

of sen-

to us is "immediate"

in

p. 237.

2Gilson, Christian
Cf. In IX Meta., 8, #1861.

Philosophy,

3Schmidt,

pp. 239-40.

4Schmidt,

p. 244.

to

In sense knowledge,

in which

as such.3

causality

formally

as evidence,

but the intellect

existence

we grasp

makes use of what the senses present

by the intellect

only the particular

the

act of being.2

in the thing's

ness of being acted upon is recognized
flectively

but

of being

We experience

activity;

and that this has its origin
Thus the intellect

senses,

it in a consciousness

acted upon by the sensible
activity

by the external

is not attained

-

p. 468, n. 4;
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the sense of the Latin term: not 'the absence
successiveness
rational

successiveness,

dle term.
passage

(as in English)

No deduction

or reasoning

or inspection,
ready present

is involved:l

essence--

larly,

first principles

explicitly

initially
attended

is al-

something

to.3

Simi-

from the content

relevant,

They are contained,

lCf. De Ve~.

a

by it.4

apart from an abstraction,

is equally

than an illustration.5

a mid-

This is not an

they are rather manifested

instance

of

it is a penetration

are not derived

they are not, evident

any sensible

although

is what is directly

of sense knowledge-Although

rather

since what is now grasped
in knowledge,2

through

we have rather

to the explicit.

process;

else--

the absence

i. e., of reasoning

from the implicit

inference

but rather

of temporal

and none is more
as being

is,

I, 1, resp.: and SCG II, 83, #31.

23. T. I, 16, 3, ad 3: I1Et est simile sicut si
comparemus intelligibile ad ens.
Non enim potest intelligi ens, quin ens sit intelligibile;
sed tamen potest intelligi ens, ita quod non intelligatur eius intelligibilitp.s.",
3Schmidt,

hension?"

p. 242.

4Joseph Donceel, S. J.,' "A Thomistic IvIisappreThought XXXII, 125 (Summer, 1957) p. 194.
5Lonergan,

p. 56.
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in the intellect's

first grasp of a

sensible.being

kind,,,l and are irrlffiediately
operatlonal
intelligible

species

is received

Just as being
without

being

expressed

acted out, exercised,

as soon as the first

in the intellect.

is utilized,
as such,

initially

requires

in actual

lived, before

a reflective

thinking:3
recognition

at least,

"these principles

are

they are expressed

proposItions. ,,2 They need not be made explicit
be utilized

of x

lI

in

in order to

in fact, formulating
of the conditions

them

ac-

lIn Boeth de Trin. VI, 4, resp.: If
Aliqua
prima, quae-quidem homo non habet necesse addiscere aut invenire, ... sed earum notitiam naturaliter habet.
Et huius
modi sunt principia demonstrationum
indemonstrabilia ... H cr.
SCG I, 57, #6. Edward Simmons writes that "self--evident
propositions cannot come from prior intellectual knowledge,
for then they would not be immediate.
They are generated
from previous sense knowledge by 1/iayof an immediate induction.
However, to say this is not to imply that they
are easily achieved .... It takes a sufficient experience ...
of the singular manifestation
of a universally necessary
truth before we are ready to penetrate beyond the acciden-.
tals ... More often than not ... propositions which are selfevident in themselves are not seen to be self-evident by us;
and when they are, it is only by way of a tremendously difficult dialectical procedure." "Demonstration and SelfEvidence," The Thomist XXIV (1961) pp. 154-55.
2 Donceel,

p. 197.

3De Malo XVI, 6, ad 11: "Habere noti tiam in actu,
dicitur dupliciter.Unomodo
quantum ad actualem considerationem; ... Alio modo quantum ad habitualem notitiam ... Non
enim nos semper actu consideramus principia, sed ipse
habitus principiarum
sufficit ad repellendum omnem contrariurn errorem cum ipsa." Cf. LoneT'gan, p. 36, n. 169.

cording

to which we know being,l

of these principles
case of self-evident

and not all who make use

are able to formulate
principles.~.

them.2

the mere

comparison

the terms puts the mind

in immediate

relation

is so clear and direct

whose evidence

affirmation
Thomas

or negation

contact

is an instantaneous

speaks of this as a judgment

As the first understanding

originates,

in this qualified

senses,

it must be reduced

lLonergan,

p.

of

with the real
that the

necessity.,,3

by "simple compre-

hension.,,4

sense,

"In the

of first principles
in the external

to them; thereafter

it origi-

57.

2Brennan,

p. 18.

3Tyrrell,

p. 20.

4De Ver. XV, 1. ad 4: "Iudicare non est proprium
rationis, per quod ab intellectu distingui possit, quia
etiam intellectus iudicat hoc esse verum, illud falsum.
Sed pro tanto iudicium rationi attribuitur et comprehensio
intelligentiae quia iudicium in nobis ut communiter fit per
resolutionem in principia, simplex autem comprehensio per
intellectum." In III Sent., d.24, q.l, a.2, q.l, ad 2:
"Termini principiorum naturaliter notorum sunt comprehensibilesnostro
intellectui: ideo cognitio quae consurgit de
ill'is principiis, est visio ..."
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nates

in and is reduced

to the internal

What is neither
through

sensation

need not remain

from the existence
reason

immediately

sensible

forever

unknown

sensed we can

or whether,

it is not so to us because

in an area to which we do not have access.
our knowledge
by a deduction

concerning

cause.

its existence

from what is actually

to exist because

actually

existing

though
it is located

In either

must be arrived

sensed:

beings

sensed,

require

them is understood

and the act of existence
as analogous

case,
at

it is inferred

Thus we judge them to exist by reduction

immediately

to us:

to what is not sensed, regard-

it is non-sensible,

in itself,

sensed nor manifested

of what is immediately

by way of causality

less of whether

senses,l

it as a
to what is

predicated

to that of sensible

of
2

beings.

lSimmons, p. 155, n. 31: "Here precisely is where
the immediate induction of the principles of demonstration
differs from the mediate induction of a conclusion from a
sufficient enumeration of singulars.
The induced conclusion
is assented to precisely in virtue of the enumeration of
singulars and cannot be known without pointing to them for
evipence.
This is not the case fOl' the induced principles."
In the case of the latter, he writes, assent "depends upon
and comes with an insight into the intrinsic intelligibility
of the proposition itself.1! Though the insight may be difficult to achieve, the assent is automatic once it is
achieved, and the dialectic which was instrumental prior to
insight is no longer needed as evidence for the truth of the
principle.
2Schmidt,

pp. 241-43.
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Every judgment
either

of existence

or j.ndirectly, upon tho

directly

provided

any judgment

appears

direction

activity

a reflective

from abstraction:

formal

determinations

through

the senses:

ledge acquired
it.

2

reflexion.

evidence

reflective

required

which moves

As abstraction

reflexion

some have suggested

accompanies

to us that Thomas
occurs

this, asserting

only in the intellect's

ISchmidt,

order to
to the

that some sort of

simple apprehension,3

excludes

known

the know-

in the sensible

That is why it is called reduction

this

takes

singulars
refers

fo:r'

in the

we have called

out of the material

back to its origin

Though

reflection

flection

immediate

the 'sort of resolution
to be an activity

opposite

senses.

seen to be based,

by our sense knowledge."l
In summary,

validate

is acc6rdingly

it appears
that the re-

second act, and is

p. 243.

2Sometimes Thomas speaks of it as "resolution to
principles," but the text makes clear that "principles"
here has the sense of "origin," i. e., sense knowledge,
rather than first principles. De Vel'. XXVIII, 3, ad 6:
"Sed perfectum iudicium intellectus non potest esse in
dormiendo, eo quod tunc ligatus est sensus, qui est primum
principium nostrae cognitionis.
Iudicium enim fit per
resolutionem in princjpia; unde de omnibus oportet nos
iudicare secundum id quod sensu accipimus, ut dicitur in
III De Caelo et de Mundi."
3Tyrrell,

p. 17.
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the means whereby
be true or false.l
directly

the composition
This reduction

to the external

senses and indirectly

or division

is judged

to the senses

senses, directly

to the external

can be made

to the internal

senses,

or indirectly

to both, par'alleling the way in which

the knowledge

evaluated

originally.

was derived

from the senses

to

to be
But it

must be made in one of these ways in every case if one
wishes

to avoid erroneous

judgments.2

lIn VI Meta. IV, #1236: "Intellectus autem habet
apud se similitudinem rei intellectae, secundum quod
rationes incomplexorum concipit; non tamen propter hoc ipsam
similitudinem dijudicat, sed solum cum componit vel dividit
... in hac sola secunda operatione intellectus est veritas
et falsitas, secundum quam non solu~ intellectus habet
similitudinem sei intellectae, sed etiam super ipsam
similitudinem reflectitur, cognoscendo et dijudicando
ipsam.!l De Ver. XII, 3, ad 2: "Jud icim;l non dependet tant urn
a receptionespeciei,
sed ex hoc quod ea de quibus iudicatur
examinatur ad aliquod principium cognitionis, ... Sed quia
primum principium nostrae cognitionis est sensus, oportet
ad sensum quoddammodo resolvere omnia de quibus iudicamus.!!
23. T. I, 84, 8, resp.: "Judicium autem perfectum
de re aliqua dari non potest, nisi ea omnia quae ad rem
pertinent cognoscantur; et praecipie si ignoraretur id quod
est terminus et finis iudicii ... Omnia autem quae in praesenti statu intelligimus, cognoscuntur a nobis per comparatiohem
ad res sensibiles naturales.
Unde impossibile est
quod sit in nobis iudicium intellectus perfectum cum ligamento sensus, per quem res sensibiles cognoscimus.Tt
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Thus,
through

our immediate

insight

rather

of resolutions:
abstraction,
into their
hand,

than reasoning--

non-reflexive

resolutions

simple intelligible

lect assures

involves

apprehension,

principles;
resolution

The intellect

grasping

its own nature

reflects

of sensible

things,l

really

things.

creative

one that is discovered
activity

which

whether

causality

of

is so derived

is

and recognized

to derive

of the imagination

of the

from information

sensible

reference,

of extra-

receptive

by the senses due to the efficient

seen to have ontological

the intel-

of its act and

received

An apprehension

sensibles

on its act of simple

and ascertaining

was derived

and

and on the other

by which

at once the nature

as a power intentionally

its apprehension

whereas

attained

two sorts

of complex

itself that it has true knowledge

reality.

quiddities

knowledge

on the one hand there are induction

there is the reflexive

mental

knowledge--

rather

as true,

from the

is seen to lack such

IS. T. 1,94,2,
resp.: "Secundum igitur prirnum
processum animae, qui est a rebus exterioribus ad seipsam,
perficitur animae cognito.
Quia scilicet intellectualis
operatio animae naturalem ordinem habet ad ea quae Bunt
extra, ... et ita per eorum cognitionem perfecte 6ognosci
potest nostra intellectualis operatio, sicut actus per
obiectum.
Et per ipsarn intellectualem operationem perfecte
potest cognosci humanus intellectus, sicut potentia per
proprium actum."
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reference,

and the intellect

apprehension
either

as true of extra-mental

case the intellect

and its act truly through
When

for some reason

carried

out correctly

reflexive

does not assert

reflection

reality.

judges truly,
this reduction

the reduction

Thus in

for it knows itself
to the senses.

to the senses

and completely,
is imperfect,

such an

is not

the intellect's

and error is possible.l

lCf. De Ver. XII, 3, ad 2; and ST 1,84,8,
resp ..
On the role of the will in preventing the intellect from
reflecting perfectly, cf. Tyrrell, pp. 113-16.

IV
DEMONSTRATION

AND RESOLUTION

The understand~ng
expressed

in a composition

reduction

to the senses,

enumeration
correctly,
reality;

of singulars
yet remains

abstraction

assimilating

aspects

or division
reasoning
duction

atomizes

ciples which makes

through

to the senses

of a single aspect

and correlating

reasoning.l

these

so must the

is achieved
is achieved

through

process

re-

through

It is this resolution

the reasoning

view

As the composition

evaluated,

the latter

of

aspects,

A more comprehensive

as the former

to principles.

and judged

the intelligible

must be reflexively

to the senses,

resolution

and reduced

only by comparing

process;

abstraction,

even if based on a sufficient

knowledge

through

through

or division,

them one by one,

can be attained
discrete

attained

TO PRINCIPLES

to prin-

demonstrative,

IS. T. I, 58, 4, resp.: lISicut in intellectu
ratiocinante comparatur conclusio ad principium, ita in
intellectu componente et dividente comparatur praedicatam
ad subiectum.
Si enim intellectus noster statim in ipso
principio videret conclusionis veritatem, nunquam intelligeret discurrendo vel ratiocinando.
Similiter si intellectus statim in apprehensione quidditatis subiecti haberet
notitiam de omnibus quae possunt attribui subiecto vel removeri ab eo, nunquam intelligeret componendo vel dividendo, se solum intelligendo quod quid est.
Sic igitur
patet quod ex eadem provenit quod intellectus noster intelligit discurrendo, et componendo et dividendo; ex hoc
scilicet quod non statim in prima apprehensione alicuius
primi apprehensi, potest inspicere quidquid in eo virtute
continentur.lI
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that is, productive

of certain

knowledge

this chapter we shall investigate
lution

to principles

the meaning

In

of the reso-

with a view to determining

as well as distinguishing
and their

or science.l

its synonyms

it from other types of resolution

synonyms.
The procedure

of reasoning
discovery;2
via iu1icii,

Thomas

analogous

on the level

called the ~J.~inventionis,

and that analogous

to judgment

the way of judgment,

posed conclusions

to induction

to principles.3

the way of

he called

which resolves

the

the pro-

The first involves

a

IDe Ver. XV, 3, resp.: "In speculativis autem
scientiis non perfici tur iudiciu.m rationis nisi quando
resolvuntur rationis in prima principia."
2Finding a suitable translation is difficult: to
speak of "inventing a conclusion" suggests in English a
fabrication rather than a respectable scholarly procedure,
and "discovering a conclusion" suggests only a passive
rummaging among already formulated possibilities, whereas
Thomas' term includes an element of creative ingenuity.
But for its usual exclusive association with experimental
science, the translation closest to Thomas' meaning might
be "the way of hypothesis."
3De Ver. X, 8, ad 10: "Ratio ex principiis secundum viam-rnveniendi
in conclusiones pervenit, et conclusiones inventas in principia resolvendo exaffiinatsecundum viam judicandi.iI Peghaire, pp. 114-15: liEn face de
la via inventionis ... nous trouvons la via judicii, ...
On peut la di;i'inir:Ie procede de la ratIO par laq"uel
celle-ci, ayant prouv~ des cortclusions, gr~ce ~ la via
intentionis, recherche leur valeur de verj.te. Pour cela,
el1e v~rife, elle examine Ie lien logique qui existe entre
cette conclusion et les principes premiers.
Cet examen,
cette verification, elle ne peut les fa ire sans ramener
ou «resoudre» les conclusions aux principes, ... Ie
resultat est un jugement sur la valeur de cette conclusion,
d'ou Ie nom de via iudicii."
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gat:hering and analysj s of e):pc::T'J,::.nt.iaJ
evj,c1eYlce;
the second
is the demonstrativ2
reasoning. 1

and organi~od

As the insight

expressed

in a composition

reduction

to the senses,

way of inquiry
through
ment,

Thomas

attained

attained

besides

important

for helping

way of resolution:

us to determine

in texts where

and independent

meaning

as when

further

clue is that,

also involves

process,

it is used

related

In both
and interThis is

the meaning

of the

it is used to name a
it cannot

have the same

for the way of judgment.

like judgment,

A

the way of judgment

reflexion.

Though
way of inquiry

~T

can stane alone.2

n~ither

by the

the way of judg-

calls this the way of resolution.

stages:

through

in an c:rgllmentand evaluated

to principles;

dependent

is

and evaluated

so the insight

cases, what we have are two mutualJ

distinct

of scientific

by induction

or division

is expressed

resolution

moment

Thomas

does not explain

corresponds

to the ~ethod

it in detail,
of the Topics:

-----~------_._----_._-,---,.._._---IGuzie,

p.

the

__ ._ _--------

.

..

95.

2Ibid.: "It is significant to note that, in
Aquinas' view, neither of these stages is complete without
the other.
A philosophically
descriptive analysis of
experience naturally gives way to judgmental organization,
in which the intellect becomes c0mmitted to the intelligible necessity of what analysis reveals; while conversely, demonstrative
exposition is ~eaningful and
scientifically
valid only after a careful consideration
of
the pertinent concrete evidence. i1
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the way of finding
oral cultures,
arguments

and positing

various

modes

probable

of argumentation

to prove one or another

poets and orators
need; extensive

exPlanations.1

and possible

point were memorized

so as to have them readily

lists became

possible

available

of writing.

collection:

the Latin term for one of these options,

causes,

comparable

things,

"common-place."
common-places
Middle
were

effects,

available

of compilations

to teachers

Ages was enormous.2

at

was such a

related

etc., was locus ~ommunis,

The number

"traditional

Topics

contraries,

by

only with the

development

included

Aristotle's

In

which

things,
literally,

of these

and preachers

Many of the individual

in the
items

truths,,3 whose d.egree of probability

was

ILudwig Oeing-Hanhoff,
llDie Methoden der Metaphysik im Mittelalter," Die Metaphysik im Mittelalter
ed. P. Wilpert, (Berlin: ~valter de Gruyer, 19b3JPP:--72-3.
2

Ong, pp. 80-85.

3The Latin term for these is dignitates: cf. ~
Ver., XI, 1, resp.
The usual English translation is
axioms. Cf. Truth, vol. II trans. James V. McGlynn, S. J.
(Chicago: Regner'y, 1953) and Com.mentary on the ]\1etaphysics
of Aristotle, trans. John P. Rowan, vv. I-Il~(Chicago:
Regnery, 1961).
The Latin term, however, connotes preeminence more than self-evidence.
As Oeing-Hanhoff has
pointed out on pp. 76-77, many of these are not genuine
axioms, for they are not self-evident as given; in fact,
some of them are really no more than 'maxims' of Aristotelian natural science.
"Traditional truths" seem to suggest that they are worthy of respect while leaving open the
possibility that some of them might be questionable precisely as truths, hence more in keeping with "the intention
of the author" than "axioms.1I

1

measured

by the authority

common-places

of thei~ originators.~

were consulted

and ut:Llized in much the same

way as we today investigate

a question

relevant

for a plausible

literature

a suggestive

looking

The

by consulting

the

explanation

or

lead.

Of course,
same as knowing:

possessing

a plausible

a probable

explanation

answer

if not the

can give rise to

,

opinion

or faith, but not to knowledge.

knowledge,

one must perceive
principles.2

self-evident
with probable
senses

arguments:

of "rational

on the De Trinitate
terminates

the explanation

NeverthelEss,

method"

distinguished

of Boethius.

otherwise

begins

of the three

in the Commentary

of principles,

we have a

we have only a rational

pp.

in

When the reasoning

But the latter can be used to prepare

lOeing-Hanhoff,

as implied

reasoning

this is the second

in the understanding

demonstration;

In order to have

procedure.

the way for necessary

74-75.

2De Ver. XI, 1, resp.: "Si autem aliquis ali cui
proponat eaquae
in principiis per se nota non includuntur,
vel includi non manifestantur,
non faciet in eo scientiam,
sed forte opinionem, vel fidem ... :
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proofs.

1

What makes

seen to be a relation
and conclusion:2
the understanding

it a demonstration
of causality

the understanding

causes which
make

actuate

it to be. 11}~

deduce

principles

between

the principles

of the principle

of the conclusion.3

demonstration ... function

is that there be

"The premises

after the fashion

the potentiality

Thus the proper
into conclusions

causes
of

of efficient

of the conclusion

activity

of reason

or elicit

and

is to

conclusions,

lIn Boeth. de Trin. VI, 1, resp. q.l: "Quandoque
autem inquisitio rationis non potest usque ad praedictum
terminum[intellectus
principiorum] perduci, sed sistitur
in ipsa inquisitione, quando scilicet inquirenti adhuc per
probabiles rationes proceditur, quae natae sunt facere
opinionem vel fidem, non scientiam.
Et sic rationabilis
processus dividitur contra demonstrativum.
Et hoc modo
rationabiliter
procedi potest in qualibet scientia ut ex
probabilibus paretur via ad necessarias probationes."
2S. T. I 14, 7, resp.: " ... In scientia enim
nostra duplex est discursus.
Unus secundum successionem
tantum; sicut cum, postquam intelligimus aliquid in actu,
convertimus nos ad intelligendum aliud.
Alius discursus
est secundum causalitatem, sicut cum per principia pervenimus in cognitionem conclusionem."
3SCG I, 57, #5: "In omni scientia discursiva
oportet.aliquid
esse causatum; nam principia sunt quoddammodo causa efficiens conclusionibus, unde et demonstratio dicitur syllogismus faciens scire ... " De Ver.
XI, 1, ad 3: ll... si doceamur aliquam conclusione~opor.tet praescire de subiecto et passione quid sint, etiam
principiis per quae conc1usio docetur, praecognitis.".
4Simmons, p.
enim nobis naturaliter
omnibus nota, ex quibus
actu conclusiones quae
aliter continentur ..."
1.

161. cr. Quodl., VIII, a. 4: llInsunt
quaedam principia prima complexa
ratio procedit ad cognoscendum in
in praedictis principiis potentiCf. also De Ver., XI, 1; ST I, 117,
._- --
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and reasoning

may be described

as Tlthe cause's

to the caused,

,,1

is called

while

science

progression

"the habit

of

~_.2

conclusions.,,2
Properly

scientific

decisive

knowledge,

"through

mediating

factor--

the middle

necessary

relation

between

conclusion-reached.3

demonstration
the cause"
term which

the major

is the epistemological

is causally

inasmuch

as the

establishes

and minor

the

terms of the

cause of the conclusion

That is, it is the cause of our knowledge;

it

may be the cause of the fact as well as the cause of its
being known by us, but it need not be, for an effect,
can be the cause of our knowing.4
demonstration

is always

causal,

Thus, relative

but relative

too,

to us, -

to things

in

lIn II Sent., d.24, q.l, a.3, sol.: " ... ratio
autem proprie.~
est faciens currere causam in causatum;
unde proprie actus rationis est deducere principium in conclusionem.
Hoc ergo quod est conclusiones elicere est actus
rationis." De Ver., XV, 1, resp.: 11Unde dicit Isaac in lib.
De DefinitionibUS
quod ratiocinatio est cursus causae in
causatum."
2S. T. I-II, 53, 1, resp.: "fGiquis vero habitus
est in intellectu possibili ex ratione causatus, scilicet
habltus conclusionum qui dicitur scientia."
3James F. Anderson, "On Proof in Metaphysics,"
in
Essays in Knowledge and Methodology, ed. Edward D. Simmons
(Milwaukee: Ken Cook Co., 1965) p. 99.
4De Spir. Creat., a. 10, resp.: "Ipsum autem intelligere animae humanae-est per modum motus; intelligit
enim animae discurrendo de effectibus in causas, et de
causis in effectus, et de similibus in similia, et de
oppositis in opposita ... 1T
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their

ontological

status,

the middle

may be either

cause or effect

demonstration

deals.l

the demonstration
the cause:

demonstration.2

When the middle

When the middle

gives us knowledge
the reason

the

of the existence

of

quia

term is the causa in re

the demonstration

of the existence
behind

with which

term is the effect,

the fact and is called

as well as in our knowledge,

explains

of the existent

gives us knowledge

it manifests

term of demonstration

not only

of the effect,

the effect.

but also

This type of demon-

lIn I Post. Anal., IV, #16: "In omni demonstratione, oportet-quod procedatur ex his, quae sunt notiora
quoad nos, ... non enim aliquid potest fieri nobis notum,
nisi per id quod est magis notum nobis.
Quandoque autem
id quod est magis notum quoad nos, est etiam magis notum
simpliciter et secundum naturam; ... Et in talibus fiunt
demonstrationes
ex his quae sunt notiora simpliciter.
Item,
quandoque id quod est not ius quoad nos non est notius simpliciter, sicut accidit in naturalibus, in quibus essentiae
et virtutes rerum, propter hoc quod in materia sunt, occultae, sed innotescunt nobis per ea, quae exterius de
ipsis apparent.
Unde in talibus fiunt demonstrationes
ut
plurimum per effectus, qui sunt notiores quoad nos et non
simpliciter.!! Cf. William Wallace, O. P., 'r:beRole of
Demonstration in Moral Theology: A Study of Methodology in
St. Thomas Aquinas~ashington,
D. C.: The Thomist Press,
1962) pp. 18-19.
2It is also quia demonstration when the middle
term is a remote, rather than, approximate cause: cf.
Owens, !!The Analytics and Thomistic Metaphysical Procedure,!!
Mediaeval Studies, XXVI (1964) pp. 91-92.
As noted above,
p. 80, n. 2, there is also a non-technical use of inductio
with reference to quia demonstrations
of the existence of
something; technically, however, the two are distinct,
since induction as such is immediate.
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stration

l

is called prop~e~

quid.

What is significant
the distinction
based

between

for our purposes

the two types of demonstration

on the way in which

the order of knowing

the order of being: when the epistemological
the ontological

here is that

cause, we have propter

is

compares

with

cause is also

quid demonstration;

and when the epistemological

cause is an ontological

we have 9..uiademonstration.

In another

effect,

text, rfhomas makes

this same distinction,

and calls the two ways of inquiry

the way of composition

and the way of resolution:

In every inquiry, one must begin from some
principle.
If this principle precedes both
in knowledge and in being, the process is not
by way of resolution, but by way of composition, for to proceed from cause to effect is
to proceed in a composite way, since causes
are more simple than effects.
But if that
which precedes in knowledge is later in the
order of being, the process is one of resolution, as when we judge concerning known effects
by resolving them to their simple causes.2
Here the way of composition

in Essays
andOwens,

and the way of resolution

both

lWilliam Baumgartner, "Demonstration and Science"
on Knowledge and Methodology, ed. Simmons, p. 55;
----rr"The
Analx:!::ics
-:..," p. 91.

2S. T. I-II, l~, 5, resp.: "In omni inquisitione
oportet incipere ab aliquo principio.
Quod quidem si, sicut
est prius in cognitione, ita etiam sit prius in esse, non
est processus resolutorius,
sed magis compositivus; procedere enim a causis in effectus, est processus compositivus
nam causae sunt simpliciores effectibus.
Si autem id quod
est prius in cbgnitione, sit posterius in esse, est processus resolutorius; utpote cum de effectibus manifestis
iudicamus, resolvendo in causas simplices."
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belong

to the way of inquiry:

vestigating

1

a subject.-

what is composite
discover
analyzes

they name two ways of in-

The way of resoluti6n

and most known to us and procedes

what is simple and most knowable
a confused

whole

into its distinct

on the other hanel, begins

simple

to what is composite,

and procedes
into a whole.2

called because,
into its logical
not a reflexive

parts,
process,

The

with what is

reassembling

it analyzes

the

is so

a composite

and also like abstraction,
though

it

parts.

Thus this "way of resolution"

like abstraction,

with

to

in itself:

way of composition,

parts

begins

it is, of course,

it is
conscious

and deliberate.
This "vmy of resolution!l then, is equivalent
quia demonstration,
tific procedure:

and is a thoroughly

it is not less decisive

lLonergan,

respectable

to

scien-

than propter

quid

p. 161.

2In II Meta., L. I, #2'(8: !lEst autem duplex via
procedendi ad cognitionem veritatis.
Una quidem per modum
resolutionis,
secundum quam procedimus a compositis ad
simblicia, et a toto ad partem, sicut dicitur in primo
Physicorum quod confusa sunt prius nobis nota.
Et in hac
via perficitur cognitio veritatis, quando pervenitur ad
singulas partes distincte cognoscendas-- Alia est via compositionis, per quam procedimus a simplicibus ad composita,
qua perficitur cognitio veritatis cum pervenitur ad totum."
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proof.

1

All demonstrations

are decisive

put the mind at rest with regard
being
answer

asked:

some, however,

the particular

rest with regard

to further

of demonstration.

as they

to the particular

the propter

qdestion,

insofar

question

guid type, not only

but even put the mind at

questions

concerning

Thus they yield a broader

the subject

intelligibility

than do the quia type; the latter are no less certain,
ever, they are merely
possible,

a propter

causality

relative

less informative.2

q1!id demonstration,
to us corresponds

of causality,

is preferable

our knowledge

of the conclusion

Thus, when
in which the

to the objective

to quia demonstration,

thing other than the prox~mate

is achieved
cause--

how-

through

order

in which
some-

either a remote

cause

or an effect.
However,

as Thomas

clearly

states

in the text we

lAnderson, "On Proof," p. 99: "Proof is not
limited to explanation, in terms of what, how, or why things
are.
Mere factual proof can be equally decisive; if proof
proves, it proves, and there's an end of it ... Proof is not
..., equivalent to... the propter quid variety, which is indeed real proof, but which is, as such, no more probative
than factual (quia) proof."
2Wallace,

p. 22.
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cited,l we must begin with what we have.2
ontological
already
Apart

cause as an epistemological

knClw the ontological

from mathematics,

tially:3
natures

our knowledge
are hidden

knowledge,

begins

which deals with

with sensible
Because,

things,

whose

for us, sensory

deals with universals,

ttwith

respect

to the investigation

causes,

less universal

those things which

if ever know this ini-

intel-

knowledge,

universal

?-s caus~.

preceeds

lectual

discover

which

cause only when we

Ca"'lSe,precisely

we rarely

from us.

We can use the

singulars,

of natural

properties

and

things are known first, because

causes by means
are universal

lIn I Post. Anal.,

of particular

in causing

we

causes ...

are known to us

IV, #16; cf. above, p. 107,

n. 1.
2Anderson, "On Proof," p. 100: "'I'herecan be no
real scientific success in dealing with any problem unless
one discovers and uses that kind of proof and procedure
which the actual state of affairs, both within and without, calls for and allows; an isomorphic approach can only
end in shipwreck."
3The exception is not as un~lal
as it might seem:
until we attain the formal object of mathematics by means of
abstraction with precision, we have not yet acquired the
habit of this science, but the abstraction by which we do
acquire it has as its point of departure the same sensible
image which is the determinate ~ource of all human knowing.
Cf. In Boeth. de Trin., VI, 1, 2, resp ..
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1

only subsequently.

"..L

sensory

are effects

knowledge

Since what we }:now at the level of

cases it is the effect which
tially.2

existence

through

of the proper

can use thereafter

causes

its formal object.3
science

in all

known to us ini-

are grounded

in the quia

which we reach knowledge

in propter

says "in speculative

than causes,

is better

Thus all our sciences

demonstrations

cerning

rather

of things,

which

quid demonstrations

of the
each science
con-

It is in this sense that Thomas
it is necessary

to proceed

in

lIn I Meta., II, #46:
"Sed quantum ad i.nvestigationem naturalfum proprietatum et causarum, prius sunt nota
minus communia; eo quod per causasparticulares,
... pervenimus in causas universales.
Ea autem quae sunt universalia in causando, sunt posterius nota quoad nos, licit sint
prius nota secundum naturam ... Nam cognitio sensus qui est
cognoscitivus singularium, in nobis praecedit cognitionem
intellectuvam quae est universalium."
cr. Joseph Bobik,
Aquinas on Being and Essence. A Translation and Interpretation, (Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame Press, 1965) p. 26.
2In I Post. Anal. XXIII, #195: "Scire quia '3st
quando ... non fit per causam: sed fit per convertentiam,
idest per effectus convertibj.les et i~mediatos.
Et tamen
talis demonstratic fit per notius, scilicet nobis: alias non
faceret scire.
Non enim pervenimus ad cognitionem ignote,
ni~i per aliquid magis notum.
Nihil enim prohibet duorum
aeque praedicantium,
idest convert~bilium,
quorum unum sit
causa, et aliud effectus, notius esse aliquando non cau~am,
sed magis effectum.
Nam effectus aliquando est notior
causa quoad nos et secundum sensum, licet causa sit semper
notior simpliciter et secundum naturam,
Et ita per effectum
notiorem causa potest fieri demonstratio, non faciens scire
propter quid, sed tantum quia."
3Anderson,

"On Proof,"

p. 101.
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a resolutive

manner

by resolving

the complex

into simple

principles. ,,1 HoI' does the fact th:'Ltit moves
to causes
a method

lessen the scientific
resulting

in certain

as a propter

Aristotle,

in an eternal

knowledge,

and necessary

guia proof as not only inferior
less scientific,
not: the things
not necessary

Thomas,

Thus the familiar
rules

Aristotelian

of scientific

Although

universe,

created

freely

doctrine

can vievl

quj~, but also

all our knowledge

but rather

as

it is every bit as

to propter

in a freely

from which

effects,

value of such reasoning;

quid demonstration.2

scientific

from effects

universe,

can

originates

created

by God.

on the nature

proof cannot be transferred

are

and

to a

lIn I Eth., 3, #35: "Necessarium est enim in qualibet operativa scientia, ut procedatur modo composito.
E
converso autem in scientia speculativa, necesse est ut
procedatur modo resolutorio, resolvendo composita in principia simplicia."
2Baumgartner, p. 58: "Was the notion, however, of
scientific knowledge restricted to propter quid demonstration?
We see in the text of Aristotle how it was extended
to include a kind of knowledge less perfect than the above,
to demonstrations
of the fact, most often proceeding from
the' effect to the cause ... The one note that this type of
argument does retain is that of cert::i.tude
and necessity. 1I
Cf. Anderson, "On Proof," p. 100.
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Thomistic

context without
Demonstration

ordained

aggregation

lect in a semi-actual
through

some reshaping,l

generates

of the species
state.,,2

a single demonstration

have scientific

knowledge

the demonstration.3
may acquire

a habit of science,
existing

in the intel-

This habit is acquired
inasmuch

as the knower

of the conclusion

But from knowing

demonstrative

"an

knowledge

does

as a result

one conclusion,

of

one

of other conclusions,

lAnderson, "On Proof," p. 102. His reason for
making this statement, however, differs from mine.
The entire controversy over whether, and how, Thomistic metaphysics fulfills the Aristotelian criteria for science,
particularly with respect to propter quid and quia demonstration, is outside the scope of this-dissertation:
those
interested in pursuing this question further may consult:
Joseph Owens, "St. Thomas and Elucidation, 11 New Scholasticism, XXXV (1961) pp. 421-44 and the subsequent articles
in the same journal by H. Nielsen, :ibid., XXXVI (1962) pp.
233-36, and Bobik, ibid., XXXVII (1963) pp. 59-63, 411-30;
and Owens, ibid., p~4-70.
2SCG I, 56, #5: "Omnis autem inte11ectus in habi tu per aliquas species intelligi t; nam hab:i.tusvel est
habilitatio quaedam intellectus ad recipiendum species intelligibiles, quibus actu fiat intelligens; vel est ordinata aggregatio ipsarum specierum existentium in intellec~
tu,. non secundum completum actum, sed medio modo inter potentiam et actum." Cf. Dliavamony, p. 143.
3S. T. I-II, 51, 3, resp.: "Respectu igitur primi
paSSlVl [intellectus possibilis] potest esse aliquod activum quod uno actu totaliter vinc:i.tpotentiam sui passivi,
sicut una propositio per se nota convincit intellectum ad
assentiendum firmiter conclusioni; ... habitum ... scientiae
possibile est causari ex uno rationis actu, quantum ad inte11ectum possibilem.
Sed quantum ad inferiores vires
apprehensivas,
necessarium est eodem actus ~luries reiterari, ut aliquid firmiter memoria imprimatur."
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e
I

thus extending

his scientific

knowledge

insofar

seen to apply to or include more things.l
state of a habit of science
is perfected

gradually

further

conclusion.2

is in this sense imperfect;

through

The mature

that is, who has an aptitude

strating
insofar

which

conclusion
one reaches

scientist

one who has the habit of carrying

of knowable,

Hence the initial

as one demonstrated

rise to a new demonstration

as it is

it

gives
a

in any area is

on such demonstrations,

for considering

a specific

type

so that he acts easily and at will in demon-

conclusions

concerning

as it is made active

that the intellect

that knowable,3

by self-evident

has the power to reason

It is only

propositions
out conclusions,

IS. T. I-II, 52, 2, resp.: "Scientia potest augeri
secundum seipsam per additionem, sicut cum aliquis plures
conclusiones geometriae addiscit, augetur in eo habitus
eiusdem scientiae secundum speciem."
2S• T. I-II, 5Lr, 4, ad 3: "Ille qui in aliqua
scientia acquirit per demonstrationem
scientiam conclusionis
unius, habet quid em habitum, sed imperfecte.
Cum vero acquirit per aliquam demonstrationem
scientiam conclusionis
alterius, non aggeneratur in eo alius habitus; sed habitus
qui prius inerat fit perfectior, utpote ad plura se extendens, eo quod conclusiones et demonstrationes
unius scientiae ordinatae sunt, et una derivatur ex alia.

3SCG II, 73, #24-25: "Scientia est de conclusionibus demonstrationem;
nam demonstratio est syllogismus
faciens scire,; .. Ex habitu autem scientiae inest facultas
considerandi, sicut ex proximo principio actus: oportet
enim quod habitus scientiae perficiat potentiam qua intelligimus, ut agat quum voluerit faciliter, sicut alii habituspotentias
in quibus sunt.n
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hence

the habit

of science

in the intellect

inas-

by first principles.l

much as it is activated
Therefore,

is caused

since the knowing

of conclusions

is

n"
t prlnclp
. . 1es, 2 in
th e e.
ff ec t 0f th e un d ers t an d"
lng 0f llrs

order to give our assent

to the conclusion

it to be caused by or follow
Until we recognize
which

elusion,

from these first principles. 3

it as implied

it was deduced,

in the principles

we cannot be certain

but to test the strength

these principles

we must perceive

is to evaluate

from

about any con-

of its connection

it in relation

with

to them.

To do this is no longer to inquire,

but to judge what the

inquiry

gives way to judgment,

which

has turned

up; here inquiry

is contradistinguished

from inquiry

as a distinct

IS. T. 1-11,51,
2, resp.:
II •••
vis intellectiva,
secundum quod ratiocinatur de conclusionibus,
habet sicut
principium activum propositionem per se nota ... habitus
scientiarum causantur in intellectu, secundum quod movetur
a primis propositionibus lt
j

2De Ver., IV, 2, resp.: IIOmne autem intellectum
in nobis es~aliquid
realiter progrediens ab altero; vel
sicut progrediuntur a principiis conceptiones conclusionem,
vel sicut conceptiones quidditatum rerum posteriorum a
quidditatibus priorum, ... ipsa enim conceptio est effectus
actus intelligendi. lI.srrI, 79, 4, ad 3: "Quia per unum intellectum fiunt etiam--a-liaintellecta, sicut per terminas
propositiones,
et per prima principia conclusiones.1I In III
Sent., d.14, a.3, sol. 3: "Ex.principiis considerat con--eluS-iones sicut ex causis effectus,1I
3~.
I, 83, 1+; resp.: ltRatiocinari autern proprie est devenire ex uno in cognitionem alterius, unde proprie de conclusionibus ratiocinamur, quae ex principiis innotescunt ... in cognitivis principium ad conclusionem,
cui
propter principia assentimus, ... f!

117

step in reasoning.
a parallel

with

term "judgment"
just."

Calling

legal matters:

The judgment

is the technical

The techn~cal

the just by
judgment

looking

"measureslf

law applies

his verdict

so the way of judgment

IGilson,
p. 310.

is ~xam~n;

iudicium
of

he recognizes
a t1true"

the way in which

to the case before

against

out

his expr2ssion

However,

is seen to express

him.

He

the law.

As the judge measures

Aquinas,

carried

to the law, \vhich is certain;

is one which

the appropriate

presented

him. 2

positive

name for the judge's

name for his verdict--

"the just" in •
the case before

is

justice was the privi.-

laws; the judge merely

of the evidence

of the

of what

since it was he who established

judgment.l

consideration

implies

meaning

determination

which defined

by promulgating

the ruler's

the original

was "the correct

lege of the ruler,
rights

it the way of judgment

measures

The Christian

his verdict
a conclusion

Philosophy

against
against

the law,
its

of St. Thomas

2S. T. II-II, 68, 2, resp.: lIQuando in crimibus
per modum accus-ationis agitur, accusator constituitur pars,
ita quod iudex inter accusatorem et eum qui accusatur medius constituitur ad examen iustitiae; in quo oportet,
quantum possible est, secundum certitudinem procedere.
non posset iudici esse certum quid et qualiter dictum sit,
debet proferre sententiam, nisi esset in scriptis redactum."
(italics mine)
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principles
elusion
merely

in order to recognize

is so tested,
an opinion

on natural

evaluates

chosen by chance

Inquiry

usually

rection

or a good guess based

an argument,

and judgment

its conclu-

from its premises:3

in order to

to the principles.

Thus the way

follow

it to see whether

do this, we must return
of judgment

a con-

with some help from the

proposes

it by examining

sion does indeed

Until

it is not known to be true; it is

ingenuity--

commonplaces.2

its truth.l

is reflexive,

proceeding

from the way of inquiry,

in the opposite

resolving

di-

conclusions

into

IDe Spiro Creat., 0..10, ad 8: "Iudicare enim aliquo de veritate dicimurdupliciter.
Uno modo, sicut media;
sicut iudicamus de conclusionibus per principia, et de regulatis per regulam.
Non enim illud quod est mutabile, vel
quod habet similitudinem falsi, potest esse infallibilis
regula veritatis."
2We cannot agree with Oeing-Hanhoff, pp. 76-77,
that this initial dependence on Hnatural ingenuity" is "an
obvious gap in the method of judicative analysis" as Thomas
uses it. For Thomas the very reliance on reasoning as a
method of attaining truth is an obvious weakness of the
human intellect. ST 11-11,49,5,
ad 2: 11 •••
sed necessitas
rationis est ex defectu intellectus; ilIa enim in quibus
vis intellectiva plenarie vi get ratione non indigent, sed
suo simplici intuiti veritatem comprehendunt;
sicut Deus
et angeli." Ibid., 83, 10, ad 2: !!Intellectus et ratio non
sunt in nobis diversae potentiae, ... differunt autem secundum perfectum et imperrectum.lI
Cf. Also, SCG I, 57, #9.
3SCG I, 57, #2: "Non enim ex hoc aliquis ratiocinatur vel discurrit quod inspicit qualiter conclusio ex
praemissis sequatur, simul utrumque considerans; hoc enim
contingit non argumentando, sed argurnenta iudicando, ..."
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principles.l

When conclusions

are resolved

they are known with certainty.

Until we examine

sion in the light of what is naturally
dent,

our assent

to the conclusion

once we judge it to be grounded
we assent

to it unconditionally.2

the certitude

and motivates

the deliberation.3

a conclu-

known as self-evi-

is merely

tentative;

in self-evident

thereby

the resolution

but

principles,

The resolution

the assent,

Thus through

to principles

manifests

completing
of con-

IDe Vel'., XV, 1, resp.:"
Similiter nec rationis discursus ad-aliquid certum perveniret, nisi fieret examinatio eius quod per discursum invenitur, ad principia
prima, in quae ratio resolvit.
ut sic intellectus inveniatur rationis principium quantum ad viam inveniendi, terminus vero quantum ad viarn iudicandi.l! Cf. ibid., ad 4; J.
Isaac, "La notion de dialectique chez S. Thomas," Revue des
Sciences philosophique et th~ologique, vol. 30, (1950) pp.-~~"Au
terme, en effet, de sa recherche resolutive,
l'esprit se retourne en quelque sorte sur liu-m@me, considere dans la luminere de leurs principes ses precedentes
conclusions devenues desormais certaines, et porte sa sentence en leur donnant son assentiment definitif."
2De Ver., XI, 1, ad 13: " ... tunc enim conclu-.
siones per c-ertltudinem sciuntur quando resolvuntur in principia: ... certitudinem scientiae non acciperemus, nisi inesset nobis certitudo principiorum, in quae conclusiones resolvuntur." Ibid., XII, 1, resp.: "Quamdiu enim non fit resolutio cogni to:cum in sua principia, cogni tio non firmatur
in uno, sed apprehendit ea quae cognoscit secundum probabilitatem." Cf. Ibid., X, 8, resp.; De JVIalo,111,3,
resp.;
In Boeth. de Trin., III, 1, ad 4; In III Sent., d.23, q.2,
sol. 3-,-#155.
- ----

a:-:2,

3In III Sent., d.23, q.2, a.2, sol. 1, #143:
"Sciens autem et assensum et cogitationem habet; sed non
cogitationem cum assensu, sed cogitationem ante assensum,
quia ratio ad intellectum resolvendo perducit." De Ver.,
XIV, 1, resp.: "Ex ipsa enim collatione principior-um ad
conclusiones, assentit conc1usionibus reso1vendo eas in
principia, et ibi figitur motus cogitantis et quietatur ...
sic non habet assensum et cogitationem quasi ex aequo: sed
cogitatio inducit ad assensum, et assensus quietat ...
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elusions

to first principles,

standing;l
carried

for perfect

beyond

ciple,

the principle

intelligibility

in under-

the resolution

must be

of the particular

stience

of contradiction,3

which

to

first prinexpresses

the

itself.4

the manner

out in specific

in fact, although

terminates

and even to the "first"

of being

Regarding
carried

certitide

the principles

the first. principles,2

science

in which

instances,

this resolution

Thomas

has little

he tells us a tirst principle

is

to say:

is one which

Sciens vera habet et cogitationem, et assensum, sed cogitationem causantem assensum, et assensum terminantem cogitationem." Cf. Isaac, p. 489.
lIn III Sent., d.23, q.2, a.2, sol. 1, #139: "Alio
modo potest considerar-i intellectus Doster secundum ordinem
ad rationem quae adintellectum
terminatur, dum resolvendo
conclusiones in princip~a per se nota, earum certitudinem
efficit.
Et hie est assensus scientiae.lI Cf. ibid., #155.
2In Boeth. de Trin., VI~ 1, resp.: lIUltimus enim
terminus, adquem
ratlonis inquisitio perducere debet, est
intellectus principiorum,
in quae resolvendo iudicamus, quod
quidem quando fit non dicitur processus vel probatio rationalibus, sed demonstrativa.lI In IV Meta., VI, #607: lIQuaelibet demonstrationis
conclusio redditur certa per reductionem ejus in primum demonstrationis
principium.lI
3In IV Meta., VI, #603-5: "Omnes demonstrationes
reducunt suas propositiones in hanc propositionem
[quod est
impossibile eidem simul inesse et non inesse idem: et secundum idem] sicut in ultimam opinionem omnibus communem;
... in hanc reducunt demonstrationes
omnia, sicut in ultimum resolvendo, ... quaelibet demonstrationis
conclusio
redditur certa per reductionem ejus in primum demonstrationis principium."
4In Post. Anal.,
cipia esse reietveritatis

IV, #5: "Eadem enim sunt prinipsius.1t
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is self-evident
terms,l

he nowh~re

stock examples
parts,"

to ar.yone who knows the meaning

gives a list of first principles.

are "evet'y whole

and the principle

to the first of these,
conclusion
principle

deduced

is greater

it is fairly

would be resolved

wholes

argument

easy to see how a

process

to the principle:
recognition

truly js a particular

principle,

being virtually

greater

than any of its parts

specific

whole

is greater

the conclusions

T. I,

of the

of the general

are virtually

present

To know that every whole
is to know virtually

is

that any

of its parts,

and

than y,lI and "y is less than

x" are establis"hed in the recognition

IS.

con-

in it in a way analo-

than anyone

lIX is greater

the mind returns

the resolution

instance

contained

inclination.3

may thus be

that the subject

gous to that in which moral virtues
in our natural

in any argument

As a conclusion

from it, so by a reflexive

sists in a reflective

With respect

to it, for this is a positive

and parts.

from the conclusion

His

than any of its

of contradiction.2

which can be used as a premise

concerning

of its

that

17, 3, ad 2: 87,1,

"x" is a whole

ad 1; I-II,

gIl,

2,

resp ..
2Cf. S. T. 1-11,51,1,
Lonergan,

p.

56-.---

3De Ver.,

XI, 1, resp ..

resp.;

SCG 11,83,

#31;
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and llyllone of its pm"t~).
llthe conclusion
lution

This is vJhat is meant

is known through

the princip1e;,,1 the reso-

is the means by which we assure

condition

is fulfilled

by saying

ourselves

that this

in our demonstration.

What is not easy to see is how the principle
contradiction

may be so utilized,

resolution.

This principle

of anything,

and therefore

premises

in any argument;

under which any being
a completed
test,

such a flaw is found.

interpretation

cannot
rather

for invalid

for the principle

to the principle
is consistent

and is used to test

reasoning:

a negative

explicitly

only when

of contradiction:

from the principle

although

both first princ~ples
is dependent

understanding

does say

bet~een

the principle

the last
in the

a whole

to being as any enunciation

lSCG III, 46, #51; In I Post. Anal.

and

of contra-

for this .is that the principle

is related

the

He tells us that,

are self-evident,

the relation

such an

concerning

on that of contradiction

sense that understanding

contradiction

it state~ the condition

a whole and its parts.

The reason

knowledge

as one of the

with what Thomas

between

its parts requires

or

It seems that this is what is meant

relation

diction.

function

is invoked

about the way it differs

mentioned

in deduction

gives us no positive

is intelligible,

argument

by resolution

either

of

of
is

II, #14.
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related

to the apprehE'n;::.~Lon
of its terms:

first in the intellect's

as

first operation,

so this principle

is first in the intellect's

second operation,

in composition

as "a being"

standing

of indivisibles.

to knowledge
related
nature

and division

As knowledge

of natures,

to knowledge

so knowledge

of the principles

can be apprehende6

so no first principle

without

of any nature

not be,l inasmuch

as all subsequent

itself.2

Knowledge

principles--

especially

of being

is related

of this principle
of natures:

as no

withbe and

regarding

of that thing with

of being,

the principle

is

it as being,

simultaneously

enunciations

in the identity

is knowledge

is in the under-

can be understood

that a thing cannot

are grounded

as fundamental

apprehending

out understanding

anything

a being!l is

.tt

and the first

of contra.diction--

lIn IV Meta., VI, #605:
!lAd hujus autem evidentiam sciendum est~od
cum duplex sit operatio intellectus:
una, qua cognoscit quod quid est, quae vacatur indivisibilium intellegentia: alia, quae componit et dividit: in utroque est aliquod primum: in prima quidem operatione est aliquod primum, quod cadit in conceptione intellectus, scilicet
hoc quod dice ens; nec a:iquid hac oberatione petest mente
concipi, nisi intelligatur ens.
Et quia hoc principium,
impossibile est esse et non esse simul, dependet ex intellectu entis, sicut hoc pr~ncipium, omne totum est majus sua
parte, ex intellectu totius et partis: ideo hoc etiam principium est naturaliter primum in secunda operatione inteltectus, scilicet componentis et dividentis.
Nec aliquis
potest secundum hanc operationem intellectus aliquid intelligere, nisi hoc principio intellecto. Sicut enim totum et
partes non intelliguntur nisi intellecto ente, ita nec hoc
principium omne totum est majus sua parte, nisi intellecto
praedicto principio firmissimo."
2Cf. Brennan,

p. 18.
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are the conditions

according

in every particular

instance

must be manifested.2
affirmative

and negative

in this way it governs

expresses

knowing,

rather

essence

nor resolved

of contradiction,

the truth of any enunciation
first principles,

be deduced

1Lonergan,
2Dhavamony,

p.

esse is

from it,

it is possible
Thomas

is reduced

and especially

because

in the way that

can anything

of essence.

of

of being and

feature:

to it in the way in which

these with the knowledge

like the notion

situation

it cannot be known

neither

cannot be

the truth of any enuncia-

than any essential

is known,

formula.tion-- that the

all judgments.4

the existential

other than essence,

Hence

these principles

forms of a proposition

it grounds

The principle
being,

of knowledge

In its logical

true simultaneously-tion;3

to which we know being.l

to do

tells us that

to self-evident

to the principle

of contra-

57.

pp. 130-31.

3S. T. I-II) 94, 2, resp.: "In his autem quae in
in apprehensiorle hominum cadunt, quidam ordo invenitur.
Nam
illud quod primo cadit in apprehensione est ens, cuius intellectus includitur in omnibus quaecumque quis apprehendit.
Et ideo primum principium indemonstrabile
est quod non est
simul affirmare et negare, quod fundatur supra rationem entis et non entis; et super hoc principio omnia alia fundantur, ut dicitur in IV Meta .."

4 Lonergan,

p.

57.
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as its first causes:l

diction,

enunciation
differs
have

is reduced

seen that to reduce

its origin

would

to reduce

appear

see the conclusion

ciple of contradiction

whole

being:

the argument

of the argument
the way that

in the principle

to being.

rather

concerning

of beto

in like man-

of contradiction
to be certain
than trying

as contained
llX

We

about any being

to the principle

contradictions)

of an essence

to the notion

of sensible

to mean examining

an

to being does not

any enunciation

an argument

is free of internal

contained

of a nature

in our experience

ner to resolve

it is reduced

our knowledge

the concept

ing, but rather

the way in which

to the first principles

from the way in which

mean to reduce

ho~ever,

it

to

in the prin-

is greater
the relation

than

yl!

is

of a

to its parts.
In Thomas'

what innate

species

ledge through

eyes, these first principles
are to angels:

such species,

first principles.2

True,

are to us

just as angels have know-

man has knowledge

first principles

through

the

are not innate

in

lIn I Sent., d. XIX, q.5, a.l, sol.: "Veritas
autem enuntiationis reducitur in prima principia per se nota
'sicut in primas causas; et praecipue in hoc principium, quod
affirmatio et negatio non sunt simul vera, ... "
2De Ver., XV, 1, resp.: "., .Illud quod est superioris naturae:- non potest esse in inferiori natura perfecte,
sed per quamdam tenuern participationem
... Id autem quod sic
participatur, non habetur ut possessio, id est sicut aliquid
perfecte subiacens potentLle habentis illud; ..." Dhavamony,
p. 133: "The highest in man is not reason but intellect;
there is a continuity between the angel and man in such a
way that man participates in the angelic intelligence and
attains in his highest. element the lOvlest element of the
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us, for knowledge

of the8 is derived

Yet, the power which makes
in sensible

things

says that since Aristotle
calls the agent intellect,
fittingly

be ascribed

connatural
they become

to us.

2

the potential

actually

intelligible

compares

Therefore,

known to us through

intelligibility
is innate.

this power,

to a light,

to the mode

things.l

from sensible

which he

its activity

of intellectual

angel, namely, he knows first principles
out reasoning."

may

light

the first principles,
our natural

Thomas

since

intellectual

immediately

with-

ISCG II, 83, #32: "Praeterea, id quod per sensum
in nobis acquiritur non infuit anlmae ante corpus.
Sed ipsorum principiorum cognitio in nobis ex sensibilibus
causatur; nisi enim aliquod tatum sensu percipissemus,
non
possemus intelligere quod totUi'l1
esset majus parte" ..17
2SCG II, 77, #5: "Quod autem lumen intelligibile
nostrae animae" connaturale sufficiat ad faciendum actionem
intellectus agentis, patet, ... Aristoteles fuit motus ad
ponendum quod ea quae sunt nobisintelligibilia
non sunt
aliqua existentia lntelligibilia per seipsa, sed fiunt ex
sensibilibus; unde oportet quod poneret vurtutem quae hoc
faceret; et haec est intellectus agens.
Ad hoc ergo
ponitur intellectus agens ut faciat intelligibilia nobis
proportionata .. Hoc autem non excedit modum luminls intelligibilis nobis connaturalis.
Unde nihil prohibet ipsi
lumini nostrae animae attribuere actionem intellectus agentis, et praecipue quum Aristoteles intellectum agentem
comparet lumini."
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light in so immediate
fail to understand
our very nature
known

and spontaEeOU3

a wayl that we cannot

them, or be mistaken

commands

to us naturally.4

assent
Because

about them) 2 since

to them,3 may be said to be
all the conclusions

of

IDe Anima I, }~, ad 6: " ...Actualem cogni tionem
principiorumhabere
non potest intellectus possibilis nisiper intellectum agentem.
Cognitio enim principorum a sensibilibus accipitur, ut dicitur in fine libri Posteriorum.
A
sensibilibus autem non possunt intelligibilia
accipi nisi
per abstractionem intel1ectus agentis." In III Sent., d. 23~.
q.2, a.2, sol. 1: "Et hoc quidem contingit in his quae
statim lumine intellectus agentis intelligibilia
fiunt,
sicut sunt prima principia quorum est intellectus."
2De Malo III, 3, resp.: "Intellectus ex necessitate assentiat interdunl propositae veritati, ... tam intellectus quam voluntas ex necessitate tendit in illud ad quod
naturaliter ordinatur; naturale enim est determinari ad
unum.
Unde intellectus ex necessitate assentit principiis
primis naturaliter notis, nec potest eorum contrariis
assentire; ... ri Cf. SCG 111,46,
#1+; ST 1,17,3,
ad 2; and
62, 8, ad 2. Cf. alSO-Dhavamony,
p. 131.
3S. T. I-II, 17, 6, resp.: "Actus rationis potest
considerari dupliciter.
Uno modo, quantum ad exercitum actus ... Alio modo, quantum ad obiectum, respectu cuius duo
actus rationis attenduntur.
Primo quidem ut veritatem circa
aliquid apprehendat.
Et hoc non est in potestate nostra;
hoc enim contingit per virtutem alicuius luminis vel naturalis vel supernaturalis.
Et ideo quantum ad hoc, actus
rationis non est in potestate nostra nec imperari potest.
Alius autem actus rationis est, dum his quae apprehend it
assentit.
Si ig1tur fuerint talia apprehensa, quibus naturaliter intellectus assentiat, sicut prima principia,
assensus talium vel dis sensus non est in potestate nostra,
sed in ordine naturae; et idea, proprie loquendo, naturae
nec imperio subiacet. 11 Cf. Dhavamony, p. 130.

4SCG III, 46, Ii 4: "Cogni tio quae fit per aliquid
naturaliter nobis inditum,;st
naturalis: sicut principia
indemonstrabilia,
quae cognoscuntur per lumen intellectus
agentis.11
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scientific

knowledge

are implicit

in these principles,

rrhomas calls them "the seeds of knovvledge. iiI
However,
which

the light of the agent intellect,

these principles

as its first source.2
source

are seen, comes to the soul from God
Accordingly,

of our understanding

impressed

other

living things

which

such things

God is likewise

of the principles

on our souls as scientific

onic state, analogous

in

knowledge

which

the
He has

in an embry-

to the way in which He impressed

the genetic3

mature

principles

and produce

according

their proper

on
to

effects.~

IDe Ver., XI, 1, resp.: "Similiter e"Glam dicendum
est de scientiae-acquisitione;
quod praeexistunt in nobis
quaedam scientiarum semina ... Et iatis autem principiis universalibus omnia principia sequuntur, sicut ex quibusdam rationibus seminalibus.
Quando ergo ex istis universalibus
cognitionibus mens educitur ut actu cognoscat particularia,
quae prius in potentia, et quasi in universali cognoscebantur, tunc aliquis dicitur scientiam acquirere." Cf. ibid.,
3, resp..
-,--2Ibid., X, 6, resp.: "Quod quidem lumen intellectus agentis in anima I'ationali procedit, sicut a prima
origine, a substantiis separatis, praecipue a Deo."
3Thomas, of course, knew nothing of modern-day
genetics-- he called them seminal principles.
But the substitution seems justified as expressing his insight more accurately than was possible with the biology of his own day.
IIDe Ver., XI, 3., resp.: "Homo ignotorum cogni tionem per duoaccfpit:
scilicet per lumen intellectuale,
et
per primas conceptiones per se notas, ... Quantum igj.tur ad
utrumque, Deus hominis scientiae causa est excellentissimo
modo; quia et ipsam anirnam intellectuali lumine insignivit,
et notitiam primorum principiorum ei impressit, quae sunt
quasi quaedam seminaria scientiarum; sicut et aliis naturalibus rebus impressit seminales rationes omnium effectuum producendorum."
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Moreover,

the agent intellect

but is a created
of reason
planted

participation

by which

not only has God as its source
jn His own light:l

such principles

are evident

in us by God as a kind of reflected

of the uncreated

truth.112

manifest

truth because

truth;3

this resemblance

our intellects

to us is im-

likeness

Thus the principles

were created

in us

are able to

they are in the likeness
should not surprise

"the light

of the first

us inasmuch

by this same supreme

as

intellect.4

IDe Anima, V, resp.: 11...Intellectus agens, sit
quasi quaedam virtus participate. ex aliqua substantia supe.riori, scilicet Deo." ST I, 79, 4, ad 1: "IlIa lux vero illuminat sicut causa universalis, a qua anima humana participat quandam particularem virturem.,.11 Lonergan, p. 87: 11 •••
Thomist thought is an ontology of knowledge inasmuch as intellectual light is referred to its origin in uncreated
Light ...11

2De Ver., XI, 1, resp.: I1Hujusmodi autem rationls
lumen, quo principia hujusmodi sunt nobis nota, est nobis a
Deoinditum, quasi quaedam similitudo increatae veritatis in
nobis resultantis.11
3Quodlib., X, a.S, resp.: I1Nihil autem possumus
veritatis cognoscere nisi ex primis principiis, et ex lumine intellectuali; quae veritatem manifestare non possunt,
nisi secundum quod sunt similitudo illius primae veritatis;
quia ex. hoc etiam habent quamdam incommutabilitatem
et infallibilitatem."
De Ver., X, 6, ad 6: I1prima principia quorum cogniti.o est nobis-innata,
sunt quaedam simili.tudines
increatae veritatis; unde secundum quod per eas de ali.is
judicamus, di.cimur judicare de rebus per rationes immuta-biles, vel veritatem increatam.tl

43. T. I, 79,4,
resp.: "Sed intellectus separatus, secundum nostrac fidei documenta, est ipse Deus, qui
est creator animae
unde ab ipso anima humana lumen intellectuale participat
" Ibid., ad 5: Ileum essentia animae
sit immaterialis a supremo intellectu creata, nihil prohibet
virtutem quae a supremo intellectu participatur, per quam
abstrahitur a materia, ab essentia ipsius procedere, sicut
et alias eius potentias.11
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When we judge according
fact, judging

to these principles,
1

by the first truth.~

seen, it is only through
scientific

conslusions

resolution

Furthermore,
to principles

certitude

that

in the eternal

there-

of scientific

comes to us from God, the interior

that we know all things

as we have

can be known with certainty;

fore, we may say that the whole
knowledge

we are, in

teacher,

exemplars.3

2

and

As the

IDe Ver., I, 4, ad 5: "Ver:Ltas secundum quam animc_
de omnibus judicat, est veritas prima.
Sicut enim a veritate intellectus divini effluunt in intellectum angelicum
species rerum innatae, secundum quas omnia cognoscit, ita a
veritate intellectus divini exemplariter procedit in intellectum nostrum veritas primorum principiorum secundum quam
de omnibus judicamus.
Et quia per earn judicare non possumus
nisi secundum quod est similitudo p~imae veritatis, ideo secundum primam veri tatem de omnibus dicimur judicare. it Cf.
Ibid., X, 6, ad 6; and 11, ad 12. Cf! Dhavamony, p. 148.
2De Ver., XI, 1, ad 13: "Certitudo sclentiae tota
oritur ex certitudine principiorum; tunc enim conclusiones
per certitudinem sciuntur, quando resolvuntur in principia:
et ideo, quod aliquid per certitudinem sciatur, est ex
lumine rationis divinitus interius indito, quo in nobis loquitur Deus." Ibid., resp.: "Unde cum omnis doctrina human a
efficaciam habere-non possit nisi ex vi~tute illius luminis;
constat quod solus Deus est qui interius et principaliter
docet ... " Cf. ibid., ad 17; De Anima, V, ad 6.
3S. T. I, 84, 5, resp.: "Alio modo dicitur aliquid
cognosci in aliquo sicut in cognitionis principio;, ... Et sic
necesse est dicere quod anima humana omnia cognoscat in
rationibus aeternis, per quarum participationem
omnia cognoscimus.
Ipsum enim lumen intellectuale quod est in nobis,
nihil est aliud quam quaedam participata similitudo luminis
increati, in quo continentur rationis aeterna." Cf. ibid.,
12, 11, ad 3. Dhavamony, pp. 131-33 analyzes and compares
Augustine's doctrine of illumination and Aquinas' abstraction, and summarizes his conclusion on p. 133: liThe difference between Augustine's illumination and Aquinas' abstraction, as we see it, is not great.
Augustine pleads for
an actual participation of eternal truth in all our intellectual knowledge, whereas Aquinas is for an habitual par-
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certitude
which

of angelic

are a reflection

intellect

truth proceeds

comes from innate

of the eternal

in the angelic

human knowledge

intellect,

and foundation

contained

intellect

of all our natural

knowledge,

whatever

as certain,

however

firmly

whose
as

are the
they

is not im-

in them and cannot be re301ved

cannot be understood

of

known principles

As the principles

also set the limit of that knowledge:
plicitly

truth of the divine

from the truth of the divine
cause.l

species

so the certitude

comes from naturally

from their exemplary
source

knowledge

to them

one may

ticipation of eternal truth in the form of the agent intellect.
But ...the actualization of this habit needs the
cooperation of God ... Thus the actual participation of
Augustine occurs again in Aquinas but as actuation of the
habitual participation of the agent intellect itself." Cf.
also Lonergan, p. 189.
lSCG III, 1~7, '7: llQuaedam sunt vera in quibus
omnes homines-concordant,
sicut sunt prima principia intellectus tam speculativi quam practici: secundum quod
universal iter in mentibus omnium divinae veritatis quasi
- quaedam imago resultat.
Inquantam ergo quaelibet mens
quidquid per certitudinem cogniscit, in his principiis intuetur, secundum quae de omnibus iudicatur, bacta resolutione in ipso, dicitur omnia in divina veri tate vel in
rationibus aeternis videre, et secundum eas de omnibus
iudicare." Cf. ST 1,12,11,
ad 3; 87, 1, resp,; De Ver.,
.I, 4, ad 5; Peghaire, p. 180.
-- ---

132

lIn II Sent., d.28, q.l, a.5, sol.: "Illa naturalem rationemexcedunt
quae non possunt concludi ex primis
principiis per se notis.
Cum enim prima principia sint sicut instrumenta intellectus agentis ...oportet ea esse proportionata virtuti ejus, sicut organa/corporalia
sunt proportionata virtuti motivae; unde quae ex primis principiis
concludi non possunt, naturale lumen intellectus excedunt."
In III Sent., d.23, q.2, a.2, sol. 3, #156: "Sed quia voluntas hoc modo non determinat intellectum ut faciat inspici
quae creduntur, sicut inspiciuntur principia per se nota vel
quae in ipsa resolvuntur, sed hoc modo ut intellectus firmitel" uni adhaereat; ...certjtudo ...fidei est ex firma adhaesione ad id quod creditur." Cf. De Ver., XVIII, 4, resp.
2The term intellectus can be used to signify both
the power of understanding
(intellect) and the activity of
understanding
(understanding);
it may be taken generally to
refer to any intellectual activity whatsoever, including
reasoning and even opinion, or, more specifically (and this,
according to Thomas in ST I, 79, 10, resp., is its most
precise and proper sense) to refer to the act of understanding as such-- a direct and immediate grasp of truth, the
primary instance of which is intellectus principiorum,
(the
understanding
of principles), an intellectual virtue which
habituates the intellectual power to and in active understanding.
This narrower sense of intellectus is distinct
from reasoning, which is an indirect way of attaining truth,
involving inquiry and comparison, proceeding in stepwise
fashion from the knowledge of one thing to that of another,
through a middle term.
Thomas' teaching on this point may
be found in De Ver., I, 12; ST I-II, 57, 2; In VI Eth., V,
#1179; In II Sent., d.24, q.~
a.3, ad 4 and-q.~
ad 2;
De Ver., XI, 1; SCG I, 57, #2, and III, 97, #12; ST II-II,
49,~
ad 3. The-classic secondary source is the-Study of
J. Peghaire previously cited, esp. p. 190ff., upon which the
foregoing brief comment is based.

a:3,

3In II Meta., I, #285: "Cum anima humana sit ultima in ordine-Substantiarum
intellectivarum,
minime perticipat de virtute intellectiva."
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in understanding
previously
standing

unknown,

to reasoning,2

certitude

arrived

In itself,

of the understanding

through

at into the
is

is perfect

resolution

of principles.4

we judge whether

in under-

understanding

but for us science

since it is achieved

tion to principles

to what was

its reasoning

the conclusions

of the principles.l

knowledge,3

it reasons

and terminates

by resolving

certitude
superior

of principles

to the

By resolu-

or not we have a true

lIn III Sent., d.35, a.l, q.2, qa. 2, sol.: "Inquisitio autem-rationis
sicut a simplici intuitu intellectus progreditur, quia ex principiis quae quis intellectu
tenet ad inquisitionem procedit, ita etiam ad intellectus
certitudinem terminatur, dum conclusiones inventae in principia resolvuntur in quibus certitudinem habent.1I De Ver.,
XIV, 1, resp.: "In scientia enim motus rationis incipit
ab intellectu principiorum,
et ad eumdem terminatur per
viam resolutionis.1I

stration

2S. T. 1-11,51,2,
ad'3; Cf. Simmons,
and Self-evidence,1I p. 150, D. 18.
3In Post. Anal.,

"Demon-

IV, #5 and #9.

4In I Sent., d.17, q.'l, a.l~,

ad 2: 1ISed istorum
habituum actus-perfecte
experimunt suas habitus quantum ad
id quod est proprium eis; sicut in actu scientiae est certitudo per causam, in qua expresse scientia demonstratur;
et multo plus est hoc in intellectu principiorum.1I In II
Sent., d.7, q.l, a.l, sol.: 11...Et similiter patet in intellectualibus;
quia principium immediatum naturaliter
cognitum determinat potestatem totam rationis.
Ante enim
quam ad ipsum deveniatur per inquicitionem resolventem,
ita
adhaeretur uni parti, ut relinquatur quaedam pronitas ad
partem aliam per modum dubitationis;
sed quando resolvendo
pervenitur ad primum principium per se notum, firmatur ad
unum cum impossibilitate
alterius.1I

demonstration;l
derstanding

not until reasoning

do we have scientific

crux of scientific

reasoning

fests that the conclusion
principles.3
flection:

the

which

mani-

is both a reflexion
and deliberate,

that a conclusion

is grounded

to un-

Hence

has truly been deduced

This resolution

ciples until he judges

knowledge.2

is the resolution

it must be conscious

not be certain

thus joins itself

from the
and a re-

for one canin first prin-

it to be, and this he cannot

less he is aware of what he is doing and intends

do un-

.

to do It.

4

lIn Boeth. de Trin., VI, 1, 1, resp.: "Ultimus
enim terminus, ad quem-rationis inquisitio perducere debet,
est intellectus principiorum,
in quae resolvendo iudicamus,
quod quid em quando fit non dicitur processus vel probatio
rationabilis,
sed demonstrativa.1i
2In Dion. de Div. Nomen, VIII, 9, #73: "Scientia
est coniunctio intellectus et rationis ... " Cf. De Ver.,
XI, 1, resp ..

3S•

T. I-II, 90, 2, ad 3: "Nihil constat firmiter
secundum rationem speculativam nisi per resolutionem ad
prima principia indemonstrabilia ...".Ibid., I, 14, 7,
resp.: "Terminus vero discursus est quando secundum videtur
in primo, resolutis effectibus in causas, et tunc cessat
discursus ." Cf., ibid., I-II, 5'7, 2, ad 2; In VI Eth., V,
#1176; De Ver., XI, 1, ad 4.
---

4S. T. I-II, 112, 5, resp.: "Homo cognoscit aliquid per seipsam, et hoc certitudinaliter ... Certitudo enim
non potest haberi de aliquo, nisi possit iudicari per proprium principium; sic enim certitudo habeturde
conclusionibus demonstrativis
per indemonstrabilia
universalia principia; nullus autem posset scire se habere scientiam alicuius conclusiones, si principium ignoraret ..." Ibid., ad
2: "De ratione scientiae est quod homo certitudinem habeat
de his quorum habet scientiam ... Et ideo quicumque habet
scientiam ... certus est se habere."
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•

The resolutive

inquiry,

and deliberate,

although

it too must be conscious

is, on the contrary, ~irect

rather

than

reflexive.
We see, therefore,
and division

a parallel

on the one hand, and reasoning

both cases there are two phases,
The discovery
known,

discovery

is a sort of stretching-out

and the evaluation,

And both phases

involve

however.

resolution--

from sensible
determinate
sensible

nature

singulars.

composite-simple--

images;

attains

a reflex~on,

species

freed. from the material

expresses

conditions

and universal.

Likewise

which moves

from effect to cause,

of resolution,

for effects

are logically

and causes

sort of resolution

are simpler

is reflexive.

it be of a composition

Judgment,

or division,

and
and

quia.

is a sort

posterior

than effects.

the

of

to the prior

demonstration,

causes,

of

species

from the posterior

and individual--

the intelligible

senses

sort of resolution,

the intelligible

Thus it moves

in

to the as yet un-

two different

the intelligible

the sensible

on the other;

also a reflection.

Abstractiori isa

for by it the intellect

composition

and evaluation.

a bending-back,

which must be known as such, therefore

resolution,

between

to

But neither
however,

whether

or of a demonstration,l

IDe Spiro Creat., X, ad 8: "Judicare enim aliquo
de veritatedicitur
dupliciter.
Uno modo sicut medio:sicut
iudicamus de conclusj.onibus per principia, ...Alio modo die itur aliquo iudicare de veritate aliqua, sicut virtute iudicativa, et hoc modo per intellectum agentem iudicamus de
veritate."

136
is necessarily

reflexive:

The reflexion

reduction

is known

to the senses and resolution

the known object
this twofold

reflection,

in judging,

obj ect, the

the knowing
senses

2,C

power.

of resolution,

movement

to principles,3

subject.

and the reason

of sensing,

The common
appears

it gives us cer-

element

of the

in these various

to be that in all cases the

is from posterior/effect

to prior/cause:

posterior/prior

as Thomas

uses them and he seems generally
to each other,

I, 9: we re-

and the na tureof

couplets,

equivalent

to its causes

The efficiency

tivi ty of knowing,

both

The steps in

are set down in pe Veritate

fleet on the passivity
sensed

reflection,

the knowing--

and the knowing

the know-

and intellectual

in a double

of which move from the effect--

titude

we retrace

in sense experiencel

ledge to its source
light.2

in judging

and effect/cause,

both the

are analogous
to regard

them as

at least so far as human knowing

l~.
I, 17, 3, ad 1: llQuia quidditas rei est
proprium obiectum intellectus, propter hoc tunc proprie dicimur aliquid intelligere, quando reducentes illud in quod
quid est, sic de eo iudiciamus; ...llIbid., II-II, 175, 4,
resp.: llIntellectus autem humanus nOl1 converitur ad intelligibilia nisi mediantibus phantasmatibus,
quae per species
intelligibiles
a sensibus accipit, et in quibus considerans
de sensibilibus iudicat et ea disponit.ll
2SCG II, 77, #5, above p. 126, n. 2.
3Cf. M-V Leroy, llAbstractio et separatio d'apres
un texte controverse de saint Thoma8;ll Revue Thomiste 48
(1948) pp. 246-47.
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activity

is concerned.l

material

effects

is essentially

Inasmuch

to prior

as it moves

immaterial

causes,

by way of resolution.2

too is by way of resolution--

resolution.3

In scientific

resolution

are distinct,

though

to inquiry

and the other to judging.

of

a reflexive

not independent:

them,

knowing

these two types

of

one belongs

Yet we can discern

a kind of convergence

between

of resolutive

is the absolutely

inquiry

human

But the certitude

human knowing

knowing,

from posterior

inasmuch

as the term

first cause,

and

lIn I Sent., d.17, q.l, a.~, sol.: "Unde ...
naturale sunt nobis procedere ex sensibus ad intelligibilia,
ex effectibus in causas, ex posterioribus
in priora, secundum statum viae ..."
2SCG II, 100, #4: "Item, species rerum intelLtgibiles contrario ordine perveniunt ad intellectum nostrum
et intellectum substantiae separatae; ad intellectum enim
nostrum perveniunt per viam resolutionis,
scilicet per
abstractionem a conditionibus materialibus et individuantibus; ... ad intellectum autem substantiae separatae perveniunt species intelligibiles quasi per viam compositionis; habet enim species intelligibiles
ex assimilatione
sui ad primam intelligibilem
speciem intellectus divini,
quae quidem non est a rebus abstracta, sed rerum factiva."
3Edmund Dolan, F. S. C. in "Resolution and Composition in Speculative and Practical Discourse" Laval
Theologique et Philosophique, VI, 1 (1950) pp. 9-62,
distinguisheS-the
two types of resolution because one belongs to the ordo determinandi and the other to the ordo
demonstrandi. -While
this is so, VIe do not find it a-s-fruitful as the distinction we have made between nonreflexive and reflexive resolution.
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this same first cause is the term af resolutive
in scientific

knowing,

is a participation

since the light by which we judge

in unereated

divine

light in us, all things

divini

l~.
luminis

I,

84,

in nobis

evaluation

5,

l:Lght.

IlBy the seal of the

are made known to us.lll

resp.: IlPe::."
ipsam sigillationem
omnia demonstrc'.ntur.Il

v
REFLECTION AND RESOLUTION IN METAPHYSICAL WISDOM
We have seen that there
human

intellectual

standing

activity:

we proceed

variety

of sciences.

conclusion

to reason

is resolved

seen in their

When,

with a simple under-

into its principles,

ing proceeds
attainment

terminates
understanding

with respect

the multiplicity

remains:

in this fashion

of a more detailed
it has sacrificed

into first prina

in each, case, the scientific

though more profound,

sciences,

in

in many ways, developing

light, reasoning

Nevertheless,

reality,

beginning

of truth in an inlmediate insight

ciples,

simple,

is a sort of circle

S0

again

in a

of truth.l

to the various
so long as human know-

it is incomplete.
understanding

the unity

as to be

In the

of sensible

of ~ts original

act of

lIn Dion. De Div. Nom., VII, 1, II (Mandonnet II,
pp. 225-26 )-:
-llInquiditioenim
ra tionis ad simplicem intelligentiam veritatis terminatur, sicut incipit a simplici
intelligentia veritatis, quae consideratur in primis principiis.- Et ideo in processus rationis est quaedam convolutio ut circulus, dum ratio ab uno incipiens per multa
procedens ad unum terminatur." De Ver., XIV, 9, resp.:
llQuaecumque autem sciuntur, proprie accepta scientja, cognoscuntur per resolutionem in prima principia, quae per se
praesto sunt intellectui, et sic omnis scientia in visione
rei praesentis perficitur." Cf. also Peghaire,
pp. 278
and 272.

139

140
understanding. 1
itself

as intellect,

integrated
vision

of reality.2

reflective

but 1s merely

reasoning's

multiplicity

neither

Until this is regained

various

judgment,

without

intrinsic

judgment,

source

culminates

and inquiry

conferred

a

on the thing by

this to the act of being
and the final

is, does, and can become.3

in insight

in science

a

in the real thing,

of that unity,

cause of all the thing

As induction

und81'standing, through

but must reach beyond

as both the intrinsic

into a total

cannot rest in knowing

how they are united

can it rest in the unity

its essence,

J'c'a;30n,
for it has not

conclusions

As intellect

of aspects

it has not fulfilled

through

through

a reflective

resolution

to first

lSCG III, 91, #3;5: "Omnia autem quae in nobis
sunt inveniuntur esse mul U.plicia, variabilia et defectibilia ... intelligentia nostra multiplicationem
habet, quia
ex multis sensibilibus veritatem intelligibilem
quasi congregamus; est etiam mutabilis, quia ex uno in aliud discurrendo procedit, ex notis ad ignota proveniens."
2SCG III, 91, #3: 1I0portet omne multiforme et
mutabile etCfeficere potens reduci, sicut in principium,
aliquod uniforme et imffiutabileet deficere non valens."

in

3De Subst. Sep., IX, #48 Tractatu3 de Substantiis
Separatis, ed. F. Lescoe. West Hartfor~Conn~
St. Joseph
College, 1962: USed quia nihil praeter corpora mente percipere poterant, resolverunt quidem corporales substantias
in aliqua principia, sed corporalia ... Posteriores vero
philosophi processerunt resolventes sensibiles substantias
in partes essentiae quae sunt materia et forma; et sic fieri
rerum naturalium in quodam transmutatione posuerunt ... Sed
ultra hunc modum fiendi necesse est secundum sententiam
Platonis et Aristotelis ponere alium altiorem ... Oportet
igitur communem quamdam resolutionem in omnibus hujusmodi
fieri, secundum quod unumquodque eorum intellectu re301vitur in id quod est et in suum esse."
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principles
sciences
which

and to the senses,

culminates

in a single,

the multiplicity

reduced

to a unified

recognized
habitude
ceives

vision

insofar

Discerning

to a distinct

each thing that is.l
as analogically
grounding
fashion

common

a scientific

science

known

as these

existence,

essences

are

the

intellect

per-

yet proper

reflectively

to all,2 is seen as capable
study and is expressed

as a rati.o _en_t_-l_'
_8.3
Thomas

is

so it comes to

from essence,

This character,

in

essences

in each being

this as true of every finite being;

grasp being as an act distinct

in all the

all~cmbracing

of scientifically

as existing.
of essence

so understanding

to

grasped
of

in conceptual

calls thi.s by various

lIn Boeth. de Trin., VI, 3, resp.: "Considerant
essentias secundum quod habent esse in rebus; et ideo ubi
inveniunt diversum modum potentiae et actusJ et per hoc diversum modum essendi, dicunt esse diversa genera." cr.
Henry Renard, S. J., !!VJha
t is St. Thomas' Approach to [\1etaphysics?!! New Scholastici.sm XXX (1956)
p. 74: "Rising from
the first intellectual knowledge (primum cognitum) which is
material quiddity ... to distinguish various-types of material things, philosophers examine various essences ... according as they have existence in things ... The metaphysician, by an analysis (consideratio) of the rationes of
the various genera, '..mdei~stand-s
that the existents, 'from
which the rationes are abstracted, have diverse modes of
existing.
Consequently, he understands that the 'habitude'
of these essences to esse is to an existential act which is
not identical with, but d-istinct from, its potency."
2S . T . I , 13 ,:J,h a d 1 :'I'T'.ulce./....
.
v In prae d'lcan t'J..onlbus oporteataequivoca
ad univoca reduci; ... omnia univoca
reducuntur ad unum primum, non univocum, sed analogicum,
quod est ens."
3See below pp. 145-146.
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names:

ens commune,

ens lnquantum

ens per communitatem.~

ens, ens in communi,

or

1

In order to make this cle~r, let us review the
whole

structure

following

of the intellect's

stages:

we acquire

first,

evolution.

an initial

an intelligible

species

We find the

act of knowing

in which

of some sensible

thing,

and at the same time, the habit of principles.
of first principles

is a kind of natural,

metaphysics ... It is not the science
the primitive
the fullness

apprehension

of that notion,

first principles
ly, by virtue
reality,

through

sciences.

intellect

pp. 74-75;

does not reveal
are the
Second-

investigates

in conclusions

grasped

of the demonstrative

of certitude,

p.

for

to these same first prin-

the habits

The final criterion

lRenard,

involved

knowledge

resolution

thus are generated

of metaphysics,

in all their vigor.n2

of first principles,
a fuller

pre-scientific

nor, consequently,

comprehended

attaining

with certitude
ciples;

of being

"This habit

75, n.

however,

is not

27.

2Thomas O'Brien, O. P., Metaphysics and the Existence of God: A Reflection on the Question of God's Existence in Contemporary Thomistic Metaphysics.
(\'Jashington,
D. C.: Thomist Press, 1960), p. 7. Cf. also Renard, p. 73:
"First of all, we should distinguish between ens meaning
thing (which is known to all, children and phil()sophers
alike) and being as being (ens commune) which is the subject of metaphysics
... n
--

143
the resolution

to first principles,

dence.l

tor the human knower,

This,

the senses,
sensory

since all human

experience.2

sciences

But a careful

but the light of evirequires

a reduction

have their
reflective

source

to

in

examination

lAs Peghaire shows, pp. 271-72, the reduction to
first principles is inadequate as the final criterion of
truth because first principles themselves are certain, not
by reason of being first principles, but by reason of being
evident: what makes them infallible is the light of evidence (and this is why they are first principles).
Peghaire goes on to demonstrate that this is Thomas' own position as stated in De Veritate XIV~ 9: "'Quaecumque autem
sciuntur, proprie accepta scientia, cognoscuntur per resolutionem in prima principia, quae per se praesto sunt intellectui'" c'est-a-dire, comme il l'avait defini quelques
lignes plus haut: 'illa p~aesto esse dicuntur intellectui,
quae capacitatem non excedunt, ut intuitu intellectus in eis
figatur.'
Cette pr~sence peute ~tre obtenu par un raisonnement ou bien immediatement,
et il conclut: let sic Cffinis scientia in visione rei praesentis perficiatur' et non
pas: toute science est parfaite quand on peut en remener les
conclusions aux premiers principes."
This does not mean
that the thing in itself is the final criterion either:
evidence is not the property of the thing as such, but rather results from the union of the thing as object "with a
subject which is in a particular way disposed so that in
this}.mion it is reflexively or concomitantly perceived as an
object of the intellectual desire to know," as Dhavamony
writes, pp. 136-37.
Yet in this union, the first principles
are the necessary dispositions conditioning the perception
of evidence: they determine the subject's dynamism to know
truth and influence the evidence of truth, Dhavamony states,
ibid ..
2Guzie, p. 95: "Various studies of the writings of
St. Thomas have revealed that the Angelic Doctor had a highly elaborated view of scientific method and a rigorous criterion of philosophical meaning.
Summarily stated, the full
commitment of the intellect to a scientific conclusion involves seeing that conclusion in the light both of the rational principles leading to the conclusion and of the basic
evidence of experience from which the conclusion is obtained.
The establishment of a philosophical conclusion
consequently entails a resolution of the higher-order propo~
sition to a twofold principle or source-- the first organizing principles of the science in question, and the ex-
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of the evidence
is more

unexplained.
derstand
thing

and the sensory

has been attained

both of things
Knowing

inquirer

can be explained

definition

the definition

aspect

to the diligent

given in it than

the scientific
which

reveals

that there

by resolution
experiences

to
from

by abstraction;

and of the knowing

some

of things remains

what a thing is may enable us to un-

what it does and doesn't

do, but never why the
,

is there at all, nor why we are not free to think

both is and is not there at anyone
tions begin

time.

to be seen, the intellect

reason

on a higher

level: this higher

object

is thus discovered

ingly,

be acquired

through

only subsequent

physics

and the other

derable

experience

sciences,

Once these ques-

is beginning

to

level science,

resolution,

to the acquisition

knowledge.

whose

can, accord-

for it presupposes

and scientific

it

of

consi-

Therefore

it

is called metaphysics.l

periential evidence or data of senSe experience upon which
the validity of the conclusion and of the first logical
principles themselves ultimately rests. 11
II n Boe th _. d.e'.lrln., VI ,~,~,resp.:
-, :>
~'I'

"N'h'l'
ll __
oml-

nus ipsa addiscitur post--phy-sicam et ceteras scientias, in
quantum consideratio intellectualis
est terminus rationalis,
propter quod dicitur metaphysica quasi tr~ns physicam, quia
post physicam resolvendo occurri t." In Meta .., proem.: !1rVIetaphysica, inquantum consider'at ens et-2".2 - quae consequuntur
ipsum.
Haec enim trans physica inveniuntur in via resolutionis, sicut magis communia post mlnus communia." Cf.
Renard, p. 64: "St. Thomas' approach to metaphysics, which
is the via resolutionis,
does not depend upon intuitive insights and existential moments, but, ... proceeds by way of
reasoned arguments, based upon intellectual analyses of conceptual knowledge which has been obtained through abstractlons, judgments, and l'easonings." And also, p. 73: " ...the
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Metaphysics
sciences
citly:

attains

in explicit

and the und~rstanding

the being

stration,

and the principles

as the indemonstrable

ground

of metaphysics

of principles

all scientific

impli-

are: the existence

the fruit of reflecting
conclusions,

principles

sight when one has reflected

subject of metaphysics
process ..."

of common

of demonThe object
in the way

being

of being proven.2

on the implications

a~d is grasped

defini-

of the intelligibility

demonstration.l

ther in need of proof nor capable

particular

grasp

is not the fruit of demonstration

that conclusions

rather

what the

of things upon which all scientific

tions are grounded
of being which,

fashion

is neiIt is
of many

as an immediate

sufficiently

in-

on the evidence:3

... is the term of a long reasoning

lIn Boeth. de Trin., VI, 4, resp.: "Et huiusmodi
sunt principia demonstrationum
indemonstrabilia,
ut 'omne
totum est maius sua parte,' et similia, in quae omnes demonstrationes scientiarum reducuntur, et etiam primae conceptiones intellectus, ut entis et unus et huiusmodi, in quae
oportet reducare omnes diffinitiones
scientiarum praedictarum." Cf. De Ver., I, 1 and ST I 49, 3, ad 6.
20wens,

"'1'heAnalytics,"

p. 98.

3What Simmons says in regard to the difference between the immediate induction of principles and the mediate
induction of a conclusion applies in this case as well: "The
induced conclusion is assented to precisely in virtue of the
enumeration of singulars and cannot be known without pointing to them for evidence."
Assent to the induced principles, hO\"Jever,"depends upon and comes with an insight
into the intrinsic intelligibility
of the proposition itself."
Though this insight may be difficult to achieve,
once it is achieved, assent to it is automatic; the dialectic which was instrumental prior to insight is no longer
needed as evidence for the truth of the principle. "Demonstration," p. 155, n. 31.

l!ens commune

is self.-evic1ent to us as soon as we consider

its ratio."l

And though

in its natural
the concept
vocal,

fashion,

of being

attained

further

quiddity,

is unlike

but dynamic

judgment

and which

express

Since being

act, its quidditative

but by a resolutive

is not identical
by a reflective
separating

from the particular

is attained
Further,

itself:

by a reflexive

called

Such knowledge

insofar

it enables

lRenard,

each
of

is clearly
as its object

by a judgment.

is really

it does not enable us to know what
rather

achieved

element

not in a composition,

by negation

"the

of divisions,

Thus metaphysics
sciences

not

that being as such

note whatever,

resolution,

it knows its object,

a division.
however,

process

of a series

thing or things.

is not a

form as abstract

being as such from some quidditative

some sensible
different

with any essential

the

It is attained,

the realization

consideration

are uni-

in judgment,

of reality.

of separation:"

which

entis--

evaluated

is the work of the hW'lan jntellect.2
by abstraction,

its insight

a ratio

other concepts

by reasoning,

elements

expresses

~s a sort of ratio--

by abstr~ction,

clarified

quidditative

the intellect

but in
knowledge;

something

is in

us to know that it is distinct

p. '76.

2In I Sent., d.19, q.5, 0..1, ad
tis esse estquoddam
esse rationis, ..."

7: "

quiddita-
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l

from other things.

So, in the case of being as being,

we

know it as other than essence,

but do not have any deter-

minate

is in itself.

knowledge

of being

of what being

is the expression

things,

each of which

thing.

Thus the content

from that of another,
recognized

as an intelligible

minate,

and consequently

analogous,

univocally

inasmuch

can be the subject
attributes

kind of intelligible

the object
thing.

of being

the concept

applicable

For this reason

of being

the

indeteris necessarily

so as to be expressed

in

to all real beings.2

as it is analogously
of scientific

differs

of any such act is

is necessarily

It cannot be clarified

a definition

of real

of one act of intelligence

though

of the concept

However,

of the intelligibility

is a specific

content

The concept

common to all, being

investigation,

and its

demonstrated.

ISCG III, 39, #1: "Sed hoc interest inter utrumque cognitionis propriae modum, quod per affirmationes propria
cognitione de re habita, scitur quid est res, et quomodo ab aliis separatur; per negationes de re, scitur quod
est ab aliis disireta, tamen quid sit remanet ignoturn."
2~.
I, 13, 10, resp.:
" ... in analogicis vero
oportet quod nomen, secundum unam significationem
accepturn,
ponatur in definitione eiusdem nominis secundum alias significationes accepta.
Sicut ens de substantia dictum ponitur in definitione entis secundum quod de accidentedicitur; ... " Ibid., 11, resp.: IlHoc nomen Qui est ... non ...
significat formam aliquarn, sed ipsum esse ... Quolibet enim
alio nomine determinaturaliquis
modus substantiae rei; sed
hoc nomen Qui est nullum modum essendi determinat, sed se
habet indeterminate ad omnes ..." Cf. Lonergan, pp. 44-1~5.

148
Nevertheless,
in metaphysics
sciences,

differs

the mode of demonstration

from that found in the other

since the attributes

cfbeing

strated

as can those of the subjects

through

the definition

cannot

of the scientific

we come to know either directly

adequate

effect. 1

geometry--

Moreover,

example

propter

subject

whose

or through

quid proof

of deductive

sciences,

science--

its

as found in
classical

cannot be made to fit into a metaphysical

for the further reason
ledge concerns

real subjects,

that the mathematical

itself with intelligible

of ideal existence

things

be demon-

of the other

quiddity

the most perfect

employed

philosophy

objects

concerns

as they exist in reality.2

can demonstrate

type of know-

cut off from their actual

whereas

exclusively

lIn Boeth.

through

de Trin.,

VI,

context

in a state

existence

in

itself with

That is why mathematics
formal

4,

causality,

but

ad 2.

2p. Chojnacki, "Les conceptions epistemologiques
de la metaphysique chez S. Thomas d'Aquin et ses origines,"
in Collectanea theologica (Varsovj_e) 34 (1963)
p. 373: "La
metaphysique ne peut pas ~tre une science d~monstrative
au
sens de la demonstration propter quid, car il nfest pas
possible de donner une definition des termes ayant un
caract~re particuli~rement
premier.
Or les termes dont
traite la rnetaphysique sont absolument premiers ou transcendentaux, par consequant ils echappent
la definition
proprement dite.
Faute de la definition de l'essence du
sujet, qui justifie l'attribution necessaire du predicat
cet sujet dans la conclusion, la formation d'une demonstration propter quid devient donc impossible." Cf. Ander-

a

a

son, p.

100.
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metaphysics
reasoning,
to reveal

cannot.~

the implications

The reasoning

that such dynamism

ultimate

ground the essence

grounded

in an act which

is why metaphysical

rigorously

an essence,

of th~ dynamism

of them.

realization

resolutions

employs

not in order to analyze

in the experience
plicit

Metaphysics

but in order

of things

leads to the ex-

it needs to be

is other than the essence.

than deductions.2

given

cannot have as its

of the thing;

demonstrations

logical

are more properly

Nor does this weaken

This
called
the

lChojnacki, p. 373: llD'apres S. rrhomas d'Aquin, la
d~monstration propter quid est pratiqu~e dans les lliath~matiques, car elles procedent
une preuve ne considerant que
la forme, qui est constitu~e par la d~finition.
La metaphysique con~id~re l'objet plus Qomplique,
que les math~matiques.
Son objet n'est pas ~tudi~ de la
meme fa~on que l'objet des mathematiques,
qui se borne
1a
consid~ration de la seule forme.
Les mathematiques
se
servent surtout de la d~monstration analytique.
Fr. Brentano a juge, que dans la metaphysique aristot~licienne
est
appliquee la demonstration analytique, mais cette opinion ne
se laisse pas soutenir, surtout
l'egard de la metaphysique
de S. Thomas d'Aquin, qui a souligne dans l'etre l'aspect
existentiel et contingent.
Or ltexistentiel et Ie contingent echappent
l'analyse mathematique.ll

a

a

a

a

21n I Post. Anal., 1, 43, #391: llVocat... resolutionem,. quando -proposi.tiones assumptae non sunt manifestae,
sed oportet eas resolvere in alias rnanifestiores.ll Geiger,
La Participation ?aQs l~_ philosophie g~ ~. Tho~as d' Aquin.
2 ed. (Paris; J. Vrin, 1953), p. 322, n. 1: llCette relation
speciale entre l'~tre et les concepts plus d~termin~s fait
l'originalite de la resolutio.ad ens, de cette analyse ou
reduction a l'etre qui nc sallrait s-lidentifier avec
l'analyse 10gique des notions univoques.
El1e n'est
d'ailleurs qui la contrepartie dela
mani~re caracteristique
dont les transcendentaux
se determinent pour constituer les
concepts limites.ll
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status
what

of metaphysics

certifies

ciples,

which

any conclusion

veals

according

is its resolution

the conclusion

to be contained

in its causes.~

tion" and "science"

Thomas'

considera-

are entitative

these the demonstrations

con-

linking

re-

in the principles

use of both

1s analogouf:'.
rather

The first principles
its resolutions

to prin-

which have led to a particular

in order to show that their rigorous

an effect

to Thomas

is, as we have seen, a reflective

tion of the elements
elusion

as a science;l

as

"demonstra-

than univocal. 3

to which metaphysics
act and potency;

4

in all the other sciences

makes
upon
depend,

lCf. Owens, "The Ana1ytlcs," p. 98ff.
For Fr.
Owens what makes these demonstrations
of metaphysics truly
scientific is the prior demonstration
of the existence of a
first cause of being.
We agree that it is the business of
metaphysics to demonstrate the existence of such a cause,
and that this demonstration is p~operly called quia demonstration, but we do not see the need for maintaining that
the status of metaphysics as a science depends on this
demonstration.
23. T'~ I, Ill, 7, resp.: "Alius discursus est secundum causalitatem, sicut cum per principia pervenimus in
cognitionem conclusionum ... discursus talis est procedentis
de noto ad ignotum ... Terminus vera discursus est, quando
secundum videtur in primo, resolutis effectibus in causas;
et tunc cessat discursils." Cf. Peghaire, p. 271.
3Cf. Baumgartner,

p. 59.

40wens, "The Intelligibility
anum XXXVI, 2 (1955) p. 192.

of Being,"

Gregori-
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thus the study of any real thing
metaphysics.
ciples

Because

which underlie

metaphysics

it deals

finds its completion

explicitly

all scientific

may be called

first philosophy.l
those,

potency,

to the things

which are intrinsic

the principles;

and those extrinsic

tive of them as agent or efficient
trinsic

principles

with the pI'in-

knowledge

are two sorts of principles:

and whatever

any given thing requires

scientific

study of that thing;3

of reality,
However,

like entitative

there

act and

of which they are

to things but constitucause.2

extrinsic

discovered

in

Both the inprinciples

must be included

so in metaphysics

it is
in any

the reso-

lIn Boeth. de Trin., VI, 1, 3, resp.: !lEt exinde
etiam est quod ipsa largitur principia omnibus aliis
scientiis, in quantum intellectualis
consideratio est principium rationalis, propter quod dicitur prima philosophia."
Cf. In Meta., prooem.
2The latter, in addition to being the principles
of other things, are also complete natures in themselves,
and may thus be the objects of a separate scientific study,
whereas the former, inasmuch as they are not complete natures in themselves, but only the principles of other natures, may not be so studied. Cf. In Boeth. de Tr~n., V, 4,
resp ..
3In Boeth. de Trin., V, 4, resp.: !lSciendum siquidem est quod quaecumque scientia considerat aliquod genus
subiectum, oportet quod considerat principia illius generis,
cum scientia non perficiatur nisi per cognitionem principiorum." In Meta., prooem.: "Ejusdem autern scientia est
considerare-Causas
proprias alicujus generis et genus ipsum ..."
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lution

to being and what belongs

the further

question

need an extrinsic
ciently

to realize

of essence
cognize

whether

cause.

to being as suchl raises

such beings

Once we have reflected

suffi-

that all the beings we know are composed

and esse, it is but a small step further

that since esse is not their essence,

exist at all.

They exist because

they have it by participation
But whatever

exists

to re-

they need not

they have esse) however

they do not have it by any necessity

esse.2

do not, in fact,

of their nature;

in that whose
through

essence

participation

is caused to exist and cannot be uncaused.3

rather

is

in being

Just as such a

lIn Boeth. de Trin., VI, 1, 3, resp.: !!Quandoque
vero procedit de uno in" aliud secundum rationem, ut quando
est processus secundum causas intrinsecas: componendo quidem
quando a formis maxime universalibus
in magis particularia
proceditur; resolvendo autem quando e converso, eo quod universalius est simplicius.
Maxime autem universalia sunt,
quae sunt communia omnibus entibus.
Et ideo terminus resolutionis in hac via ultimus est consideratio entis et eorum
quae sunt entis in quantum huiusmodi.!!
2SCG I, 22, #9: !!Omnis res est per hoc quod habet
esse; nulla igitur res, cujus essentia non est suum esse,
est per essentiam suam, sed per participatione
alicujus,
scilicet ipsius esse. f! Cf. Gerald Smith, S. J. and Lottie
Kendzierski, The Philosophy of Being (New York: Macmillan,

1961) p.

13, n;--3.

--

-

---

3S. T. I, l~}~, 1, ad 1: !!Licet habi tudo ad causam
non intret definitionern ent1s.quod est causatum, tamen sequitur ad ea qua sunt de eius ratione; quia ex hoc quod aliquid per participationem
est ens, sequitur quod sit causatam
ab alio.
Unde huiusmodi ens non potest esse, quin sit causaturn; ...
Sed quia esse causatum non est de ratione entis
simpliciter, propter hoc invenitur aliquod ens non causatum.
Cf. Smith and Kendzierski, p. 13, n. 3; and Rev. Louis de
Raeymaeker, The Philosophy of Being (St. Louis: B. Herder
Book Co., 195L1Y p. 2~-:l().---.-
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being

cannot

exist without

being

caused}

and fully known as long as its causes
seen that for Aristotle
fically
vious

and Thomas

is to know it "through

chapter

we considered

first principles

ontological

causality

a principle,

lutely3),
every

discovery

seeks the causes

process
effect

of discovering

in Thomistic

as an

as such
since to be

of being taken abso-

When Thomas

asserts

of its subject,

this cause is called

that

since the

investigation,5

cause to which he is referring.

to its proportionate

procedure

causality

of these is the goal of scientific

it is the ontological

the

cause of scienti-

cause of being,

but of caused beings.4

science

knowledge:

not of being

does not enter into the nature

scienti-

In the pre-

within

Here we have to consider
,

principle;

we have

to know a thing

its causes."l

(i. e., there can be an uncaused
caused

are unknown;

are the epistemological

fic conclusions.2

it cannot be truly

"reducing

The
an

cause,,,6 and it is a fundamental

metaphysics.

-------------------------------,---

lCf. above p. 2} n. 3.
2Cf.

pp.

105-'7.

3Cf. above,

Macmillam,

p. 152, n. 3.

4Gerald Smith, S. J. Natural Theology (New York:
1951) pp. 58-9. De Raeymaeker, pp. 260-61.
5In Meta. , prooem.

resp ..

and In Boeth.

--

6SCG II, 21, #10 cf. below,

de Trin. , V, 4

p. In;
:J"

,

n. 2.

,
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There are different
which

something

actuality

else somehow

in some respect

is appropriately
be distinct

called

substances,

ties of one substance.
properties
thing,

and proper

orders
depends,

or distinct

activities
things

sciences

also include

activi-

is the cause of the

the kind

by the efficient

causality

The reduction

causes determined

fects of the same kind, as plants

The reductions

and/or

of our experience

thing of the same kind.

sciences.2

and cause

kind of

of another

other human beingsl--

be,

of any particular

in turn is explained

causes--

on

its

it cannot

effect

elements

Thus the essence

anything

explains

and apart from which

of essence

beings,

which

its cause, whether

and in the natural

to such particular

of causes:

produce

of a thing

to proper

plants,

ef-

and human

is the work of the particular

carried

the reduction

out by the particular
of whatever

is per

lIn VI Meta., 3, #1207: lIHae 19itur causae in tertio gradu existentes sunt particulares, et ad proprios effectus secundum singulas species determinatae: ignis enim
generat ignem, et homo generat hominem, et planta plantam.lI
Man, of course, can also produce effects-- all those things
which constitute human culture-- which resemble his spiritual rather than his biological aspects.
2Analogously, lIparts" such as principles (i. e.,
intrinsic ontological principles, such as matter and form,
rather than logical prlnciples, such as the principle of
con';cadiction) privation:::;
and potencies must be reduced to
the . "whole"-- a substance in act---'in order to be understood, although strictly speaking they are not effects
caused by a substance. Cf. above, p. 15, n. 3 and sea III,
11, 10.
3In VI Met~.,

3,

#1191--1222.
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to that which is per se and of future
.
1
their present causes.

effects

accidens

In all these instances,
particular

what the cause accounts

something

which

exists

ence of anything.

already,

rather

rather

in

than the very exist-

Only metaphysics

object.

can seek the cause
has being

quate cause is a being which does not participate
This being is not merely

lCf. above,

as such

The cauae of what is participated

is per se; thus in the case of being,

but is being.3

than

for is a modification

of being as such, since only metaphysics
for its proper

is

To cause being as such is to produce

.
2
ou t.r>.l-1
01 nO~llng.

that which

the effect

and the cause is a cause of becoming

of being:

.
b elng

however,

to

is

its adein being,

"a being"--

even

p. 16, n. 1;

2SCG II, 21, #10: "Quum fit aliquod ens, ut homo
vel lapis, home quidem per se fit, quia ex non homine; ens
autem per accidens, quia non ex non-ente simpliciter, sed ex
non-ente hoc, ut Philosophus dicit.
Quum ergo aliquid fit
omnino ex non-ente, ens per se fiet; oportet igitur quod ab
eo qui est per se causa essendi procedat; nam effectus proportionalitel' reducuntur in causas.
Hoc autem est primum
ens solum quod est causa entis, in quantum hujusmodi est;
alia vera sunt causa essendi per accidens et non per se.
Quum igitur producere ens ex non-ente praeexistente
sit
creare, oportet quod solius Dei SJ..tcreare. II
3In II Sent., d.37,.q.l, a.2, sol.: "Per se'dictum
est causa eius -quod per participat5_onem dici tur; et ideo
oportet quod illud ens quod non per participationem
alicuius
esse, quod sit aliud quam ipsum, dicitur ens, quod primum
inter alia entia est, sit causa omnium aliorum entium.
Alia
autem entia dicuntur per posterius, inquantum aliquod esse
participant. II Cf. L-B Geiger, La Participation
p. L~61~.
j
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•

"the highest

being among others.

der altogethers

it.

all other things

What is caused

their essence

plained
plains

depends

quidditatively

being.2

exist because

all that exists

that is,

they are caused

of
by

since

on their esse and cannot be apart
as total beings

cause,

to the extrinsic

can be ex-

metaphysics

ex-

their esse, and final-

cause,

the cause of their

can be only one such cause which
by participation,

from

that are caused.

or do, which

by their essence,

first by the intrinsic

There

or-

It alone exists by necessity

they are, acquire,

ly by reduction

is to exist;

in them is not just their esse;

it, it is they themselves
Thus whatever

It is of a, different

since its very nature

its esse is its essence.l
nature;

11

accounts

for

and to which all are

lIn I Sent., 0..8, q.4, a.2, sol.: "In Deo autem
esse suum est quidditas sua: aliter enim accideret quidditati, et ita esset sibi acquisitum ab alio, et non haberet
esse per essentiam suam." Geiger, p. 475 and Smith and
Kendzierski, p. 13, n. 3.
2In II Meta., II, #296: "Et hoc est necessarium:
quia necesse-est ut omnia composi ta et participantia,
reducantur in ea, quae sunt per essentiam, sicut in causas.
Omnia a~tem corporalia sunt entia in actu, inquantum participant aliquas formas.
Unde necesse est substantiam
separatem, quae est forma per suam essentiam, corporalis
substantiae principium esse."
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reduced.l
causes

Thus in metaphysics

are reduced

all the composite

to this single uncaused

efficient

cause, which

is

God.2
The existence
apart

of this cause is not evident

from the reduction,

Thomas,

in the second question

Summa Theologiae
cause's

refers

actuality.3

strictest
analytic

thus it constitutes

the definition

to as a quia demonstration

Yet the proof

the predicates

of some subject.

cisely the reverse:
some substance,

a proof which

of the first part of the

instead

which

of drawing

are contained

in the

out in
in the

What we have here is pre-

of deducing

we reflectively

of the

is not a deduction

sense: the latter is a matter
fashion

to us

the properties

of

seek its presuppositions;

IDe Subst. Sep., cap. IX, 48: nCum enim necesse
sit primum principium simplicissimum esse, neeesse est quod
non hoc modo esse ponatur quasi esse participans, sed quasi
ipsum esse existens.
Quia vera esse subsistens non potest
esse nisi unum, ... necesse est omnia alia quae sub ipso
sunt, sic esse quasi esse participantia ... Oportet igitur
supra modum fiendi quo aliqua fit, forma materiae adveniente praeintelligere
aliam rerum originem, secundum quod
esse atribuitur toti universitati rerum a primo ente quod
est suurn esse .II Cf. SCG I, 6 6, # 9; ibid ., 9 8, # II; p, 15,
n. 3, above.
---2SCG II, 21, #5: "Oportet omnes eausas inferiores
agentes reduci in causas superiores sieut instrumentales
in
primarias.
Omnis autem alia substantia praeter Deum habet
esse causatum ab alia, ... Impossibile est igitur quod sit
causa essendi nisi sieut instrumentalis et agens in virtute
alterius .... Nulla igitur substantia, praeter Deum, potest
aliquid creare.ll
3S. T. I, 2, 1, resp ..
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rather

than what follows

nature,

from it as consequent

we ask what must precede

for it.

The precise

deduction

as a necessary

name for this method

proceeds

of inquiry

to common being,

each thing that is, and analogically
precedes

extrinsic

condition
is not

but reduction.l
'Thus the resolution

beings,

upon its

and is the basis

universal

are now seen as unable
have in common--

their being;

of an

Here too, intellect

way: the beings

to account

to

of all

for the discovery

cause of being.

in an resolutive

predicable

intrinsic

of our experience

for the very factor

hence they are revealed

they
as

IGaston Rabeau, Species Verbum L'activite intellectuelle elementaire selon S. Thomas d'Aquin (Paris: J
Vrin, 1938) pp. 176-78: llPrenons, comme exemple de re-.
duction les 'cinq voies' par lesque11es saint Thomas prouve
l'existence de Dieu.
Chacune d'el1es repose sur un 'fait
philosophique',
et, de ce 'fait philosophique',
saint Thomas
remonte (sans Ie dire expressement, car il ne pourrait
exprimer cette operation de pens~epure
en un syllogisme de
genres et d'especes) aux presupposes de cet fait .... La
deduction parfaite, telle qu'on l'imagine d'apres 1a subsomption des classes, tire analytiquement
les predicats
contenus dans les sujets: on a Ie droit de tirer Ie predicat
du sujet, parce qu'il fait partie de sa definition. Or,
saint Thomas note ~u'i1 existe un mode exactement inverse
de cette 'praedicatio per se',
savoir quand Ie sujet entre
dans la definition du predicat ...c'eat une reduction.
Mais cet ordre theorique, que suivra Ie math~maticien dans son expose synthetique, n'est pas du tout
l'ordre que suit la connaissance humaine spontanee: e11e
remonte, nous Ie savons d~j~, du compose au simple.
Dans
la multitude elle decouvre l'unite comme condition essentielle: l'unite ~ son tour suppose la division; 1a division
suppose l'@tre.
Cette marche ~ rebours est une decouverte,
non l'expose de ce qui l'on possede.
Elle est une reduction.ll

a
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effects

dependent

is considered

upon an extrinsic

proven

cause.

1

A conclusion

only when the resolution

is carried

the way to the first indemonstrable

princiPles,2

tude in judging

that this resolution

first principles
ciples,

any effect requires
be carried

its causes.3

investigation
are attained
intellect

to its extrinsic

Hence the ultimate

is the discovery
common being

is capable

to

end of metaphysical

is not understood
it.

and certi-

first prin-

of such causes;4

of understanding

all

until

they

as fully as our
They are called

lIn VI r.1eta.,3, #1215: "Sed si ulterius ista
contingentiareducantur
in causam altissimam divinam, nihil
inveniri poterit, quod ab ordine ejvs exeat, cum ejus
causalitatis extendat se ad omnia inquantu:Tlsunt entia."
Cf. In II Meta., II, #296, above p. 156, n. 2.
2In III Eth., L. VIII, #~76: " ...qui vult probare
aliquam conclusionem oportet quod resolvat conclusionem in
principia quousque pervenit ad principia prima indemonstrabilia."

3In I Post. Anal. I} #6: "Iudicium certum de effectibus haberi non patest nisi resolvendo in prima principia ..." ST I-II, lL~, 5, resp.: "Si au tern id quod est prius
in cognitione, sit posterius in esse, est processus resolutorius: utpate cum de effectibus manifestis iudicamus
resolvendo in causas simplices."
4SCG II, 21, #5: "Et inde est quod opartet omnes
causas inferiores agentes reduci in causas superiores sicut
instrumentales
in primarias.
Omnis autem alia substantia
praeter Deum habet esse causatum ab alio ..." Ibid., #10:
"Oportet igitur quod ab eo quod est per se causa essendi:
nam effectibus proportionaliter
reducuntul' in causas."
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.,
the separate

substances~

supremely

in act, without

intrinsic

principles

not include matter
matter;

unlike

because
matter

or motion.2

of common being,

the principles

there were a number

of common

only one.

light of his Christian

being,

does
on

they cannot

For Aristotle

for Thomas,

But reinterpreting
belief

does not depend

and motion. 3

of such causes;

Like the

their definition

and their existence

in any way exist with matter

ultimately

they are most perfect,

there was

Aristotle

in the existence

in the

of angels

,

~In Boeth. de Trin., VI, 3, resp.: HRatio enim ...
procedit quandoque deuno
in aliud secundum rem, ut quando
est demonstratio per causas vel effectus extrinsicas: componendo quidem, cum proceditur a causis ad effectus; quasi
resolvendo, cum proceditur ab effectibus ad causas, eo quod
causae sunt effectibus simpliciores et magis immobiliter et
uniformiter permanentes.
Ultimus ergo terminus resolutionis in hoc via est, cum pervenitur ad causas supremas
maxime simplices, quae Bunt substantiae separatae
Haec
autem sunt, de quibus scientia divina considerat,
scilicet substantiae separatae et communia omnibus entibus."
2Ibid., V. ,4, resp.: "Omnium autem entium sunt
principia communia non solum secundum primum modum, quod
appellat Philosophus in XI Metaphysicae omnia entia habere
eodem principia secundum analogiam, sed etiam secundum modum
secundum, ut sint quaedam res eadom numero exsistentes
omnium rerum principia, prout scilicet principia accidentium
reducuntur in principia substantiae et principia substantiarum corruptibilem reducuntur in substantias incorruptibiles, et sic quodam gradu et ordine in quaedam principia
omnia entia reducuntur.
Et quia id, quod est principium
essendi omnibus oportet maxime ens, ...ideo huiusmodi principia oportet esse completissima,
et propter hoc oportet ea
esse maxime actu ... Et propter hoc esse absque materia ...
et absque motu."

3Ibid.,

and In Meta.,

prooem.
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enabled
under
terial

him to hold that the other separate

God, a secondary
universe,l

metaphysics.2
where,

natures.3

especially

science

Although

says, if the divine
in such immaterial

metaphysics,

which

have,

to the ma-

and so to give them a legitimate

Therefore,

be called divine

being

causal role in respect

As Aristotle

it exists

substances

place

exists

in

any-

and immobile

studies

them, may

1l

or theology. '

theoretically

in itself and a principle

whatever

is both a complete

6f other things

may be

lIn De Vel", X, 6, resp. Thomas equates the separated substancescalled
intelligences with the angels; in XI,
3 he says it is appropriate for men to be taught by angels
and explains the manner of such teaching.
On the overall
causal role of the angels with respect to the material
universe cf. ST I, qq. 110-13.
2In Boeth de 'rrin., V, ~., ad 3: "Scientia di vina,
quae est perinspirationemdivinam
accpeta, non est de an-gelis sicut de subiecto, sed solum sicut de his, quae assumuntur ad manifestationem
subiecti.
Sic enim in sacra
scriptura agitur de angelis sicut et de ceteris creaturis.
Sed in scientia divina, quam philosophi tradunt, consideratur de angelis, quas intelligentias vocant, eadem ratione
qua et de prima causa, quae deus est, in quantum ipsi etiam
sunt rerum principia secunda, saltern per motum orbium, quibus quidem nullus motus physicus accidere potest.ll
3Ibid., resp.: "Et huiusmodi Bunt res divinae,
'quia si di vinum alicubi_ exsisti t, in tali natura,' immateriali scilicet et immobili, maxime 'exsistit, I ut di~
citur in VI Metaphysicae."
Thomas, of course, does not mean
to put the angels on the same-level as God: they remain
created spirits.
But he does, here and elsewhere, follow
Aristotle's usage, in which "divine" was a generic term for
any immaterial substance considered a cause of motion although itself unmoved. Cf. ibid., ad 3 above and Maurer,
p. 40, n. 19.
--

4In

Met~.,

prooem.
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1

studied

in both ways,

studied

as the subject

cause even though

the separat8d

substances

of any purely

human

they are most knowable

are not so to us.

Inasmuch

science,2

as they are wholly

by our sense powers,3

covered

through

their effects.

effects

are not ontologically

cannot

but are dis-

Moreover,

science

which

common

studies

science.6

these

equal to them; therefore,

Thus metaphysics,

they are principles

human

4

they

immaterial,

come to know what they are in themselves

directly.5

be-

in themselves,

they cannot be perceived
studying

may not be

which

studies

to all beings,

them; accordingly,

Metaphysics,

we

even in-

them insofar

as

is the only huma.n
it is the ultimate

like any other science,

must
7

inquire

about the properties

Consequently,
separate

ultimate.

the goal of metaphysical

substances

evaluations

and causes

resolution

and it alone of the sciences

by reference

is the
makes

de ~ri~.,

of whatever

V,

4,

resp.

V,

4,

resp.

is known

2SCG III, 41, #10.
3In

I

4In

Boeth.

Meta.,

#46.

de Tri~.,

5Ibi~ .., I, 2, resp.;
6I~ Meta.,

its

to what is truly and absolutely

Since any final evaluation

lIn Boeth.

of its subject.'

and VI, 4,

ad 2.

prooem.

7 Ibid.; and In Boeth. de ;rrin., V, 4, re sp .
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in any science

can only be made by reference

truly ultimate,
inquiries

it is in metaphysical

of all the other

human answer.l

By correlating

of the particular
produces

sciences,

in knowledge

this, metaphysics
other

sciences:

sciences

metaphysics

soning

of vision

which metaphysical

of the particular

In

in reasoning

in contemplating
of things.

Com-

to understanding,

rea-

and compared

resolution

sciences

to and re-

of reality.

many things

a multitude
proper

and conclusions

more than the

understanding,

is a sort of multiplicity,2

of vision
lutions

comprehends

that the

their final

reveals

understanding

to one simple truth, whereas

pared to the unity

receive

the insights

the latter consider

one simple truth,

resolution

the unity and harmony

resembles

to what is

to the unity

achieves,

are partial

the reso-

and mul-

tiple.3

lIn Boeth. de rrrin., VI, 1, 3, resp.: "Tota autem
consideratio rationis resolventis in omnibus scientiis ad
considerationem
divinae scientiae terminatur ... Unde patet
quod sua consideratio est maxima intellectualis."
Cfo In II
Meta., 1, #273; Bernard Illuller-Thym, "St" Thomas and the
Recapturing of Natural vJisdom," Modern Schoolman XVIII
(Nov., 1941) po 68; amd O'Brien, p. 8.
2In Boeth. de Trin., VI, 1, 3, resp.:
" ... intellectualiter-Procedere-attribuitur
divinae scientiae, eo quod
in ipsa maxime observatur modus intellectus.
Differt autem
ratio ab intellectu, sicut multitudo ab unitate ... Est enim
rationis proprium circa multa diffundi et ex eis unam simplicem cognitionem colligere .... Intellectus autem e converso per prius unam et simplicem veritatem considerat et in
ilIa totius multitudinis cognitionem capit, ..."
3Cf. ST I, 11, 3, resp.
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Nevertheless,
understanding

metaphysics

of principles

its beginning:

the understanding

since it is concerned

timate with respect
mination.

of principles

takes account
sophia, Thomas

activity,l

metaphysics

of its special
called

can be deduced

conclusions

status.

either

science

1

cr.

to them,

or understanding

.

called

Like understand-

like science,

'3

cul-

name, which

What Aristotle

from those principles,

-

TIleta-

is the latter's

s8.]2.ientia--.
wisdom. 2

by reference

is the ini-

whereas

has another

ing it speaks truly of principles;
what

is from

with what is final and ul-

to human knowing,

Therefore,

from the

as the term of an action

tial stage of human intellectual
physics,

is distinct

it knows

and judges

but It goes further

insofar

its
than

as it can explain

SCG III, 37, #8.

2In I flleta.,1, #34: "Scientia vero est conclusionibus exeausis
inferioribus.
Sapientia vero considerat
causas primas unde ibidem dicitur caput scientiarum." Cf.
ibid., 2, #51.
3The first principle to which metaphysics reduces
its scientific conclusions is the principle of causality,
though ~homas nowhere tr0ats of this explicitly as a first
principle.
The certitude of this principle, like the
others, is the result of a reflexive intuition. Cf, J.
Defever, S. J. La Preuve Reelle de Dieu (Paris: Desclee de
Brouwer, 1953) p:- 33.
- ---
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and defend

the very principles

Thus both science
wisdom,2
examining

whose

and understanding

proper

and unique

Although

in any particular

themselves.l

are dependent

function

what has been discovered

certain.4

sense,

of demonstration

upon

is to judge,3

in the light of what

he who knows the cause which

is

is highest

order may be called wise in a qualified

only he who knows the cause which

is absolutely

the

lIn VI Eth., V, #1182: "Oportet quod sapiens non
solum sciat-ea-quae ex principiis demonstrationem
concluduntur circa ea de quibus considerat: sed etiam quod dicat
circa ipsa principia prima: non quidem quod demonstret ea:
sed inquantum ad sapientes pertinet notificare commu~ia, ...
quibus cognitis principia demonstrationum
innotescunt.
Unde
et ad hujusmodi sapientem pertinet disputare contra negantes
principia ... " Ibid., #1183: "Sapientia, inquantum dicit
verum circa principia, est intellectus; inquantum autem Bclt
ea quae ex principiis concluduntur, est scientia.
Distinguitur tamen a scientia communiter sumpta propter eminentiam quam habet inter alias scientias: est enim virtus quaedarn omnium scientiarum." Cf. ST I-II, 57, 2, ad 1.
2

S. T. I-II, 57, 2, ad 2: "Et utrumque [scl.entia
et intellectus] dependet a sapientia sicut a principalissimo, quae sub se continet et intellectum et scientias, ut
de cODclusionibus
scientiarum diiudicans, et de principiis
earundem," Cf. SCG III, 25, #9.
3Wisdom is the virtue of right judgment because
it has to do with knowledge of the real as real, and it is
in judgment that we know reality. cr. Lonergan, p. 66; ST
I, 1, 6, resp.; ibid., II-II, 45, 1, resp; ibid., 11-11-,45, 2, and 5.

4S. '1'. I, 79, 10, ad
excogitatum examinat ad aliqua
sapere; quod est phronesis vel
est iudicare'''. cr. In VI Eth.,

3: "Durn vero is quod est
certa, dicitur scire vel
sapientia; nam 'sapeintiae
V, #1180; In Meta., prooem.
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highest

is said to be completely

wise.1

is fitted

to rule and direct

so wisdom

is fitted to rule and direct

it takes account
a more basic
knows

of the subjects

less wise than himself,
the other

of the other

2

sciences:

sciences

level than they do, that of their being,

the latter as an effect

is God.3

those

As the wise man

Because

Cause, ultimate

it carries

with respect

is ultimate

with respect

is perfect

and universal.

of the highest
its resolutions

and

cause, which
to this First

to all human knowing

to all beings),

on

•

wisdom's

Thus it is appropriate

(as it
judgment
for it to

IS. T. II-II, ~5, 1, resp.: ".". ad sapientem
pertinet considerare causam altissimam, per quam certissime
de aliis iudicatur, et secundum quam omnia ordinari oportet.
Causa autem altissima dupliciter accipi potest: vel
simpliciter, vel in aliquo genere.
rlle ergo qui cognoscit causam altissimam in aliquo genere et per earn potest
de omnibus quae sunt illius generis iudicare et ordinare,
dicitur esse sapiens in illo genere, ... Ille autem qui
cognoscit causam altissimam simpliciter,
...dicitur sapiens
simpliciter ..."
2InMeta.,

prooem.

3S. T. I-II, 66, 5, ad 4: "Cognoscere autem rationem entis et' non entis, et totius et partis et aliorum
quae consequuntur ad ens, ex quibus sicut ex terminis constituuntur principia indemonstrabilia,
pertinet ad sapientiam: quia ens commune est proprius eff'ectus causae altissimae, scilicet Dei."
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judge the other sciences
unity

of wisdom

all lower sciences

and final justification.2
the human

intellect

the noblest
attained

and set them in order;l

science

a unified

find their integration

As the supreme

by which

it reaches

achievement

God,3 wisdom

and the last to be learned.4
vision

in the

of all things

of
is

Having

as dependent

upon

lIbid., 57, 2, resp.: "Id quod est ultimum respectu totius cognitionis humanae, est id quod primum et maxime
cognoscibile secundum naturam.
Et circa huiusmodi est
'sapientia, quae considerat altissimas causas: '...Unde convenienter iudicat et ordinat de omnibus, quia iudicium
perfectum et universali haberi non potest nisi per resolutionem ad prirnas causas." Cf. In VI Eth., V, #1177 and
1181.
- -2In III Sent., d,35.~ q.2, a.l, sol.2, #117: "Ad
sapientem pertinet judicare et ordinare.
Judicium autem de
aliquibus fieri non potest nisi per ea quae sunt lex et
regula eorum.
Semper autem oport~t quod superiora judicare
unde quamvis intentio quandoque ab infirmis incipiat et ad
suprema tendat, tamen judicium numquarn perficitur nisi per
superiora in quibus inferiora resolvuntur.
Et ideo oportet
sapientem de altissimis cognitorem esse."
3s. T. I-II, 66, 5, resp.: "Obiectum autem sapientiae praecellit inter obiecta omnium virtutem intellectualium: considerat enim causam 'alti.ssimam quae Deus est."
SCG III, 25, #9: "Prima philosophia tota ordinatur ad Dei
cognitionem sicut ultimum finem; unde et scientia divina
nominatur.
Est ergo cognitio divina finis ultimus omnis
humanae cognitionis et operationis.Tl
Cf. ST I, 1, 6, resp.;
II-II, 45, 1, resp.; Cf. Kieran Conley, O-.-S. B. A Theology
of Wisdom (Dubuque, Iowa: The Priory Press, 1963)-p. 3~4In I Met.9:."II, #46: Ii ••• et ideo ista scientia,
quae sapientia dicitur, quamvis sit prima in dignitate, est
tamen ultima in addiscendo.Tl
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in comtemplation:2

God,l human reason

resta

the human analogue

of the intuitive

pure

spirits,3

and the highest

this vision

understanding

is

proper

wisdom man's unaided

to

reason

can reach.
The method
only by reflection
wisdom

proper

to this wisdom

do we discover

and its extrinsic. cause.

sorts of resolution:
proceeds

the proper

ens, which

object

of

Th~s it makes use of two

a ~~_s_o_l_ut_i_o
_se9_u_n_d_u_m_!
rationem,

in terms of the intrinsic

the particular

is reflective;

to the universal,

causes

which

of things,

from

even to the most universal,

is common to all that is; and secondly,

a

lIn III Sent., d.35., q.2, a.l, sol. 1, #114: llQuia
quodammodo LSapientia--quae est vL-,tus intellectualis]
comprehendit ipsum [intelJ.ectum principiorum],
ut dicitu~ in
VI Eth., secundum quod ex princlpiis negotiatur circa
altissima et difficillisma et de his etiam quodammodo ordinat, inquantum reducit omnia ad unum principiurn, ...ll
2In II Sent., d. 41, q. 1, a. 1, so 1 .: II Ha bit urn
sapientiae cujus actus est felicitas contemplativa.ll In IV
Sent., d.15, q.4, a.l, q.l, a.2, ad 1: llContemplatio aTi=quando sumitur stricte pro actu intellectus divina meditantis.
Et sic contemplatio est sapientiae actus.ll Conley,
p. 38, h. 49.
3SCG III, 91, #5: llAngelorum autem cognitio est
uniformis, quia ab ipso uno veritatis fonte, scilicet Deo,
accipiunt veritatis cog;nitionem; est etiam immobilis, quia
non discurrendo ab effectibus in causas aut e converso, sed
simplici intuitu, puram veritatem de rebus intuentur.ll In
Boeth. de Trin., VI, l, 3, resp.: llUnde Dionysius dici t-fc .
De divinIsnmnen.
quod animae secundum hoc habent rationalitatem quod diffusive circuerunt existentium veritatem, et
in hoc deficiunt ab angelis; sed in quantum convolvunt
multa ad unum, quodam modo angelis aequantur.ll
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resolutio
posites
God.l

.?ecundum rem, which beg:\.rls
with sensible

In addition

science,

its conclusions

whereas

on the ontological

through

resolution

pp.

and psychological

in which
factors

the first and second are refactors which

is known.

lRabeau,

is

just like any other human

the logical

cause knowing,

flections

cause, which

The last of these is a reflexion

the mind considers

which

to these,

it evaluates

to principles.

which

extrinsic

to seek their

com-
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cause the being

VI

although

SUPERNATURAL

vJISDOM

Metaphysical

wisdom,

the question

AND frHE RETURN
however,

regarding

once it is seen to be dependent
God,l nevertheless

the God whose

from it.2

remains

hidden

unknown

in himself.3

Though

TO GOD

remains

incomplete:

common being is answered
upon the causal
existence

action

it has discovered

known in his effects,

For Aristotle

of

the ultimate

he is

goal of

IHow the demonstration of the existence of God
comes into metaphysics has been long and vigorously debated
by Thomists both before and subsequent to O'Brien's study.
The list of relevant articles is too extensive to cite here
and a careful consideration of all the arguments would constitute a dissertation in itself.
Moreover, whether a
scientific grasp of the real distinction is possible prior
to demonstrating the existence of a first cause, as O'Brien
seems to maintain, or only subsequBnt to it, as Owens
as.serts (IIAnalytics ...", pp. 96-101; IIIntelligibi1ity ... !t,
p. 192), there apprear to be a general agreement that the
demonstration deepens our understanding of the being of
creatures; hence it cannot be omitted as irrelevant to metaphysics.
Our purpose here does not require that we pursue
the question further.
2In Boeth. de Trin., I, 2, ad 1: "Dicimu; in fine
nostrae cognitlonis deum--tamquarn ignotum cognoscere, quia
tunc maxime mens in cognitione profecisse invenitur, quando
cognoscit eius essentiarn esse supra omne quod apprehendere
potest in statu viae, et sic quarnvis mane at ignotum quid
est, scitur tamen quia est.!! Cf. De Pot., 7, 5, ad 14; In I
.Sent., d.S, q.l, a.l, ad ~; De Ve--r-:,
II, 1, ad 9; De Div-:-Nom., 7, 4, #731; SCG 1,30;-111--:--39 and 49. Cf. Conley, p.
57, n. 100.
3In Boeth. de Trin., I, 2, resp.: "Quia igitur intellectus noster secundum statum viae habet determinatam
habitudinem ad formas, quae a sensu abstrahuntur, ...non potest ipsum deum cognoscere in hoc statu per formam quae est
essentia sua, ... Unde relinquitur quod solummodo per effectus formam cognoscatur ... Et sic' se habet cogni tio effectus ut principium ad cognoscendum de causa an est, ...
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metaphysical

wisdom

was an unmoved

thought-thinking-itself,
its self-reflection,
things

forever

incapable

or even of perceiving

most the attainment
physician
covering

cause of motion,

locked

achieving

in the isolation

of relating

itself

their relationship

of the motion

his own ultimate

fulfillment

could.

But for Thomas

the goal of metaphysical

cause of being;

hence

are comprehended,

his power extends.

free rather
creating

and in

Mover

insofar

wisdom

his creative

therefore

Thomas'

this

as he

to

activity

his motive

God is not merely

is an
his

since he knows the things
Moreover,

to those beings

in dis-

in his self-reflection

than necessitated;

must be love.

attractive

The

by contemplating

the Unmoved

which

to it.

of other things,

thus imitating

creatures

to other

satisfaction

source,

uncaused

of

of such a goal could offer the meta-

was a sort of intellectual
the source

a

is

in

passively

of which he is the final cause

(as is Aristotle's

Unmoved

Mover):

them to himself.l

Therefore,

there

he is actively

attracting

is not only the possi-

Hoc autem modo se habet omnis effectus ad deum. Et ideo non
possumus in statu viae pertingere ad cognoscendum de ipso
nisi quia est."
Ibid., V, 4, resp ..
lIn Dion. de Div. Nom., I, L. 2~ #48:
"PrimLun in
purgatione voluntatisest
quod voluntas ad bonum incommutabile reducantur; et quantum ad hoc dicit quod Divinitas
est revocatio et resurrectio decidentium ab Ipsa, scilicet
per peccatum. Et poni t revocationem et resurre"ctionem, quia
non solum attrahit nos, quod est revocare sed etiam dat
vires ut revocati surgamus.tl
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bility

of a conscious

physician,
fering

there is an invitation

of assistance,

accepting

relationship

Hence,

and grace,

for Thomas

the contemplation

God is no longer

simply the highest

known;

he is the supreme

good to be loved.2

can attain

of love: by way of resolution
secondary

in

it is possible

of God, but God him-

self.l

Human wisdom

God and the meta-

to it, and even the of-

through revelation

the invitation.

to love, not merely

between

truth to be

God as the supreme

we are able to reason

object
from

causes to the first cause so as to seek God

l~.
II-II, 180, 7, resp.: IIAliqua contemplatio
potest esse delectabilis dupliciter.
Uno modo, ratione
ipsius operationis, quia unicuique delectabilis est operatio
sibi conveniens secundum propriam naturam vel habitum.
Contemplatio autem veritatis competit homini secundum suam naturam, prout est animal rationale.
Ex quo con~ingit quod
omnes hominines natura scire desiderant: et per consequens
in cognitione veritatis delectantur.
Et adhuc magis fit
hoc delectabile habenti habitum sapientiae et scientiae, ex
quo accidit quod sine difficultate aliquis contemplatur.
Alio modo contemplatio redditur delectabilis ex parte obiecti, inquantum scilicet.aliquis
rem amatam contemplatur;
sicut etiam accidit in visione corporali quae delectabilis
redditur non solum ex eo quod ipsum videre est delectabile,
sed etiam ex eo quod videt quis personam amatam.
Quia ergo
vita contemplativa praecipue consistit in contemp1atione
Dei, ad quam movet caritas, ... inde est quod in vita contemplativa non solum estdelectatio
ratione ipsius contemplationis,
sed etiam ratione ipsius divini amoris.1I Cf.
Conley, p. 45.
2n~...
:hd., ad 1: IIUl
tima perfectio contemplati vae
vitae: ut scilicet non solum divina veritas videatur sed
etiam ut amatur.!l Cf. Conley, p. 44.
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explicitly.l
directly;2

But we cannot by hwnan wisdom

God

as we have seen, there. cannot be a human

of the separate
contemplation

substances.3

through

science

The joy of metaphysical

is not yet full beatitude,4

God only indirectly,
intellect

behold

his eff~cts;

falls short of the fuller vision

for it attains
thus our human
for which

it

IDe Ver., XXII, 2, resp.: "Virtus primae causae
est in secunda~t
principia in conclusionibus;
resolver'e
autem conclusiones in principia, vel secundas causas in
primas, est tantum virtutis rationalis.
Dnde sola rationalis natura potest secundarios fines in ipsium Deum per
quamdam viam resolutlonis inducere, ut sic ipsum Deum explicite appetat.
Et sic in demonstrativis
scientiis non
recte sumitur conclusio nisi per resolutionem in prima
principia, ita appetitus creaturae rationalis non est reditus nisi per appetitum explicitum ipsius Dei, ... !!
2De Virtutibus in communi, 1, 12, ad 11,
Quaestiones Dii,pUt-if:3.2 (Ramae: IVIarietti,1927) vol. II:
TiSapfenti-aqua nunc contemplamur Deum non immediate respici t
ipsum Deum, sed effectus quibus ipsum in praesenti contemplamur. It Cf. Conley, p. 57, n. 98.

3Cf.

above,

4s,-,,,
l,IJ III
_
,..J,?9

pp.

144-45.

#1'.... 11
.
pf;r a fl""~lrma t.lones proprla
cognitione de re habita, scitur quid est res et quomodo ab
aliis separatur; per negationes autem habita propria cognitionede
re, scitur quod est ab aliis discreta, tamen quid
sit remanet ignotum.
Talis autem est propria cognitio quae
de Deo habetur per demonstrationes.
Non est autem nee ista
ad ultimam homL1is felicitate:m sufficiens."
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longs.l

That is why metaphysical

a sort of foretaste
happiness.2

permanently

of a longed-for,

For Aristotle,

to man,3 but Thomas

wisdom

but as yet unattained

such happiness

knows man's

frustrated.

can be no more than

There

longing

was unattainable

for more need not be

is, above metaphysical

IS, T. I-II, 3, 8, resp.: lIUl
tima et perfecta
beatitudo non potest esse nisi in visicne divinae essentiae.
Ad cuius evidentiam, duo consideranda sunt.
Primo quidem,
quod homo non est perfecte beatus, quandiu restat sibi a1iquid desiderandum et quaerendum.
Secundum est, quod uniuscuiusque potentiae perfectio attenditur secundum rationem
sui obiecti.
'Obiectum autem inte11ectus est quod quid est,
idest essentia rei,' ut dicitur in II De An.
Si igitur intellectus humanuS; cognoscens essentiam alicuius effectus creati, non cognoscat de Deo nisi an
est; nondum perfectio eius attingit simpliciter ad causam
primam, se~ remanet ei adhuc naturale desiderium inquirendi
causam.
Uri'denondum est perfecte beatus.
Ad perfectam
igitur beatitudinem requiritur quod intellectus pertingat
ad ipsam essentiam primae causae.
Et sic perfectionem suam
habebit per unionem ad Deum sicut ad obiectum, in quo solo
beatitudo hominis consistit." Cf. Lonergan, pp. 86-87.

2S. T. I-II, 66, 5, ad 2: "Sapientia considerat
ipsum obiectum felicitatis, quod est altissimum intelligibile.
Et 81 quidem esset perfecta consideratio sapientiae
respectu sui obiecti, esset perfecta felicitas in actu
sapientiae.
Sed quia actus sapientiae in hac vita est imperfectus respectu principalis obiecti, quod est Deus; ideo
actus sapientiae est quaedam inchoatio seu participatio
futurae felicitatis." Cf. Conley, p. 42, n. 60; pp. 42-43.
3SCGIII,
48, #14: "Quia vero Aristoteles vidit
quod non estalia
cognitio hominis in hac vita quam per
scientias speculativas, po suit hominem non consequi felicitatem perfectam, sed suo modo."
According to Werner
Jaeger, in Aristotle: the Fundamentals of the History of
his Development, trans. R. Robinson (Oxford: Clarendon Press
1948 2nd ed.) pp. 320-32, Aristotle himself, in his last
years, found solace in the non-discursive accounts of
reality which we call myth.
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wisdom,
which

another

way of knowing

is conferred

it, the longing
planted

as a gift through

to know God perfectly

in man by his Creator,

fulfillment

divine

of this longing

cannot reach this unless

things
faith.2

as such,l
As Thomas

has been divinely

who destined

im-

him for the

as his final perfection.3

God undertakes

sees

Man

to teach him:4 we

1In Boeth. de Trin., V, 4, resp.: "Est autem alius
modus cognoscendi huiusmodi res, non secundum quod per effectus namifestantur,
sed secundum quod ipsae se ipsas manifestant ... Et per hunc modum tractantur res divinae, secundum quod in se ipsis subsistunt et non solum prout sunt
rerum principia."
2Ibid., II, 2, resp.:
"... de divinis duplex
scientia habetur.
Una secundum modum nostrum, ... et sic de
divinis philosophi scientiam tradiderunt, philosophiam
primam scientiam divinam dicentes.
Alia secundum modurn ipsorum divinoram, ut ipsa divina secundum se capiantur, quae
quidem- perfecte in statu.viae nobis est impossibilis, sed
fit nobis in statu viae quaedam illius cognitionis participatio et assimilatio ad cognitionem divinam, in quantum
per fidem nobis infusam inhaeremus ipsi primae veritati
propter se ipsam."
3SCG IV, 54, l~: l1Quia beatitude perfecta hominis
in tali cognitione Dei consistit quae facultatem omnis intellectus creati excedit, necessarium fuit quamdam hujusmodi cognitionis praelibationem
in homine esse, qua dirigeretur in illam plentitudinem cognitionis beatae; quod fit
per fidem, ..."
-

4De Ver., XIV, 10, resp.: "Ultima autem perfectio
ad quam homoordinatur,
consistit in perfecta Dei cognitione: ad quam quidem pervenire non potest nisi operatione
et instructione Dei, qui est sui perfectus cognitor.ll Cf.
SCG IV,

54,

#4.
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have God's self-revelation

is left for man to do is to receive
ing through

believin~

first believe,

in it.2

acquire

the grasp of reason,

for this.3

by believing

Others,

powers

are inadequate.4

to a knowable

although

rather

be-

although

not

his rea-

however,

we

in this life, since for

for by it the intellect

mination

we at

fully,

to develop

is a kind of knowing,
object,

this teach-

in them, and even when known by

faith, they cannot be understood
this our human knowing

and all that

Some of the things

has the time and opportunity

soning power sufficiently
cannot

and accept

we may later come to understand

cause they are not beyond
everyone

scripturel

in sacred

Faith,

then,

is determined

in this case the deter-

comes not from what is seen by the believer,

but

from what is seen by the one in whom the believer

lIn Boeth. de Trin., V, 4, resp.: "Theologia sive
scientia di vina est dup-leX-:-Una, ...est theologia, quam
philosophi prosequuntur, quae aliohomine
metaphysica dicitur.
Alio vero, quae ipsas res divinas considerat propter
se ipsas ut subiectum scientiae, et haec est theologia, quae
in sacra scriptura traditur."
2De ""ler.,XIV, 10, resp.: llPerfectae autem cognitionis statim homo in sui principio capax non est; unde
oportet quod accipiat per viam credidendi aliqua, per quae
manducatur ad perveniendum in perfectam cognitionem."
3De Ver., XIV, 10, resp ..

4Ibid.: "Quorum quaedam talia sunt, quod in hac
vita de eis perfecta cognitio haberi non potest, quae totaliter vim humanae rationis excedunt: et ista oportet
credere quamdiu in statu viae sumus."
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believes.l
careless
veloped

Far from being the refuge

intellect,
intellect,

recognize
accept

such faith is the act of a man of defor only such a man is able to clearly

the limits of his understanding

as a gift that wh~ch

tellect,

exceeds

and to humbly

the reach

of his in-

since his love for the truth is greater

love for his own intellectual
Because
able object,

faith is a virtue
defines

the intellect

to assent

the natural

than his

ability.2

it determines

lect:3 Thomas

unlike

of a man of lazy or

the intellect

to a know-

of the speculative

it as the habit

intel-

of mind which

to what is not apparent.4

speculative

virtues

causes
However,

of understanding,

IS. T. I, 12, 13, ad 3: llPides cognitio quaedam
est, inquantumintellectus
determinatur per fidem ad aliquid cognoscibile.
Sed haec determinatio ad unum non procedit ex visione credentis, sed a visione eius cui creditur.
Et sic inquantum deest visio, deficit a ratione cognitionis
quae est in scientia; nam scientia determinat intel1ectum
ad unum per visionem et intellectum primorum principiorum.ll
2Lonergan, p. 91: l1Beyond the wisdom we may attain
by the natural light of our intellects, there is a further
wisdom attained through the supernatural light of faith,
when the humble surrender of our own light to the selfrevealing uncreated Light makes the latter the loved law of
all our assents.l1

and ibid.,

3ef. S. T. I, 12, 13, ad 3; above,
I-II, 5b, 3, resp.

4Ibid.,
mentis ... faclens

p.177.

n! 1

II-II, It, 1, re:..,: l1Fides est habitus
intel1ectum aSS8[;t,j.re
non apparentibus. 1l
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science

and wisdom,

which

are acquired,

it is a sort of light superadded
reason
natural

enabling
light.2

to the natural

us to knew what exceeds
Our assent

through

evident

resolution

caused by the will, which moves
obedience

to God.3

thoughtlessly:
effort

nevertheless

of deliberation

faith to self-evident

of being made

so

first principles.

assent

the intellect

succeed

of faith cannot

the intellect

The intellect's

of our

for they are neither

to us nor capable
to self-evident

light of

the capacity

to the truths

be caused by the light of evidence,
themselves

faith is infused:l

to believe

in

is not given
cannot by any

in resolving

first principles,

It is

the truths

of

so as to see the

lIn Boeth. de Trin., III, 1, ad 4: "In fide qua in
deum credimus non solum est acceptio rerum quibus assentimus
sed aliquid quod inclinat ad assensum; et hoc est lumen
quoddam, quod est habitus fidei, divinitus menti humanae
infusam ... sicut cognitio principiorum
accipitur a sensu et
tamen lumen quo principia cognoscuntur est innatum, ita
'fides' est 1 ex audi tu' et tamen habitus fidei est infusus. II
2s. T. 11--11, 8, 1, resp.: "Lumen autem naturale
nostri intellectus est finitae virtutis; ... Indiget ergo
homo supernaturali ~umine ut ulterius penetret ad cognoscendum quaedam quae p~r lumen naturale cognoscere non
valet." De Anirn, V, ad 6: ll supra huiusmodi lumen naturale addif, ".---:-:CO-piosus
lumen,
sicut est lumen fidei ... II
3s. T. II-II: 5, 2.,resp.: llIntellectus cI'edentis
assentit rei creditae non quia ipsnm videat vel secundum se
vel per resolutionem ad prima ~rincipia per se visa, sed
quia convincitur per a~ctoritatam divinam assentire his quae
non videt et propter imperium voluntatis moventis intellectus et obedientis Deo.!1 cr. In III Sent., d.23, q.2, a.2,
sol, 1, #140.
-- --- ----
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•

former

as implied

in the latter,l

though

there is no resolution

order of knowledge,

On the other hand,

to first principles

there is resolution

ciple in the order of being--

certitude
evident

Hence,

of faith is not based on assent

to us, but rather

to what is believed,3

on the firmness

yet the source

in the

to the first prin-

to God himself,

cause and final end of all that is,2

even

the first
while

the

to that which

is

of our adherence

of this adherence

is

lIn III Sent., d.23, q.2, a.2, sol. 1, #143:
"Credens autem habet assensum simul et cogitationem quia intellectus ad principia per se nota non perducitur." In
Boeth. de Trin., II, 1, ad 5: I1Ratio autem persuasoria
aumpta ex aliquibus similitudinibus ad ea quae sunt fidei
inducta non evacuat fidei rationem; quia non facit ea esse
apparentia, cum non fiat resolutio in prima principia quae
quae intellectu videntu.r. II
2SCG IV, 54, 4: "Cogitationem autem qua homo in
ultimum finem dirigitur, oportet esse certissimam, eo quod
est principium omnium quae ordinantur in ordinem finem;
scilicet et principia naturaliter nota certissima sunt.
Certissima autem cognitio alicuius esse non potest nisi vel
illud sit per se notum, sicut nobis prima demonstrationis
principia; vel in ea quae per se nota sunt resolvantur,
qualiter nobis certissima est demonstrationis
conclusio .. ,
Et quamvis omnibus divinam essentiam videntibus sit quoddammodo. per se notum, tamen ad certissimam cognitionem
habendam oportet reductionem fieri in primum huius cognitionis principium, scilicet in Deum, cui est naturaliter per
se notum, et a quo omnibus innotescit: sicut et certitudo
scientiae non habetur nisi per resolutionem in prima principia indemonstrabilia."
3De Ver., XIV, 1, ad 7: "Certitudo duo potest
importare: scilicet firmitatem adhaesionis; et quantum ad
hoc fides est certior omni intellectu et scientia ...
Importare etiam evidentiam eius cui assentitur; et sic fides
non habet certitudinem, sed scientia et intellectus."
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God, the first truth himself;

therefore

the adherence

faith is even firmer than that of the understanding
principles,

or of the science

first principles,

of conclusions

for judging

of

resolved

to
l

and faith has the greater

The light of faith is adequate

of

certitude.

and cannot be

false since it is a sort of imprint

of the first truth

our minds,

nor is deceived.2

and God neither
Accordingly,

deceives

there can even be scientific

soning about divine

things: what is believed

a sort of principle

from which

drawn.3

This scientific

further

knowledge

res-

may serve as

conclusions

of divine

in

may be

things Thomas

lIn III Seht., d.23, q.2, a.2, sol. 3, #157: "In
his ergo quae per fidem credimus, ratio voluntatem inclinans, ut dictum est, est ipsa veritas prima sive Deus cui
credj.tur, quae habet majorem firmitatem quam lumen intellectus humani in quo conspiciuntur principia, vel ratio
humana secundum quam conclusiones in principia resolvuntur.
Et ideo fides habet majorem certitudinem quantum ad firmitatem adhaesionis, quam sit certitudo scientiae vel intellectus, quamvis in scientia et intellectu sit major evidentia eorum quibus assentitur." cr. Tyrrell, p. 39:
"rrhroughout his treatment of faith, Caj etan, like St.
Thomas, seems to regard the assent of belief and the assent
of first principles and demonstr~tion, not as entirely different types of acts, but rather as diverse examples of the
same general type of act.
They differ rather in the extrinsic factor that brings them into operation than in their
nature."
2In Boeth.

de Trin.,

III, 1, ad

4.

3Ibid., II, 2, resp.: "Et sicut deus ex hoc, quod
cognoscit se;-cognoscit alia modo suo, is est simplici intuitu, non discurrendo, ita nos ex his, quae per fidem capimus primae veritati adhaerendo, venimus in cognitionem
aliorum secundum modum nostrum discurrendo de principiis ad
conclusiones, ut sic ipsa, quae fide tenemus, sint nobis
quasi principia in hoc scientia et alia sint quasi conclusiones."
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e
i

usually

calls sacra dC5::'C:.Tina,
1 rather

than theology

as we do

today though he does use the latter occassionally.2
principles

from which

theology

us by the light of our natural
to God and the blessed
ledge;3

likewise,

this superior
to the science
sophers;5

is derived

by the light of their

knowledge.
of divine

but because

4

but are known
superior

Thus ?_a_c_r_a_
doctrina

things

know-

are to the principles

handed

it cannot be reduced

as can the conclusions

natural

revealed

theology

2Cf. In Boeth. de Trin.,
In I Sent., prol. I, 5, ad 3.

is superior

to naturally

of philosophical

is called

lCf. ST I, 1, 2, resp. below;
cf. also Maurer-,-p. 41, n. 23.

of

down by the philo-

known principles,
theology,

are not known to

understanding,

its resolutions

The

science

or

in an

above p. 162, n. 2;

II, 2, resp.; V,

4,

resp.

3s. T. I, 2, resp.: !lSacram doctrinam esse scientiam.
Sed sciendum est quod duplex est scientiarum genus.
Quaedam enim sunt, quaeprocedunt
ex principiis notis lumine
naturali intellectus, ... Quaedam vero sunt, quae procedunt
ex principiis notis lumine superioris scientiae ....Et hoc
modo sacra doctrina est scientia, quia procedit ex principiis notis lumine superiori scientiae, quae scilicet est
scientia Dei et beatol'um.!l

4Ibid., ad 1: "Principia cuiuslibet scientia ve'l
sunt nota per-8e, vel reducuntur ad notitiam superioris
scientiae.
Et talia sunt principia sacrae doctrinae."
5In Boeth. de 'l'rin.,II, 2, resp.: !lEx quo patet
quod haec scientia est-altior ilIa scientia divina, quam
philosophi tradiderunt, cum ex altioribus procedat principiis."
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sense.l

analogous
rooted

natu~al

in first principles,

natural
human

Whereas

wisdom

is rooted

intellect

theology

revealed

theology

orders the data of revelation

on all other sciences,

physical

wisdom.2

including,

The habit of fa.ith guides.the
it: the intellect's

by apprehending
the intellect
intellect

the evident

latter

capable

of assenting

is not the actual

to God.4

be given supernatural
a supernatural
perfect
o

of course,

but does

Faith makes

However,

But this requires

the

that is, of assenting
to be capable

of

the cause of the

as we have seen, commands
that the will,

to direct

end: the infused

only

and faith does not make

assenting:

virtues

meta-

is necessitated

fre~ly,

to do so.3

is the will which,

obedience

truth,

the

and passes

intellect,

able to see what it believes.

when it is not forced
assenting

assent

is

or super-

in faith; guided by faith,

judgment

not coerce

or wisdom

virtues

it in
too,

it to actively

seek

of hope and charity

man's will as faith his intellect.

These

three are

lIn III Sent., d.33, q.l, a.2, sol. 4: "Si autem
esset aliquascie-ntia '-quaenon posset reduci ad principia
naturaliter cognita, non esset ejusdem specii cum aliis
scientiis, nee univoce scientia diceretur."
2

~~.

I, 6, and 8. Cf. Lonergan,

p. 91.

3In Boeth. de Trin., II, 1, ad 4: "Habitus fidei
...non facir-videre illa-quae creduntur nec cogit assensum,
sed facit voluntarie assentire."
LI

cr.

above p. 156, n. 1.
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called theological

virtues

because

their proper

function

is

to direct man to union with God.l

But the seeking

of this

union

God as revealed

to the

depends,

believer,

not only on knowing

but on right

and manner

judgment

regarding

of life, and this is needed

even those least fitted by nature
theologians.

Therefore,

that it is in harmony
need of a wisdom
the opportunity

enables

by every Christian,

and opportunity

with the Father's

for theological
which

will, he stands

upon intellectual

in
and

there

is the gift of the Holy Spirit.

by inclination.2

implications

acumen

study and reflection:

one to judge, not by any process

directly,

to be

to enable man to so order his life

not dependent

is such a wisdom,

all one's actions

of reasoning,

The wisdom which

of faith, as metaphysical

wisdom

develops
develops

It
but

the
what

IS. T. I-II, 62, 3, resp.
2s. T. I, 1, 6, ad 3: "Cum iudicium ad sapientem
pertineat, secundum duplicem modum iudicandi, dupliciter
sapientia accipitur.
Contingit enim aliquem iudicare uno
modo per modum inclinationis,
sicut qui habet habitum virtutis, ~ecte iudicat de his quae sunt secundum virtutem
agenda, inquantum ad ilIa inclinatur unde et in X Eth.
dicitur quod virtuosus est mensura et regula actuum-humanorum.
Alio modo per modum cognitionis, sicut aliquis
instrucus in scientia morali posset iudicare de actibus
virtutis, etiam si virtutem non haberet.
Primus igitur
modus iudicandi de rebus divinis pertinet ad sapientiam quae
ponitur donum Spiritus Sancti, ...Secundus autem modus iudicandi pertinet ad hanc doctrinam, secunduln quod per studium
habetur, licet euis principia ex revelatione habeantur."
Ibid., II-II, 45, 2, resp.; Cf. Lonergan, p. 91.
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theological

wisdom--

gift of wisdom-wisdom

knowing

a way of acting

about God-- but the

in union with God.2

is a gift of grace which does not proceed

our natural
making

a way of thinking

it docile

to the guidance

both human and divine

higher

we already
eternal

Such

at all from

light, but is added to it as perfective
of the Holy Spirit

of it,
in

things.3

Thus even while we are living
nature,

.
oJ
prlmarl..y

are beginning

through

life: this will reach

in this state of
faith to live a

its full development

when we come at last to our true home with our Father.

What

lIn III Sent., d.35, q.2, a.l, sol. 1, #114:
"Sicut se habetsapientia
quae est virtus intellectualis ad
intellectum principiorum ...ita se habet sapientia quae est
donum, ad fidem quae est cognitio simplex articulorum, quae
sunt principia totius christianae sapientiae."
2S. T. II-II, L15, 3, ad 1: "Sapientia quae est
donum est excellentior quam sapientia quae est virtus intellectualis, utpote magis de propinquo Deum attingens, per
quandam scilicet unionem animae ad ipsum, habet quod non
solum dirigat in contemplatione,
sed etiam in actione."
3Ibid., 8, 1, ad 2: "Donum autem gratiae non procedit ex lumine naturae, sed superadditur ei, quasi perficiens ipsum." Ibid., I-II, 68, 5, ad 1: "Alio modo possunt
accipi prout sunt dona Spiritus Sancti.
Et sic sapientia et
scientia nihil aliud sunt quam quaedam perfectiones humanae
mentis, secundum quas disponitur ad sequendum instinctum
Spiritus Sancti in cognitione divinorum vel humanorum."
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we now believe,
"Though

our intellects5

naturally
tellects
nothing

we shall then understand

to the vision
have a dynamic

because

potential,

orientation,
vision

a natural

in this life insofar

itself

desire,

that

in contemplating

Yet that wisdom

enlightens

the believer

as he is joined to God in

10ve:4 by it the human mind is assisted
above

as in-

can satisfy utterly ...

us. 3

is the gift of the Holy Spirit

already

attain

until they :C8St in seeing Him.1I2

."
N o th'1ng 1 ess th an th"18 lS prom1sea
which

cannot

of God, still our intellects

short of that unknown

our minds are restless

perfectly.l

so as to be raised

God as being beyond

everything

lSCG, IV, 54, #4: "Adhuc, quia beati tudo perfecta
hominis in tali cognitione Dei consistit quae facultatem
omnis intellectus creati excedit, ... necessarium fuit quamdam hujusmodi cognitionis praelibationem
in homine esse, qua
dirigeretur in illam plenitudinem cognitionis beatae; quod
quidern fit per fidem. IIST II-II, If, 1, resp.: "Fides est
habitus mentis qua incohatur vita aeterna in nobis." De Vel'.
XIV, 10, resp.: IIIsta oportet credere quamdiu in statuviae
sumus; videbimus autern ea perfecte in statu patriae."
2Lonergan,

pp. 89-90.

3 In B0eth. de Tr in., I, 2, res p.: "... non pot est
ipsum deurn cognoscere-in-hoc
statu per formam quae est essentia sua, sed sic cognoscetur in patria a beatis."

4S. T. II-II, 45, 2, resp.: "Huiusmodi autem compassio sive connaturalitas ad res divinas fit per caritatem
quae quidem unit nos a Deo.1I .
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it understands

naturally.l

non-scientific

and non--conceptual, it is nevertheless

knowledge.

"When things

...through
wisdom

And though

divine

the love of charity,

such knowledge

are intimately
it is proper

to make use of that love, that infused

order to make
Holy Ghost,
ledge.,,2

it pass, under the special

to the status

Though

of an objective

our understanding

is
real

joined

to us

to the gift of
charity,

inspiration
medium

in

of the

of know-

does not yet behold

God

lIn Boeth. de Trin., I, 2, resp.: "In hoc autem
profectu cognitionis maY-ime iuvatur mens humana, cum lumen
eius naturale nova illustratione confortatur; sicut est
lumen fidei et doni sapientiae et intellectus, per quod mens
in contemplatione
supra se elevari dicitur, in quantum cognoscit deum esse supra omne id quod naturaliter comprehendit.
Sed quia ad eius essentiam videndam penetrare non
sufficit, dicitur in se ipsam quodammodo ab excellenti
lumine reflecti ... "
2Jacques Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge (New
York: Charles Scribner's Sons -;1-959 )011P--. 261 develops
knowledge by connaturality much further than Thomas himself
did, with the help of John of St. Thomas; on p. 262 he
quotes from the latter's Cursus Theologiae I-II, q. 68-70,
disp. 18, a. 4, n. 14: llInits darkness faith attains God
yet as He remains at a distance, inasmuch as faith is of
things not seen.
But charity attains God in Himself immediately, intimately uniting us to that which is hidden in
faith.
And so, even though faith rules love and the union
with God, inasmuch as it is faith that proposes their ob-.
ject, yet, in virtue of this union in which love clings to
God immediately, the intellect is, through a certain affective experience, so elevated as to judge of divine things
in a way higher than the darkness of faith would permit.
This is so because the intellect penetrates, and knows that
more lies hidden in things of faith than faith itself reveals--,ever finding there more to love and taste of in love.
From this more, which love makes the intellect feel is hidden there,"itjudges
more highly of things divine under a
special instinct of the Holy Ghost." cr. also McLaughlin,
p. 342, n. 6.
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as He is, yet already

we love Him as He is,l and we are made

able to judge rightly

about the things

fection

for divine

Then the believer
experiences

things

"From af-

comes their ma.nifestation~. 113

no longer merely

Him ~s a presence.4

this point than Richard

of God.2

thinks

Thomas

of St. Victor

about

God, but

says far less on

or John of the Cross,

but what he does say 1s often illuminated

by the descrip-

IS. T. I-II, 27, 2, argo 2: "Deus qui in hac vita
non potest per seipsum cognosci, potest per seipsum amari."
Cf. Maritain, p. 271, ~. 2.
2In Dion. de Div. Nom. II, 4, in fine: Ii ••• id est
non solum di vinarum s-cientiam in intellectu accipiens, sed
etiam diligendo, eis unitus per affectum.
Passio enim magis
ad appetitum quam ad cClgnitionem pertinere videtur, quia
cognita sunt in cognoscente secundum modum cognoscentis, et
non secundum modum rerum cognitarum, sed appetitus movet ad
res secundum modum quod in seipsis sunt, et sic per amorem
ad ipsas res quodammodo immutatur.
Sicut autem aliquis
virtosus ex habi tu. virtutis quam habet in affectu perfici tur
ad directe judicandum de. his quae ad virtutem illam per,tinent, ita quae afficitUr ad divina, accipit divinitus
rectum judicium de rebus divinis.H
3De Ver.,
affectione provenit
Joan. cap. XIV, 21:
meo, et ego diligam
Lonergan, p. 91.

XXVI, 3, ad 18: "Ex ipsa enim divinorum
manifestatio eorumdem secundum illud
Si guis diligit me, diligetur a Patre
eum, et manifestabo e1 meipsum." Cf.

4T. Philippe, "Speculation metaphysique et contemplation chretienne, II Angelicum XIV (1937)
p. 245: "Tandis
que la contemplation est pour Ie philosophe un regard, le
couronnement de toute la vie intellectuelle;
elle est pour
Ie saint llexercice Ie plus parfait, Ie plus divin de la
charite: elle nlest pas tant un regard qulune presence.
Dep(YJlsIe debut de l'.f<~glise
les saints et les mystiques
affirment par leurs ecrits et par leur vie qulune exp~rience
de Dieu est possible, que Dieu veut bien s'unir ~ nous et
nous introduire, des cette terre, dans son intimite."

188

tions mystical

writers

.

What is important
is no longer merely

being

Indeed,

is a reductio:2

the existence

of the speculative
personality.
ligious

scaffolding. ,,3

sociated

to God.,,4

because

Although

things

attains
and from

to be the activity

and involves

the whole

involves
behind

this process

a re-

rational

has been as-

of transcendental

philosophy

can sustain

lCf. Lonergan,

which

and existence,

resolutio

"it is the method

the transcendental

of one's

it is not, as a method~

even in a realist

of concrete

alone,

but the act

is "the very SOLJ_land fine art

with neo-Platonism,

flection--

process

should never be hidden

Resolution

to these systems:

activity

of God, here ceases

"The intellectual

act which

of a return

of essence

intellect

is that this

the fulfillment

the resolutive

first the co~principles
these

for us to notice

an epistemological

of one's whole being.

1

give of this experlence.

where

the loftiest

is recognized

tied
re-

an awareness

contemplation

in the world

of

p. 92.

2~.
I-II, Ill, 1, resp.: "In hoc autern ordo
rerum consistit, quod quaedam per alia in Deum reducuntur;
ut Dion. dicit in De Cael. Rier. [Po G. 3, 181-c4, #3J.
Cum
igi tur gratia ad hoc ordinetur ut homo I'educantur in Deum,
ordine quandam hoc agitur, utscilicet
quidam per alios in
Deum reducantur.ll
Cf. In II Sen~., d.ll, q.l, a.l, ad 1.
3M. D. Chenu, O. P.Is Theology a Science? trans.
Green-Armytage
(New York: Hawthorn,1959f-p~- 73 (Fr"e-nch:La
theologie est-elle une .?cience? Paris: Lib. Artberne Fayard,
1957, p. 72).
4Ibid., p.

74

(French, p.

73).

189
becoming

and time.

Aristotle,
personal
method

Although

it is Thomas

it is proper

connatural

knowledge

of God conferred

into the world

wisdom

of Christ who carne from the

and left the world to return

to him.

lChenu,

for the

by the gift of wis-

for we too have corne from the Father

tined to return

of revealed

to God,3 it is essential

It is but the following

Father,4

and

who has made it one of the most

to the supernatural

as a return

Father

in Plotinus

parts of his methodology. III As an epistemological

theology;2

dom.

it is present

Everything

to the

and are des-

that God has created

p. 74 (French, p. 73).

2Ibid., pp. 74--75: IlIn any case this 'resolution'
by virtue of its object and its method, cannot fail to be a
prototype [proc~de type] of the divinely revealed science.
Theology as a science is discursive; but to a greater extent than other sciences does it yearn for understanding.
Starting from faith, as from the understanding of God, it
does not rest until it returns there once again, bringing
with it all that it has absorbed and elaborated.
This is
resolutio ordered and guaranteed by that communion which
faith grants to it at its setting forth and which, in the
mystery, gives us 'the substance of things hoped for.'
Theolgoy, in fact, seeks the knowledge of its conclusions
only that it may the better understand its own first
principles. II (French, p. '73).
3Geiger, La Participation, p. 355 is translated
in Chenu, ibid., pp-.-73-4 as folfows: IIThis process is unusual from-another aspect: it is a journey which never quite
reaches its destination.
It is forever having to begin again, and it is never more truly itself than when it fills
us with the conviction both of its necessity and of its inevitable imperfection.
It is a road whereon we set forth
but which will never, this side of the grave, lead us to the
resting place of fulfillment and possession."
4John 16:28.
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pre-existed

from eternity

Him, both in its substance
ing;l it is through

and its intentional

the Word,

The manner
returns

in his Word, and carne forth from

of this return,

to God substantially,

according

to the teaching

power and the wisdom
come our wisdom. ,,3

likewise,

through

modes

of be-

that each returns.

however,

differs:

God's grace,

of the Word made

flesh,2

man

by living
"the

of God who by Godls own doing has beAll lower forms-.- not only sentient

IS. T. I, 56, 2, resp.: H ...sicut Augustine dj.cit,
II Super Genes1m ad Li tt ., ea quae in Verbo Dei ab aeterno
praeextiterunt dupliciter ab eo fluxerunt; uno modo, in intellectum angelicum; alio modo ut subsisterent in propriis
naturis.
In intellectum autem angelicum processerunt per
hoc quod Deus menti angelicae impr~ssit rerum similitudines
quas in esse naturali produxit.
In Verbo autem Dei ab
aeterno extiterunt non solum rationes rerum corporalium, sed
etiam rationes omnium spiritualium creaturarum.
Sic igitur
uniciuque spiritualium creaturarum a Verbo Dei impressae
sunt omnes rationes rerum omnium, tam corporalium quam spiritualium.
Ita tamen quod uniciuque angelo impressa est ratio suae speciei secundum esse naturale et intellectuale
simul, ita scilicet quod in natura suae speciei subsisteret,
et per earn se intelligeret; aliarum vero naturarum, tam'
spiritualium quam corporalium rationes sunt ei impressae secundum esse intellectuale tantum, ut videlicet per huiusmodi
species impressas, tarn creaturas corporales quam spirituales
cognosceret.H In Dion. de Div. Nom., II, 5: "Dicit ergo
primo, quod DeitaSJesuChristi-est
causa omnium, inquantum
per ipsam omnia reducuntur in esse, et est etiam adimpletiva
omnium, inquantum per ipsam omnia suis perfectionibus
replentur.H Cf. In II ~ent., d.12, q.l, a.3, ad 5.
2SCQ:. IV,

51+.

3In I Sent., prol.: HInter multas sententias quae
a diversis prodierunt, quid scilicet esset vera sapientia,
unam singulariter firmam et veram Apostolus protulit dicens
Christum Dei virtutern et Dei sapientiam, qui etiam factus
est nobis sapientia a Deo.H cr. Gilson, Wisdom and Love in
St. 'rhornasAquinas (Milwaukee: Marquette University PresS-:1951 )p-:-52, n. 12. 'rhc,;
scriptural quotation is from St.
Paul, I Corinthians 1:25 & 30.
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beings,

but even the lowliest

turn intentionally
doing,

through

non-living

substances--

man's knowledge;

since it is from Him man receives
in this fashion.l

understand

forms this manner
intentional

existence

and even a more perfect
physical

one, inasmuch

for these

is a genuine

in human knowing

lower

one: their

is actual

mode of existence
as the former

also by God's

the power to

Nevertheless,

of returning

re-

existence,

than their

is immaterial,

whereas

...,

the latter

is material.

intelligible

species

as are those through
God in man's
pendent

Rather,
things

knowledge

the known object,
potentially,

know them, infused
man's

by

is de-

it is from

of them, and this knowstate, even after

is at once the perfection

which previously

and of the knowing

1S. T. I, I0 5,

knowledge

themselves:

in him in an habitual

Human understanding

for the

which man knows them are not,

which angels

upon the sensible

ledge endures

And it l.S their. return,

through

creation.3

them that he acquires

death.4

c..

was intelligible

subject,

3, ad land

whose

of

only

power to

2.

2De Ver., XIX, 1, resp.: "Species autem in ipsa
re sensibilihabet
esse maxime materj.ale, in intellectn
autem summe spirituale ..."
3Cf. p.

4ge

190, n. 1.

Ver., XIX, 1,
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understand

is completed

the object.
achieves
terial

only through

In this actual understanding

its perfection

and attains

things are perfectly

the act of intelligence

which

which did not create

confers

the world,

God's plan his collaborator

perfectly

the universe

only through

The human

of the human

itself and luminous

through
But it is

collaborates
intellect,

to itself

with God
which

is

only by means

of

the understanding

of the world which the medievals,

profound

called the image or mirror

insight,

and in

intellect,

is, nevertheless,

world

ma-

on them that perfec-

in its completion.

true that the material

in the full development

understanding

its unification:

themselves

tion to which they are destined.

equally

actively

with

of the soul

and God.l
Thus the circle
of all things,
creatures

prepare

Spirit

to Him consciously,

in their highest

of knowledge

which culminate

But creatures

Intelligent

through

aspirations,

man for God's self-revelation

unification

as God is the origin

so is He their final goal.

return

love, which

is closed:

knowledge

and

reach toward

and

in Scripture

and the

and love in the gifts of the Holy

after death

in the Beatific

Vision.

below man, who come forth from God no l~ss

lAndre Hayen, llIntentionnalite de l'etre et
metaphysique de la participation,ll Revue Neoscolastique
philosophie (Louvain) (1939) tome 42, p. 401.

de
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than he, also return
power

is activated

to God through

by knowing

they exist more perfectly
redeemed

through

his knowledge
is redeemed:
brought

man, whose

them and in whose

than in themselves.

the Word made flesh,

of it expressed
in being brought

intellectual
knowledge
As man is

so, with man, through

in human words,

the universe

to its final end, it is also

back to its source.l

IHayen,

"Intentionnalite

•... " pp.

408-9.

CONCLUSION
The purpose
the meaning
writings

of resolution

as an intellectual

of Thomas Aquinas.

for him a variety
ways in which

of meanings

tradition

technique

method

We have discovered

in the

that it has

due in part to the differing
by his predecessors.l

it was understood

the Aristotelian
logical

of this study has been to investigate

it was primarily

by which the mind moved

In

an epistemo-

from the complex

>

and posterior

to the simple and prior; because

does this in several
ferent

different

situations,

there are dif-

types of resolution.
In simple apprehension,

material

composite

acquired,

back to the sensible

(the sensible
likeness),

achieved

thing of which

hence judgment

through

Furthermore,

or bend back upon itself,

or division

to what is prior
is the intelligible

reduction

to the senses

this reduction

is

in order to know that its con-

through

senses a.ctually perceived,

f'_.

the species

so

from what is P03-

species)

through

reflexion;

cept was apprehended

IC

a movement

(the intentional

is also a resolution.

the concept

from its composition

thing--

from the

thus abstraction

But in evaluating

the mind moves

in being

the mind moves

to its simple quiddity;

is a sort of resolution.

terior

the mind

abstraction

the mind must

from what th~
"retrace

and the certitude

- 9 - 2-::>
a b ove, pp. .1
.J'
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its steps"

of its knowledge
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is assured

through

self-reflection,

thing present

in sensation,

presentation,

is consciously

reflective

reflexion

the truth value
reflective

but also the manner
grasped.l

described

resolution

to see why resolution

equated.

Likewise,

initially)

logical

the conclusion

resolution

the

is judged by resolution
causes,

effect.

from posterior

whereas

Here again
effect

to

cause.
In the Neo-platonic

couplets,
cause,

posterior/prior,

primary

connotations

tradition,

however,

composite/simple,

had chiefly ontological

temological

ipsum,

causes.

nevertheless,

which are the epistemological

we see a reflective

(at least

is from the onto-

effect,

is the epistemological

only in

came to be

to th9ir prior

process

Since

it is not

the mind moves

in fact, the movement

of the reasoning

to principles

prior

effects

cause to the ontological

conclusion

is known

and reflection

in reasoning

from posterior

Even later when,

2

I, 9.

a !1thinking back over",

difficult

of its

Thus we have the

in De yeritate

of abstractive

resolution,

in which not only the

connotations,

were also present.

was not reflection--

a thinking

the three

and effect!
though

epis-

What was

back over-- but

IDe Pot_., VII, 9, resp.: " ...reflec ti tur supra se
intelLLgens se intelligere et modum quo intelligit."
2Cf. above,

pp.

70-78.
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return~really

a going back.

When man was considered

a spirit trapped

returning

was indeed

and return
readily

in alien matter,

self-reflection,

were equivalent

be reconciled

terms.

material

hand, the Christian
to return

created

of

But this view cannot
faith,

for which

To man so understood,

world is no alien prison

to his development

the method

so that reflection

with the Christian

man is both spirit and matter.

to be

but the place

for him by God.

1

the

suitable

On the other

longs no less than the Neo-platonist

to the source

of his being;

the Neo-platonic

way will not serve his need, but the way that does

serve

lConrad Pepler, O. P. in The Basis of the
Mysticism of St. Thomas (The AquinaS-Society
of London,
Aquinas PaperNo.- 21: Blackfriar's Publications, 1953) p. 17
cites the French biblical scholar Claude Tresmontant as
follows: "From the Platonic point of view contemplation and
love consist in a man's elevating himself, leaving the
sensible and reaching out to the archetype of which the
sensible creature is the image.
In the biblical tradition
contemplation is also an ascent from the sensible creature
which is a word.
But the difference between the two contemplations comes from the different approach to the sensible creation.
Plato and Plotinus had to 'run away.'
On
the contrary, biblical contemplation assumes the sensible
and the particular.
It progresses by passing through
them ..." (Essai sur la Pensee Hebraique, Paris: Editions
du Cerf, Lection Divinal~
66)
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will quite naturally
lution.1

What seems to us unique

which he integrated
thought,
worked

be correlated

in Thomas

these different

out their mutual

to demonstration

which

a predicate

containing

subject,

re80-

is the way in

traditions

and guided by his lived experience

in his own

au a Christian,

implications.2

As a discursive

wherein

with reflective

activity

"unfolds

resolution

from within

is contrary

a deduction

is drawn by way of analysis
since that predicate

from a

is part of the

lIn God and the Unconscious
(Chicago: H. Regnery,
o. P. comments: "The Absolute
Good of Plato was indeed humanly impractable and unattainable.
But now the Christian Revelation showed that in a
sense Plato had been fundamentally right} even if for the
wrong reasons.
For the Absolute Good is no impersonal Idea,
no mere principle of intelligibility
or ultimate aim of
movement and desire (as for Greek speculation generally)
but the living God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, the Father
of the Lord Jesus Christ.
"So the Summa of St. Thomas begins by affirming
what at the beg~nning of his Ethics Aristotle had been
forced to deny: the attainability 'o-fman I s true and last end
and bliss and completion."
And Chenu, in his Introduction,
explains how the Aristotelian St. Thomas adopted the Neoplatonic resolutio, pp. 160-69 (English, pp. 188-98).

1953), p. lOIl, Victor White,

2Pepler, p. Ill: "[ St. Thomas] transformed the
platonic ideas and incorporated them in his immense and
noble synthesis, and it would be foolish to deny that the
platonic tradition made its own vital contribution to his
thought.
But Dr. Jaeger has argued that Aristotle perfected and completed rather than contradicted the platonic
intuitions; and if we followed this line of thought it might
be shown that St. Thomas developed what Aristotle had begun
in bringing down the ideal and the abstract into the concrete, and that he was guided thereto by living the life of
the Word Incarnate."
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Subject."l
starts

Resolution

I'lovesin the opposite

from the contents

their necessary
which render

prerequisites,

in actual
what makes

in deduction.

of a complex

through

completely

It is, in the
which

of objects,

thought,

re-possesses

them one and is led on even to the contemplation

of being."3

It is a method

simple

of discovery

than that of syllogistic

it can be expressed
movement

to

flln this case, the process

sense, a resolutio

possession

and works backward

is :cevealed something

from what is implied

strict technical

is more

wherein

it

that is, to the conditions

them intelligible.2

is one of reductio,
different

of a subject

direction:

in a syllogistic

of the mind

this dialectic,

which

is more direct

and of proof which
reasoning,4

form.

though

Actually,

and concentrated:

the
in

stands at the summit of a metaphysics

of participation,

we reach

the point at which human intel-

ligence

formally

as inte11ect

rather

functions
than reason

(ratio).5

Regrettably

(intellectus)
for our purposes

IChenu, Introduction, p. 160 (English~
La Theologie, p. 7O-CEngiish, p. 72).
2Chenu,

La Theologie,

p.

70 (English,

p. 188) Cf.
p.

72).

3Ibid.

Chenu,

4Rabeau, p. 214 (Cf. the English translation in
Towards Understanding
St. T~omas, p. 189, p. 42).

5Chenu,
Cf. La Theologie,

Introduction, p. 153 (English,
p. 70 (English, p. 72).

p. 180)
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here, Thomas
cription

did not leave us a careful

of resolutions'

modes

the case of syllogistic

and detailed

of operation,

deduction.

itl are sufficient

made regarding
that Thomas

was clearly

Our examination
Thomas

to justify

of the different

theme of a return

logical,

epistemological,

particular

case.

resolution

which moves

universal

nature

begins

instances

of our knowing

composite

the nature

participation
be a twofold

upon the

to the

speaking,

as

of that nature.

and the agent intellect

there must likewise

on the one

depending

which may be seen, logically

singular

in which

with an abstractive

from some sensible

we have seen, a created
Hence

senses

variations

or ontological

Human knowing

the source

the sensible

and originality.

to f-_vh_e
!:?_o_u_r_c_e_.
The latter may be

the source of all the singular
However,

the assertion

has led us to conclude

that, in his mind, all are analogous
central

he has

metaphysics.2

of a reflexive

uses ther term resolution

he did make use

remarks

aware of its nature

It is the source and method

as he did in

However,

of it, as we have seen, and the scattered

des-

is twofold:
(which is, as

in Uncreated
return:

Truth).

thr'ough a

lChenu,

Introduction, p. 160, n. 1 (English; p.
In Boeth de Trin., q.6, a.l, c, ad
3am q. (pp. 211-12 in the Decker-edition)
as the main text
in which Thomas defines resolution.

188, n. 41) indicates

2Ib'

~.,

,

p. 160 (English, p. 189); Rabeau, p. 214.
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reflexive
tellect

called reduction

resolutl

recognize~

reflection,

~]e

takin~

external

account

it recognizes

itself

that it is in conformity
knowledge
Thomas

whatsoever,

the internal

depends
insists

intellects

source.

his understanding

on this point:

However,

Himself

Thus

intellect,

for all

"in any intellect

ways:

is its own

intelligible

by dif-

since the divine

intel-

the understanding

of

of his essence

are

Since the essence

and all other things

The angelic

it assures

this is achieved

and the understanding

and perfectly

self-

on self-.knowledge.

in different

one and the same act.2

the in-

as a knowing

with reality,

lect is its own act of understanding,

solutely

and through

the first thing that is understood

act of understanding. "I
ferent

source,

of its own nature

power,

genuine

to the senses

of God is ab-

in itself,

God knows

3

as well by his own essence.

on the other hand,

is not its own

l~.
I, 87, 3, resp.: "Hoc igitur est primum
quod de intellectu intelligitur, scilicet ipsum eius intelligere.
Sed circa hoc diversi intellectus diversimode
se habent.
Est enim aliquis intellectus, scilicet divinus, qui est ipsum suum intelligere.
Et sic in Deo idem
est quod intelligat se intelligere, et quod intelligat suam
essentiam, quia sua essentia est suum intelligere."
21bid.
3Ibid., I, resp.: flEssentia igi tur Dei, quae est
actus, purus et' perfectus, est simpliciter et perfecte, secundum seipsam intelligibilis.
Unde Deus per suam es-.
sentiam non solum seipsum, sed etiam omnia intelligit."
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act of understanding,
the angelic
himself

things

intelligible

of which

but not other things;

species.

These,

rather

than acquired

is known to it initially

object

for this he

however,

they are the likeness.2

is not the initial

of that act is

an angel is able to understand

are already

from the

Likewise,

is not its own act of understanding;

own essence

thing.

the first object

Hence,

with his nature,

intellect

what

essence.l

by his essence,

requires
present

though

the human

further,

its

of its understanding:

is the nature

of some material

But it does not know that it knows that thing until

(by reflection)
perfection

it knows that it is a knowing

is the act of understanding.3

power whose

That is, it knows

lIbid., 3, resp.: "Est autem alius intellectus,
scilicet angelicus, qui non est suum intelligere, ...sed tamen primum obiectum sui intelligere est eius essentia.
Unde
etsi aliud sit in angelo, secundum rationem, quod intelligat
se intelligere, et quod intelligat suam essentiam, tamen
simul et uno actu utrumque intelligit; quia hoc quod est intelligere suam essential, est propria perfectio suae essentiae, simul autem et uno actu intelligitur res cum sua perfectione."
2Ibid., 1, resp.: "Angeli autem essentia est quidem in genere intelligibilium ut actus, non tamen ut actus
purus neque completus.
Unde eius intelligere non completur
per essentiam suam; etsi enim per essentiam suam se intelligat angelus, tamen non omnia potest per essentiam suam
cognoscere, sed cogniscit alia a se per eorum similitudines."
3Ibid., 3, resp.: "Est autem alius intellectus,
scilicet humanus, qui nee est suum intelligere, nee suum
intelligere est obiectum primum ipsa eius essentia, sed
aliquid extrinsecum, scilicet natura materialis rei.
Et
ideo quod primo cognoscitur ab intellectu humano, est
huiusmodi obiectum; et secundario cognoscitur ipse actus
quo cognoscitur obiectum; et per actum cognoscitur ipse
intellectus, cuius est perfectio ipsum intelligere."
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itself,

not by its essence,

it is only by knowing
other things;

but by its act,l

jts act that it knows that it knows

thus in all cases it is by understanding

very act of understanding

that other things

and the act of' understanding
understood,
rather

meaning

Inasmuch

as our initial

of all sensible
vestigates

of time but

and extrinsic,
reflecting
things,

of anything

reasoning

to deepen

is
it,

them to their
both the

and the causal principles,
of sensible

effects.

on the existential

discovers

its properties

knowledge

The latter include

of knowledge,

wisdom,

a priority

by resolving

the first principles.

both intrinsic
physical

we require

our conclusions

first principles

are understood,

may be said to be the "first"

not necessarily

far from comprehensive,

source,

the

of importance.2

a priority

and evaluate

Nevertheless,

Meta-

situation

being as such and in-

which are common to all the beings

lIbid., 1, resp.: "Intellectus autem humanus se
habet in genere rerum intelligibilium ut ens in potentia
tantum, sicut et materia prima se habet en genere rerum sensibilium, unde 'possibilis' nominatur.
Sic igitur in sua
essentia consideratus, se habet ut potentia intelligens.
Unde ex se ipso habet virtutem ut intelligat, non autem ut
intelligatur, nisi secundum id quod fit actu ... Sed quia
connaturale est intellectui nostro secundum statum praesentis vitae, quod ad materialia et sensibilia respiciat, ...
consequens est ut sic seipsum intelligat intellectus noster,
secundum quod fit actu per species ... Non ergo per essentiam
suam, sed per actum suum se cognoscit intellectus noster,"
2Ibid.,

3, resp.: cf. p. 200, n.

1 above.
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we experience

directly;

here we move fro~ the multiciplicity

of many kinds of beings
them are composites

to a sort of uniJy

of essence

and ~sse.

I

insofar
Through

as all of
further

I

reflection,
extrinsic

metaphysics

we can return

wisdom

with

lIS

cannot fulfill ourselves
return

teaches

to God through

of creation

cannot

the exilstence of the

I

cause of their being,l
Christian

whole

discovers

living

us we ~eed

not stop here;

faitJ, bringing

the

intentionally,

IISince withou.t

intellectuallY,'

and without

to its Creator.

Finally,

t'his return

it we

us it

of all

i

things
Vision,
cluded

to God through

man is completed

id the Beatifi.c

where man knows and loves all thJngS,

himself

in-

I

in the eternal

exemplars.3

The l~tter are the divine

I

i

lChenu, Towards Understanding
St. Thomas, pp. 18990: "The entire dialectics of essence andi-existence-- the
t~o distinct from one a~ot~er in c~e~ted ~eing, ~hence arlses the latter's ontologlcal deflclency; one wlth the
other in God Who is ~._,-Ipsum Esse
[Being Its1elfJ-unravels
----~
according to the technique and within th~ atmosphere of
~"esolutio. ~

I

2In Meta., prooem.: "Omnes autem scientiae et
artes ordinantur in unum, scilicet ad hom1inis perfectionem,
quae est ejus beatitudo."

i

3S. T. I, 84, 5, resp.:Cum ergo quaeritur utrum
anima humana in rationibus aeternis omnia; cognoscat, di.cendum est quod aliquid in aliquo dicitu~ cognosci dupliciter.
Uno modo, sicut in obiecto cognit~; sicut aliquis
videt in speculo ea quorum imagice s in sp1eculo re suI tant .
Et hoc modo anima in statu praes' tis vit~e non potest
videre omnia in rationibus aeter~ls; sed ~ic in rationibus
aeternis cognoscunt omnia beati, qui Deu~ vident et omnia
in ipso."
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ideas:

the various

ways which the divine

intellect,

con-

I

sidering

the di;ine es~;ence, "devises"
l

imitated.
created
cause,

Thus the intelligible

in time pre-exist
and are derived

may subsist.

exemPlJrs

eternally

impresses

intellects

abled to understand.
the understood

flrst

them ls intelligible
I

so that the latter

are en-

Thus both the power to understand

species

who also maintains

of all things

from Him as creatu!res so that they

He likewise

on created

it can be

in Hi1m, their

-

species

i~ which

are received

.

and preserves

and specles together.2

As Thomas

by creatures

I

the eXisrence
indicates

and

from God,

of power

in the text

I

I

just referred
understand

to, God gives both our natural

and additional

power,

beyond

I

power to

that to which

our

I
I

IDe Ver., III, 2, ad 6: "Una prima forma, ad quam
omnia reducuntur, est ipsa essentia divina secundum se
considerata; ex cujus consideratione divinus intellectus
adinvenit, ut ita dicam, diversos modos ifuitationis ipsius,
in quibus plurali tas idearum con~:;isti
t .If

i

2S. T. I, 105,3,
resp.: IlSimiliter cum ipse sit
primum ens,-er-omnia entia praeexistant in ipso sicut in
prima causa, oportet quod sint in eo intelligibiliter
secundum modum eius .. Sicut enim omnes ratibnes rerum intelligibiles primo existunt in Deo, et ab eolderivantur in
alios intellectus, ut actu intelligant; s~c etiam derivantur in creaturas, ut subsistant.
Sic igitur Deus movet intellectum inquantum dat ei virtutem ad inielligendum, vel
naturalem vel superadditam; et inquantum imprimit ei species
intelligibiles:
et utrumque tenet et conservat in esse."

205

nature

entitles

natural

us, enabling

power i~ unable

love for us.
perfected

These

to g:asp, becausJ

include

by charity,2

us to know ~hings

our own

of His bountiful

:

the light of ~aith,l

which

is

I

and the gifts of the Holy Spirit.3

Since the being that each thing has in it~elf

comes from

I

the divine

essence

as its exemplar,4

to that same divine
over, inasmuch

essence

it is fitting

all things arl reduced.

as all cr~ated

thing~

that
More-

havel as their exemplars
I

the divine

ideas, they come from God's se~f-reflection,5

and it is especially
to Him through

fitting

reflection,

I

that all should be brought

back

I

and be known at last in knowing
I
I
I

I

IDe Anima V, ad 6: "Ulterius autem cum posuerimus
intellectum-agentem
esse quamdam virtutemlparticipatam
in
animabus nostris, velut lumen quoddam: necesse est ponere
aliam causam exteriorem a qua illud lumen participetur:
et
hanc dicimus Deum, qui interius docet, in quantum hujusmodi
lumen animae infundit; et supra.hujusmodij lumen naturale,
addit pro suo beneplacito copiosus lumen ad cognoscendum
ea ad quae naturalis ratio attingere non potest; sicut est
lumen fidei, ..."
2Cf. above,

p.

182.

3

Cf. S. T. I-II, 68, 5: II-II,

resp:--

.

8, 1; In Boeth.

I

-

Trin.

I, 2,

habet

4SCG I, 66, #9: "Esse etiam cuiuslibet rei quod
in seipso, est ab ea exemplariter deductum."
I

5De Ver.,

III, 2, ad 6: cf. p.

~04, n.

1 above.

de
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"'I

Him.

Here knowing

ing is His being,
fully

satisfied

contemplating

and being are unified~
and the longing

in knowing

the divine

in Him whose

I

of the human

everything

heart

know-

is

mos~ truly through

I

essence.

I

Clearly,

no mere Aristotelian2

could have conceived
only a Christian,

~or Neo-platonist3

of such a unificatiol

having

been taught

the Word of God, could bring

and fulfillment:

his ~rue destiny
I

about the integration

that was best in both traditions.

by

of all

In ordlr to do this

I
lIn I Sent., d.19, q.5, a.l, so[.: tlUtroque autem
veritas, scilicet intellectus et rei, reducitur sicut in
primum principium, in ipsum Deum~ quia suhm esse est causa
omnis esse, et suum intelligere est causal omnis cognitionis.
Et ideo ipse est prima veritas, sieut et brimum ens: unumquoque enim ita se habet ad veritatem sieht ad esse, ...Et
inde est quod prima causa essendi est pri~a causa veritatis
et maxime vera; se ilicet Deus ...tl

I

2Chenu, Towards Understanding St. Thomas, p. 190:
"We see, then, to.how great a~ extent thefGod of.Aristotle
and the God of Salnt Thomas dlffer from one another as regards both the technical approach to themi and the degree of
thei.r spiritualness.
This is due to the fact that the
Aristotelian proof, concluding to the existence of a prime
mover, ontologically segregated from all the rest, differs
from the Thomistic way which leads on to ~psum Esse SubsistensWhom
the existence of things, by the very facr-of
their deficiency, reveals as present.tl

I

3Pepler, p. 16: "It is ... one of the most im.pressive aspects of St. Thomas! genius that he distinguished
without separating-- while the Platonic sbstem always tended
to separate with the result tbat the finai stage of reascent
to the Godhead became one of identifj.catibn or absorption
or pantheism.tl
I
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and original
whose

thinker.

Christian

tellectual

But even more,

commitment

he needed

to be a man

was more than a matter

assent to the dogmas

of faith:2

of in-

one to whom

I

being a Christian

in as deep and complete

sible was the central
was such a man.

purpose

I

a sense as pos-

of life.3

Thomas Aquinas

He knew very well that, Ithough God is,

indeed, both the source and the goal of all intelligibility
and understanding

as He is of being,

thiJ truth does us but

I
!

._-------------

Ipepler, p. 14: "These tvvo greJt streams [Platonism and Aristotelianism]
converged in Ithe thought and
experience of St. Thomas to provide him with the principles
that integrated his grasp of the whole mdvement of love from
the first flutterings of natural desire to its soaring
flight s in the union of the lover vJith the divine Beloved. Il
2Ibid., p. 16:' "St, Thomas disJingUiSheS the intellectual and volitional elements in fa:iJthfrom the rest of
the work of sanctification of the soul; but that should help
the mind of man to grasp more comPletely,1 as an integrated
part of the way of salvation, what Our Lord meant by faith,
a faith that included trust and love as w,ell. Faith gathers
all the aspects of truth into a single w~ole, and the faith
of the gospel gathers the three theologidal virtues into a
single act of a complete man, and the com1plete man is
gathered by the body of Christ in the Euc~arist into the
whole body of Christ on earth ...H
I

I

3Ibid., p. 15: HIt is against the background of
the sacred mystery which remains inviolab:ly in the world
that St. Thomas I whole theology is workedl out.
It is not
something that may be ravished by the int[llect of man
alone; there is not some hidden secret which the chosen
few who receive special illumination can ~ttain through an
experience beyond faith ... Wisdom, underst anding and knowledge are the perfection of faith through the working of
the Holy Spirit who dwells with greater and greater intensity of life in the Christi.an l'v-ho
is being sanctified. H

'

l

I
I

, I
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minimal

good without

our personal

consent

..
opera t.lon exerclsed

1"
f'd
l'f
1
ln ~lvlng
1 _e~l~Y.

internal

in the depths

resolution

"seeks out the immediate
effectiveness

and active

This involves

an

of man'~ will, which

end of its acts IbY virtue

of a supreme

co-

end, with the ~esult

of the

that the

I
particular

goods it pursues

this all-encompassing

willing

The least action performed
good is laden-zation--

take on thei1 value

that leads us to happiness ...

in pursuit

of ~ome particular

in its intelligibleness

with the very will urging

the absolute,,,2

from within

This volitional

and in its reali-

I

us on to the pursuit

resolutibn

.

I

supports

of

and

I

facilitates
faith:

the intellectual

"the faith begins

weakenss;

in multiplicity

which

bn

occurs

account

for he has to begin with many ...aritcles

creed and dogmas.

in
of man's

of the

But as he grows in the grace of God,

these are seen to belong
God. ,,3

resolution

to the One Truthl

1,ivj.ng, as he did, by Jesus'

the Word of

I

Spir!it in loving

fi-

I
I

IHayen, p. 215 and 216: HC' est-a~dire q~.!eDieu me
cr~e vr~iment moi, qu'il fait que j'exist~ vraim~nt et que
ce soit vraiment moi "qui existe, qui exerbe, moi, mon acte
d'exister pour toujours, C'est-a-dire quelme creer, c'est
me faire exister activement, dans une nature vraiment
mienne, c'est me faire cooperer
rna prop~e creation, par
mon consentement, conscient et libre, &p~rticiper
~ la
r~alit~
absolue de Dieu ....1,lexercice cobcret de ce consentement s'exprimant dans Ie temps, c'esi precisement Ie
mouvement de la reflexion."

a

I

2Chenu, Towards

3 Pepler, p, 15.

Understanding

St, Thomas,

p. 189,
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delity

to the truth WhlCh he knew to be no mere abstract

concept,

I

but the very Son of God, his Redeemer,

a far deeper

insight

an uncommitted
Because

into that all-encomJasSing

thinker,

however

brillianJ

he lived this resolution,

tegrate

in his ePisCe~olog~

of resolution

which

discerned.

The ontological

as a whole,

and in intelligent

(both physically
source

and justification

as an intellectual

method

could ever gain.l

.,

it, was able to inand metaphysics

earlie~

resoJution

thinkers

had

at work in creation

creatures

and intentionally)

than

1

and so grasping

those aspects

Truth

he was able reflectively

to grasp its nature,2
and harmonize

gave Thomas

~n a twofold

thus lppears

ior the centrali~y

way

as the

of resolution

I

in his PhilOSOPiYO

I

I

lChenu, Towards Understanding
St. Thomas, p. 166:
"Nothing would be more deceiving and nothing more intellectually perverse than to move among the~e theological
texts, and not all the while maintain onekelf under the
secret communicative action of the work of God and as under
the spell of contemplation.
The rationallstructure
of
these texts can be the same; the light that promotes them
has first placed our minds vIi thin another world. "

I

2Chenu, ibid., p. 189 comments that "the entire
beginning of the 1a-11ae (q. 1 and 2) is
pointed illustration "of the reduction vIithin the human will, and it
has been pointed out by many commentator's that the plan of
the whole Summa illustrates both the begimning of creatures
in God and their return again to Him.1:

a

I

I
I
I
.
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As human understanding

activity

mode

the resolution

proper

steps
and
The third

to judgment,

which Thomas
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"reduction

of the two-fold

sense experience

to the senses":
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and intellectual
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activity.
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which the knowledge
The fourth
reasoning:
perience,

instance
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principles
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reasoning
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physics

reduces

through

resolution

beings.

technique,

is dependent
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of a process
as either

of
im-

to these first principles.
investigates

to being

to a unity

(ens) and the first cause of

however,

functions,

the way in which meta-

of the sciences

even metaphysical
the existence

Accordingly,

beyond metaphysics

resolution

of a first

chapter

six fol-

into the realm of faith,

not as an epistemological

but as an existential

from whom man has come through
The conclusion

to

to which all human thinking

for it attains

where resolution

proper

from sense ex-

when it is perceived

cause, but not its nature.
lows Thomas

the resolution

structure

the plurality

For Thomas,

is incomplete,

to the way in

The truth of the conclusion

is established

to the

the type of reduction

its content

of intelligibility

is

from the senses.

studies

the latter derives

Whatever

or indirectly,

corresponds

was derived

chapter

an explicit

pilgrimage

back to the God

creation.

of this study is that Thomas'

doctrine

,

of resolution

is a synthesis

of an Aristotelian

epistemo-

logical

procedure

carried

out under the influence

basic meaning
return

wit}l the Neoplatonic

of resolution

to the source, which

knowledge

united
cluded,

of his Christian

from Thomas
includes

are finally

to God in eternity,
in their creative

is always

The

that of a
of our

All the specific

integrated

when man, being

knows all ~hings,
source.

faith.

both the sources

and the source of our being.

types of resolution

way of salvation,
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